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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs. 
RICHARD W. WRIGHT 
Defendant/ Appellant 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
SUPREME COURT NUMBER 
39483 
CLERK'S RECORD 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE HONORABLE JOHN T. MITCHELL, PRESIDING JUDGE 
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, PRESIDING 
MR. RICHARD K. KUCK 
ATTORNEY 
PO BOX 1320 
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83816-1320 
MR. LAWRENCE WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
700 W JEFFERSON, STE 210 
BOISE, ID 83720 
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Date: 1/27/2012 
Time: 09:58 AM 
Page 1 of 4 
First Judicial District Court- Kootenai County 
ROAReport 
Case: CR-2009-0025609 Current Judge: Penny E. Friedlander 
Defendant: Wright, Richard William 
State of Idaho vs. Richard William Wright 
Date Code User 
1/4/2010 HRSC DANDERSON Hearing Scheduled (Pre-Trial 
Conference/Arraignment 01/19/2010 08:30AM) 
DANDERSON Notice of Pretrial Conference 
1/19/2010 ARRN HAMILTON Hearing result for Pre-Trial 
Conference/Arraignment held on 01/19/2010 
08:30AM: Arraignment I First Appearance 
PLEA HAMILTON A Plea is entered for charge: - NG (149-1301 
Accident-Leaving the Scene or Failing to Stop for 
Damage Accident) 
INFO HAMILTON Information To Defendant 
1/20/2010 ADMR HOFFMAN Administrative assignment of Judge 
HRSC HOFFMAN Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial Scheduled 
03/01/2010 01:00 PM) 
HOFFMAN Notice of Trial 
STRS HOFFMAN Speedy Trial Limit Satisfied 
2/1/2010 SUBF COCHRAN Subpoena Return/found--Joshua Leyk--1 /28/10 
SUBF COCHRAN Subpoena Return/found--Patrick S 
Meehan--1/28/10 
2/5/2010 SUBF CRUMPACKER Subpoena Return/found 2/2/1 0 Timothy J Dewitt 
SUBF CRUMPACKER Subpoena Return/found 2/2/1 0 Donald J 
Blanchard 
3/1/2010 WHJD BIELEC Withheld Judgment Entered (149-1301 
Accident-Leaving the Scene or Failing to Stop for 
Damage Accident) 
SNPF BIELEC Sentenced To Pay Fine 
STAT BIELEC Case status changed: closed pending clerk 
action 
PLEA BURRINGTON A Plea is entered for charge: - GT (149-1301 
Accident-Leaving the Scene or Failing to Stop for 
Damage Accident) 
SNIC BURRINGTON Sentenced To Incarceration (149-1301 
Accident-Leaving the Scene or Failing to Stop for 
Damage Accident) Confinement terms: 
PROB BURRINGTON Probation Ordered (149-1301 Accident-Leaving 
the Scene or Failing to Stop for Damage 
Accident) Probation term: 1 year. (Unsupervised) 
JDMT BURRINGTON Judgment 
DPHR STONE Hearing result for Court Trial Scheduled held on 
03/01/2010 01:00PM: Disposition With Hearing 
3/12/2010 MEMR MCCANDLESS Memorandum Of Restitution 
3/25/2010 BNDC BIELEC Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 14053 Dated 
3/25/2010 for 156.34) 
3/30/2010 CJOR DARNELL Civil Judgment And Order For Restitution 
User: MCCANDLESS 
Judge 
To Be Assigned 
To Be Assigned 
Robert B. Burton 
Robert B. Burton 
Robert B. Burton 
Penny E. Friedlander 
Penny E. Friedlander 
Penny E. Friedlander 
Penny E. Friedlander 
Penny E. Friedlander 
Penny E. Friedlander 
Penny E. Friedlander 
Penny E. Friedlander 
Penny E. Friedlander 
Penny E. Friedlander 
Penny E. Friedlander 
Penny E. Friedlander 
Penny E. Friedlander 
Penny E. Friedlander 
Penny E. Friedlander 
Penny E. Friedlander 
Penny E. Friedlander 
Penny E. Friedlander 
Penny E. Friedlander 
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Date: 1/27/2012 First Judicial District Court- Kootenai County User: MCCANDLESS 
Time: 09:58 AM ROAReport 
Page 2 of4 Case: CR-2009-0025609 Current Judge: Penny E. Friedlander 
Defendant: Wright, Richard William 
State of Idaho vs. Richard William Wright 
Date Code User Judge 
4/8/2010 HRSC STONE Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/17/2010 11:00 Penny E. Friedlander 
AM) motion to stay 
STAT STONE Case status changed: Reopened Penny E. Friedlander 
4/9/2010 APDC OREILLY Appeal Filed In District Court Penny E. Friedlander 
ADMR OREILLY Administrative assignment of Judge John T. Mitchell 
4/12/2010 EST I CAMPBELL Estimate Of Transcript Costs ($260.00 to be paid John T. Mitchell 
by Defendant) 
4/15/2010 HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Stay 06/01/2010 John T. Mitchell 
03:30 PM) Kuck 
4/19/2010 WPLC MCCANDLESS Kootenai County Work Program Letter Of John T. Mitchell 
Completion 
4/27/2010 BNDV OREILLY Bond Converted (Receipt number 18940 dated John T. Mitchell 
4/27/2010 amount 156.34) 
BNDC OREILLY Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 18941 Dated John T. Mitchell 
4/27/2010 for 260.00) 
5/17/2010 NOTH OREILLY Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
MOTN OREILLY Motion For Stay Of Judgment During Appeal John T. Mitchell 
5/24/2010 NLTR CAMPBELL Notice of Lodging Transcript - Trial John T. Mitchell 
LODG CAMPBELL Lodged - Transcript - Trial John T. Mitchell I·· 
BNDV CAMPBELL Bond Converted {Transaction number 1272 dated John T. Mitchell 
5/24/201 0 amount 211.00) 
BNDV CAMPBELL Bond Converted {Transaction number 1273 dated John T. Mitchell 
5/24/2010 amount 49.00) 
5/25/2010 RECT BROWN Receipt Of Transcript - Trial John T. Mitchell 
RECT MCCANDLESS Receipt Of Transcript-Richard Kuck John T. Mitchell 
6/1/2010 INHD CARROLL Hearing result for Motion to Stay held on John T. Mitchell 
06/01/2010 03:30PM: Interim Hearing Held 
Kuck 
ORDR CARROLL Order to Stay and Arrest Judgment During John T. Mitchell 
Appeal 
6/17/2010 HRVC STONE Hearing result for Motion held on 06/17/2010 Penny E. Friedlander 
11:00 AM: Hearing Vacated motion to stay 
--Cook 10 minutes 
6/22/2010 NOTS CAMPBELL Notice Of Settling Transcript On Appeal and John T. Mitchell 
Briefing Schedule 
7/28/2010 PETN MCCANDLESS Petitioner's Opening Brief John T. Mitchell 
8/12/2010 MEMO MCCANDLESS Memorandum Opposing Appellant's Opening John T. Mitchell 
Brief 
9/15/2010 BRFR MCCANDLESS Appellant's Reply Brief John T. Mitchell 
3/1/2011 HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal John T. Mitchell 
05/10/2011 04:00PM) 
CLAUSEN Notice of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
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Date: 1/27/2012 
Time: 09:58 AM 
Page 3 of4 
First Judicial District Court- Kootenai County 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2009-0025609 Current Judge: Penny E. Friedlander 
Defendant: Wright, Richard William 
User: MCCANDLESS 
State of Idaho vs. Richard William Wright 
Date 
5/10/2011 
5/11/2011 
5/16/2011 
5/18/2011 
6/1/2011 
6/15/2011 
6/22/2011 
6/23/2011 
6/30/2011 
7/5/2011 
7/6/2011 
7/20/2011 
7/28/2011 
8/4/2011 
8/15/2011 
10/4/2011 
Code 
HRHD 
DCHH 
ORDR 
STAT 
HRSC 
STAT 
PETN 
MEMO 
MOTN 
NOHG 
MEMS 
DENY 
STAT 
STAT 
ORDR 
MOTN 
MEMO 
HRSC 
STAT 
STAT 
NOHG 
HRSC 
STAT 
NOHG 
DENY 
User 
ROHRBACH 
ROHRBACH 
CLAUSEN 
MEYER 
STONE 
STONE 
Judge 
Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal held John T. Mitchell 
on 05/10/2011 04:00 PM: Hearing Held 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Julie Foland 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 
John T. Mitchell 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Appeal John T. Mitchell 
Case status changed (batch process) 
Hearing Scheduled (Rule 35 06/30/2011 09:00 Penny E. Friedlander 
AM) Modify Conditions of the Withheld --Kuck 15 
minutes 
Case status changed: Reopened 
MCCANDLESS Petition for Re Hearing 
Penny E. Friedlander 
Penny E. Friedlander 
MCCANDLESS Memorandum in Support of Petition for Hearing Penny E. Friedlander 
BROWN Motion Top Modify Terms Of Withheld Judgment Penny E. Friedlander 
BROWN Notice Of Hearing Penny E. Friedlander 
MCCANDLESS Corrected Memorandum In Support Of Petition Penny E. Friedlander 
for Rehearing 
LARSEN Hearing result for Rule 35 scheduled on Penny E. Friedlander 
06/30/2011 09:00AM: Motion Denied Modify 
LARSEN 
DUBE 
STONE 
OREILLY 
OREILLY 
STONE 
STONE 
STONE 
Conditions of the Withheld --Kuck 15 minutes 
Case status changed: closed pending clerk 
action 
Case status changed (batch process) 
Order Denying Rule 35 Motion 
Motion For Reconsideration 
Memorandum In Support Of Motion For 
Reconsideration 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Reconsider 
10/04/2011 10:00 AM) --KUCK 
Case status changed: Reopened 
Case status changed: closed pending clerk 
action 
MCCANDLESS Notice Of Hearing 
CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/11/2011 02:30 
PM) for Rehearing; Kuck; 1/2 Hour 
CLAUSEN Case status changed: Reopened 
MCCANDLESS Notice Of Hearing 
STONE Hearing result for Motion to Reconsider 
scheduled on 10/04/2011 10:00 AM: Motion 
Denied --KUCK 
Penny E. Friedlander 
Penny E. Friedlander 
Penny E. Friedlander 
Penny E. Friedlander 
Penny E. Friedlander 
Penny E. Friedlander 
Penny E. Friedlander 
Penny E. Friedlander 
John T. Mitchell 
Penny E. Friedlander 
Penny E. Friedlander 
Penny E. Friedlander 
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Date: 1/27/2012 
Time: 09:58 AM 
Page 4 of4 
First Judicial District Court- Kootenai County 
ROAReport 
Case: CR-2009-0025609 Current Judge: Penny E. Friedlander 
Defendant: Wright, Richard William 
User: MCCANDLESS 
State of Idaho vs. Richard William Wright 
Date Code User Judge 
10/11/2011 HRHD ROHRBACH Hearing result for Motion scheduled on John T. Mitchell 
10/11/2011 02:30 PM: Hearing Held for 
Rehearing; Kuck; 1/2 Hour- denied 
DCHH ROHRBACH District Court Hearing Held John T. Mitchell 
Court Reporter: Julie Foland 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 
10/12/2011 FILE POOLE New File Created #2 Penny E. Friedlander 
10/14/2011 ORDR STONE Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration Penny E. Friedlander 
10/17/2011 ORDR CLAUSEN Order Denying Defendant's Petition for John T. Mitchell 
Rehearing 
10/17/2011 STAT MEYER Case status changed (batch process) 
11/23/2011 BNDC LYONS Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 48684 Dated Penny E. Friedlander 
11/23/2011 for 1 00 .00) 
STAT LYONS Case status changed: Closed pending clerk Penny E. Friedlander 
action 
APSC MCCANDLESS Appealed To The Supreme Court Penny E. Friedlander 
11/29/2011 REMT CLAUSEN Remittitur (Motion to Reconsider) John T. Mitchell 
12/5/2011 HRSC ROHRBACH Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 01/18/2012 Penny E. Friedlander 
01:00PM) 
STAT ROHRBACH Case status changed: Reopened Penny E. Friedlander 
ROHRBACH Notice of Hearing Penny E. Friedlander 
1/3/2012 NAPL MCCANDLESS Notice Of Appeal Due Date From Supreme Court Penny E. Friedlander 
1/18/2012 HRHD ZANETTI Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on Penny E. Friedlander 
01/18/2012 01:00PM: Hearing Held 
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JqlQTENAI COUNTY Contract City of 
e • ~HAYDEN 0 FERNAN 0 OTHER_ SHERIFF'S DEPT. o DALTON GARD. o HUETTER ~DISTRICT _'3~1 __ _ 
IDAHO UNIFORM CITATION 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 1ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) COMPLAINT AND SUMMONS 
vs. ) 
<.O \N~ \<":JHT ) 
0 LastName ) 
D Infraction Citation 
.,......, OR 
~ Misdemeanor Citation 
M ) D Accident Involved 
o:::t R. \ CH Aitt> w I L L.l ~ ) 
N First Name , Middle Initial D Companion Citation 
/') ,0 q "\ ~/'--...q Attached I~# t-f'\ 0 · c;l--) :--l USDOT TK Census#---------
~perator D Class A D Class B D Class C ~Class D D Other ___ --=-------=,.---
0 GVWR 26001 + D 16 + Persons D Placard Hazardous Materials DR# 'QIII.- 3 0 S'8 5 
Home Address '" £ • Az..Vrs RD. fiiWOt!N. JD 3~J"3S"' 
Business Address I 01{ tJ, 'f11.( C1"T'{ r€'Jt.k. Gttf.c. Phone #8/8 -763, 
THE UNDERSIGNED OFFICER (PARTY) HEREBY CERTIFIES AND SAYS: 
nds, and believe the above-named Defendant, 
DL or SS# State J D Sex:M M D F 
Height S'&c H Wt. '2...1 '() Hair G.-12:='1' Eyes BUt\ DOB  
Veh. Lie.# /<3b7S'I£ State IP Yr. of Vehicle 9 b Make .....:_J=->~fef......_,__ _ _ 
Model t;Uhtlp Ctlfltd IClf€ Color .SLI\c.-K · 
Did commit the following act(s) on L '2 I I R 20 ~ at 7'. ~$"" o'clock _A_ M. 
Via. #1 LC1WIN6 m£ .5<.-F-IV£ a£ '12, I'JoJ 
p~ .../.-... o.t' J"'Ll._ _ Code Section 
r '""rn<T1- vrrrrrFit;€ C&/tstl 
Vio.#2 
~ tii Location N I"T"A X C.t>vEfrNI"'It.ErJ-r w~ 11ftA(/)b./ 
a: H M KOOTENAI 5 u: rtliil•'i ~. ~- LHK. '2..1fl;y \t Dae ~ .Qfficer/Party Serial #/Address 
\ZA LJjo1 vt.r. t'. M-i:iif:th=N 2'3'-fi 
Date Witnessing Officer Serial #/Address 
THE STATE OF IDAHO TO THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT 
Code Section 
County, Idaho. (<_c::.sp 
K Dept. 
c..S,t> 
Dept. 
You are hereby summoned to appear before the Clerk of the Magistrate's Court of the 
District Court of KOOTENAI County COEUR D'ALENE Idaho, 
located at 324 W. GARDEN on the {;"/H day of 
J ~vAR..'( , 20· I o , at I: "3 b o'clock _2_ M 
I acknowledge receipt of this summons and I promi 
w 
I hereby certify service upon the defendant personally on---------· 20 __ 
Officer 
NOTICE: See reverse side of your copy for PENALTY and COMPLIANCE instructions. 
COURT COPY VIOLATION #1 
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Court Minutes: 
Session: BURTON011910A 
Session Date: 01/19/2010 
Judge: Burton, Robert 
Reporter: 
Clerk(s): Hamilton, Emily 
State Attorney(s): 
Green, Robert 
Shulsen, Jessica 
Public Defender(s): 
Prob. Officer(s): 
Court interpreter(s): 
Case ID: 0002 
01/19/2010 
09:53:12 
09:53:12 
Case number: CR2009-25609 
Plaintiff: 
Plaintiff Attorney: 
Defendant: WRJGHT, IUCff..ARD 
Pers. Attorney: 
Co-Defendant( s ): 
State Attorney: Shulsen, Jessica 
Public Defender: 
Recording Started: 
Case called 
Division: MAG 
Session Time: 08:30 
09:53:21 Judge: Burton, Robert 
ARRAIGNMENT/PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE 
Court Minutes Session: BURTON01191 OA 
Courtroom: Courtroo 11 
Page 3, ... 
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09:53:24 DF IS PRESENT, 
09:53:31 State Attorney: Shulsen, Jessica 
NOT GUILTY PLEA 
09:53:54 . NO OFFER MADE TODAY 
09:54:01 300 FINE AND RESTITUTION, HE HIT A SPEEDING 
SIGN 
09:54:32 AMEND TO 49-1304 
09:54:41 Judge: Burton, Robert 
REVIEWS 49-1304 DOES NOT INCLUDE DL SUSPENSION 
09:54:54 Defendant: WRIGHT, RICHARD 
NOTGUILTY, TRIAL BY JUDGE ONLY 
09:55:09 Judge: Burton, Robert 
108 N 4TH ST SUITE ONE CDA !D 83814 
09:55:36 Defendant: WRIGHT, RICHARD 
YES 
09:55:45 Stop recording 
Court Minutes Session: BURTON01191 OA Page4, ... 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
INFORMATION TO DEFENDANT R. c...~'c'"""'j w 'r-\s ~ -l CASE# o 9 ~ 3 DS'8' r-
CHARGE leavivcs s~en'€ C>r£ Pr-ofe·rlsy Ae.-eld-ent 
A. You have the right to: 
1. Enter a plea of guilty, or enter a plea of not guilty in which event, it will be continued to a day 
certain for your trial, or 
2. Request a delay before entering a plea. 
B. You have the following constitutional rights relating to this charge: 
1. To represent yourself in court. 
2. To engage counsel-the court can appoint one for you if you are indigent-and to be represented 
by counsel at all stages of any proceedings against you. 
3. To a reasonable delay if you desire to engage counsel. 
4. To see, hear and question all witnesses who testify against you and to have witnesses you may 
desire compelled to come to court at no expense to you. 
5. To testify or to not testify in your behalf at trial. 
6. To trial by a six-man jury or you may give up this right and be tried by a magistrate only. 
7. To require the State to prove the allegations of the complaint beyond a reasonable doubt. 
8. To appeal to the District Court within forty-two days by filing a written notice of appeal with the 
magistrate if you are convicted in a magistrate court. 
C. If you enter a plea of guilty to the charge, you will give up all of your rights set out above, except the 
right to counsel and appeal. A guilty plea will have the same force and effect as a judgment of the court 
and will constitute a record of conviction. 
D. If you are convicted of a traffic misdemeanor at trial, or if you enter a plea of guilty to a traffic wisde-
meanor, a record of conviction will be sent to the Idaho Dept. of Transportation or to the state where 
you are licensed to drive to become a part of your driving record. 
E. The maximum penalty which can be imposed by the court for misdemeanor offenses, which includes 
traffic matters, would be a fine of $5,000.00 or imprisonment in the county jail for one year, or a combi-
nation of both fine and imprisonment. However, most misdemeanors carry a maximum penalty of 
$1000.00 or imprisonment in the county jail for six months or a combination of both fine and imprison-
ment. 
F. If you are not a citizen of the United States, it is possible that the entry of a guilty plea could have 
immigration consequences of deportation, inability to obtain legal status, or denial of United States 
citizenship. 
APPEARANCE AND ENTRY OF PLEA 
I, the undersigned, do hereby enter my appearance on the offense charged in the complaint referred to above. I 
acknowledge receipt of all of the information relating to my rights set out above and: 
[ ] I hereby plead guilty to the offense charged. 
pd I hereby plead not guilty to the offense charged, and request: 
[ ] Trial by six-person jury £><1 Trial by judge only 
Richard W. Wright 39483 9 of 183
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Court Minutes: 
Session: FRIEDLAN030110P 
Session Date: 03/01/201 0 
Judge: Friedlander, Penny 
Reporter: 
Clerk(s): Stone, Emma 
State Attorney(s): 
Nixon, A~tTIY 
Reierson, James 
Public Defender(s): 
Prob. Officer(s): 
Court interpreter(s): 
Case ID: 0010 
Case number: CR2009-25609 
Plaintiff: 
Plaintiff Attorney: 
Defenda.'1t: WRIGHT, RICHARD 
Pers. Attorney: 
Co-Defendant(s): 
State Attorney: Reierson, James 
Public Defender: 
Division: MAG 
Session Time: 11 :33 
Previous audio and annotations can be found in case: 0009 
03/01/2010 
14:47:54 
Recording Started: 
14:47:54 
Case recalled 
14:48:00 Defendant: WRIGHT, RICHARD 
Court Minutes Session: FRIEDLAN03011 OP 
Courtroom: Courtroom7 
Page 25, ... 
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14:48:09 
14:48:13 
14:48:38 
14:49:12 
14:49:54 
14:50:12 
14:51:48 
REVIEWED THE POLICE REPORT READY 
State Attorney: Reierson, James 
CALLS WITNESS 
Add Ins: CLERK 
SWEARS IN WITNESS 
Add Ins: BLANCHARD, DONALD 
STATES NAME. 12/18/09. I WAS SOUTH BOUND ON GOVT 
WA Y.l WAS WITH TIM DEWITT. 
BEFORE 8AM APPROACHING NEDA EAST OF GOVERNMENT. 
DRAWS A DIAGRAM 
SOUTH BOUND BEHIND A JEEP CHEORKE. BLACK GRAND 
CHEROKE, IT WAS CLEAR OUT AND 
THERE WAS NO ONE BETWEEN UP. THERE WERE CARS 
GOTI'-lG NORTH BOilliD. 8-10 CAR 
14:52:13 LINKS. I SAW NO BRAKE LIGHTS MAYBE 30MPH NO 
SIGNAL. MADE A LEFT TURN THE JEEP 
14:52:47 DRIFTED. THE ROADS WERE VERY ICY. STRIKE A 
STREET SIGN. IT WENT INTO THE 
14:53:15 SWELL NEVER BRAKED. SNOW BURROW. STANDARD STREET 
SIGN. HE KNOCKED THE SIGN 
14:53:49 DOWN.HEMISSEDTHETREE. WAYNEANDNEDA THERE 
IS A LIGHT. HE MADE A LEFT 
14:54:22 TURN I9 MADE TIM TURN LEFT SO I COULD GET THE 
LICENSE PLATE NUMBER. WE WENT 
14:54:40 DOWN GOVERNMENT. THE JEEP PASSED IN FRONT OF US. 
AT WAYNE AND CENT A. THE JEEP 
14:55:11 CONTINUED TO PRAIRE AVE AND I RECORDED THE 
NUMBER., HE ROLLED THE 
14:55:28 INTERSECTION Al'ID TURNED EAST ON PRAIRE. FRONT/ 
REAR BUMPER. TIM HIT THE HORN 
14:55:57 HE DIDNT TURN HIS HEAD. I GOT THE LICENSE PLATE 
NUMBER AND RECORDED IT IN MY 
14:56:30 PHONE. I CALLED DISPATCH WHEN I WAS AT WORK. I 
ONLY SAW A DRIVER. I HAD A 
14:57:02 VIEW FROM THE CORNER. I SAW A HAIR LINE,. IT 
APPEARED TO BE A MALE. LATE 40S 
14:57:22 EARLY 50S I DIDNT SEE HIS FACE. 7:55AM. I CALLED 
LAW ENFORCEMENT FROM MY SHOP 
14:57:50 5 MINUTES AFTER 8. I ONLY WENT BACK TO THE SHOP 
DID NT PASS THE SIGN. 8-10 CAR 
14:58:32 LINKS BACK. 25 MPH AT THAT POINT 
14:59:18 TIM DIDNT HIT THE HORN UNTIL PRAIRE. THE RIGHT 
SIDE FENDER AND FRONT DOOR. 
Court Minutes Session: FRIEDLAN03011 OP Page 26, ... 
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14:59:59 KOOTENAI COUNTY STATE OF IDAHO. I CALLED THE 
DISPATCH. I DESCRIBED WHAT WE 
15:00:36 SAW. THE OFFICERS CAME 1 1/2-2 HOURS LATER 
15:00:58 State Attorney: Reierson, James 
CALLS WITNESS 
15:01:01 Add Ins: CLERK 
SWEARS IN WITNESS 
15:01:09 Add Ins: DEWITT, TIMOTHY 
STATES NAME. 12/18/09 I RECALL. I WAS A DRIVER 
BEHIND A JEEP CHEROKE. I KNOW 
15:01:51 THAT AREA FROM THE DIAGRAM. THE ROADS WERE ICY. 
I WAS UNDER THE SPEED LIMIT. 
15:02:17 IWAS DRIVING AND OLDSMOBILE 1988. MRBLANCHARD 
WAS MY PASSENGER. THE DRIVER 
15:02:46 OF THE JEEP CUT THE CORNER THE JEEP WENT SIDE 
WAYS I SUPRISED IT DIDNT ROL .. 
15:03:12 IT NEVER SLOWED DOWN. I THOUGHT HE WOULD AT 
LEAST COME TO A STOP. 3-4FT INTO 
15:03:36 THE PARKWAY AND WENT BACK ON THE STREET. I 
SLOWED DOWN. IT GO BACK ON THE 
15:04:02 ROAD AND WENT TO WAYNE DRIVE AND MADE A QUICK 
RIGHT. I DIDNT SEE ANY BRAKE 
15:04:17 LIGHTS. I WENT DOWN TO THE NEXT STREET. PRBABLY 
20-30 FT TO THE STOP SIGN. I 
15:04:43 LOOKED INTO THE JEEP. I SAW ON PERSON. I GOT A 
PROFILE. IT WAS A MAN. TURNED 
15:05:08 ON TO WIND ST. HE DID A ROLL AND STOP. NEVER 
CAME TO A COMPLETE STOP 
15:05:52 Defendant: WRIGHT, RICHARD 
NO QUESTIONS 
15:05:57 State Attorney: Reierson, James 
CALLS WITNESS 
15:06:01 Add Ins: CLERK 
SWEARS IN WITNESS 
15:06:12 Add Ins: MEEHAN, PATRICK 
STATES NAME. KOOTENAI COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPT 8 
YRS, I RECALL 12/18/10 I WAS A 
15:06:58 TRAINING OFFICER DEPT LEYK. HE WAS TRAINING. HE 
HAD GONE TO ACADEMY. PHASE ON 
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15:07:22 E 5 WEEKS THERE ARE 3 OTHER PHASES. THEN 
CERTIFIED., I WAS OPERATING OUT OF 
15:07:46 THE SAME VEHICLE, BREIFING AT 8:30AM IT DEPENDS. 
BREIFING FINISHED ABOUT 
15:08:06 8:45AM. I WAS DISPATCHED TO A MECHANIC SHOP. I 
MADE CONTACT WITH MR. DEWITT 
15:08:29 AND BLANCHARD. I HAD A LICENSE PLATE ON THE 
JEEP. RICHARD WRIGHT WE WENT TO 
15:08:52 HIS HOUSE AND CONTACTED HIS WIFE. WE WENT TO THE 
SCENE FIRST. THERE WERE 
15:09:19 MARKS WHERE A CAR WENT OVER. SIGN WAS BROKEN. 
COVERING FROM THE VEHICLE ON 
15:09:42 THEGROUND WE LOADED THE PIECES INTO OUR CAR AND 
CALLED TO HAVE THE SIGNED 
15:10:02 REPAIRED. THERE WAS AN UNIAMOUS PERSON CALLED AS 
WELL. APPROX 20-25 MINUTES. 
15:10:36 TOOK PICTURPS .AJ'-JD PICI<£D lJP Pi\.RTS. 66 ALVIS ll'~ 
EMERALD ESTATES, MR WRIGHT'S 
15:11:00 WIFE WAS HOME. WE EXPLAINED TO HER WE WERE 
TRYING TO CONTACT HIM ABOUT AN 
15:11:22 ACCIENT. SHE HAD A CELL PHONE SHE CALLED HER 
HUSBAND WITHIN 2FT FROM HER. I 
15:11:39 HEARD A CLEAR MALE VOICE. I SPOKE WITH MR., 
WRIGHT THAT MORNING .. I HEARD HIM 
15:13:26 TELL HIS WIFE HE SLIDE AND HIT A SIGN AND HE WAS 
OKAY. SHE WAS VERY CONCERNED 
15:13:50 FOR HER HUSBAND. DEPT LEYK TALKED TO HIM ON THE 
PHONE. 10 MINUTES AT THE 
15:14:23 HOUSE WENT TO MR. WRIGHT'S BUSINESS. GET MORE 
INFORMATION AND ISSUE A 
15:14:40 CITATION. COFFEE SHOP 4TH AND SHERMAN. I SAW A 
JEEP CHEROKE. I JUST DRIVE 
15:15:19 TIME 10-15 MINUTES. THE JEEP HAD SOME MINOR 
DAMAGE TO THE FRONT TO REAR TIRE. 
15:15:38 THE PARTS WE FOUND MATCHED. IDENTICALLY MATCHES. 
DEPT LEYK SPOKE WITH MR. 
15:16:16 WRIGHT. HAYDEN IDAHO. KOOTENAI COUNTY. 
15:16:39 Defendant: WRIGHT, RICHARD 
ex 
15:16:53 Add Ins: MEEHAN, PATRICK 
I HEARD THE CONVERSATION. MRS. WRIGHT ASKED IF 
YOU WERE IN AN ACCIDENT AND IF 
15:17:10 YOU WERE OK. YOU STATED YOU WERE IN AN ACCIDENT 
AND YOU WERE OK 
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15: 17:32 State Attorney: Reierson, James 
CALLS WITNESS 
15:17:44 Add Ins: CLERK 
SWEARS IN WITNESS 
15:17:57 Add Ins: LEYK,JOSHUA 
STATES NAME. KOOTENAI COUNTY. 6-8 MONTHS. 
SEATTLE POLICE DEPT. FINISHED THE 
15:18:44 ACADEMEY AND I AM IN PARSE 3. 12/18/09 I WAS IN 
PHASE ONE TRAINING WITH 
15:19:13 OFFICER MEEHAN. IN THE SAME VEHICLE. I WAS 
DRIVING. NORMAL FOR TRAINING. SAME 
15:19:35 BREIFING AS DEPT MEEHAN. I WAS NOTIFIED THROUGH 
DISPATCH ABOUT THE WRIGHT 
15:20:10 HOME. ONE PERSON AT THE HOME IN UNIFORM KNOCKED 
Al"-ID RANG THE DOOR BELL. SHE 
15:20:26 WAS CONFUSED WHY WE WERE THERE. SHE WAS 
SURPRISED HER HUSBAND WAS IN AN 
15:20:45 ACCIDENT. NOTIFIED IT WAS HER HUSBAND VEHICLE. I 
OBSERVED HER WITH A CELPHONE 
15:21:12 I TOOK HER CELL PHONE. I WAS WITHIN 2FT OF HER. 
I HEARD A MALE VOICE. I WENT 
15:21:41 TO A BUSINESS DOWNTOWN AND MET A MALE. SAME 
VOICE AS THE MALE VOICE FROM THE 
15:22:01 CELLL PHONE. THE MALE TOLD HIS WIFE HE SLIDE ON 
THE ICE AND HIT A SIGN AND 
15:22:18 KNOCKED IT DOWN. HE HAD A REGRETFUL DEMAN OR. HE 
STATED HE WAS FINE. 1-2 
15:22:57 MINUTES. I ASKED TO SPEAK TO HIM THE LADY HANDED 
ME HER CELL PHONE IT WAS ON. 
15:23:16 I IDENTIFIED MYSELF. I CO!'WIIlivffiD THE PERSON WAS 
MR. WRIGHT. I ASKED HIM I 
15:23:41 ASKED ABOUT THE JEEP CHEROKE, I STATED MY 
PURPOSE. HIS VEHICLE WAS IN AN 
15:23:58 ACCIDENT. HE STATED HE WAS IN AN ACCIDENT. HE 
SAID HE WAS OKAY. MR, WRIGHT 
15:24:31 TOLD ME HAD SLIPPED ON THE ICE AND HIT A TRAFFIC 
SIGN. HE WAS AWARE OF THE 
15:24:49 SIGN AND PLANNED ON TURNNING IT IN. OVER THE 
PHONE. I ADVISED HIM HE IS 
15:25:16 REQUIRED TO IMMEDIATELY NOTIFY LAW ENFORCEMENT. 
I FOUND OUT WHERE HE WAS 
15:25:39 WORKING. HIS WIFE WAS REIEVED HE WASNTHURT. 
TRAVELED TO 4TH AND SHERMAN IN A 
15:26:04 MARK VEHICLE. PARKED BEHIND THE JEEP. SAW A JEEP 
Court Minutes Session: FRIEDLAN03011 OP Page 29, ... 
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CHEROKE IT HAD THE SAME 
15:26:33 LICENSE PLATE NUMBER THAT WAS GIVEN TO DISPATCH. 
K367845. IT WAS PARKED IN A 
15:27:20 SLOT IN THE ALLEY THERE WAS MINOR DAMAGE ON THE 
PASSENGER SIDE. IT WAS A 
15:27:52 PLACE OF BUSINESS HE HAD 1-2 VISITOR I SPOKE 
WITH MR. WRIGHT. POINTS OUT THE 
15:28:13 DEFENDANT. SAME GENTLEMAN AT SHERMAN BUSINESS. 
SAME VOICE 
15:28:34 Defendant: WRIGHT, RICHARD 
OBJ 
15:28:47 Judge: Friedlander, Penny 
OVERRULED 
15:28:54 Add Ins: LEYK, JOSHUA 
I IDENTIFIED MYSELF AND MY PURPOSE FOR BEING 
THERE. HE DIDNT SEEM SURPRISED 
15:29:33 TO SEE ME. HE WAS DOING SOMETHING WITH HIS TIL. 
DEPT MEEHAN WAS THERE. I CANT 
15:30:01 RECALL WHAT I SAID. I ASKED HIM TO EXPLAIN THE 
ACCIDENT IN GREATER DETAIL, I 
15:30:22 DONT BELIEVE I REFERRED TO THE PHONE CALL. I AM 
SURE HE ACKNOWLEDGE AS THE DE 
15:30:59 OPT HE SPOKE WITH. MR. WRIGHT DENIED ANY 
INVOLVEMENT. HE STATED HE WAS TOLD 
15:31:18 HIS VEHICLE WAS IN AN ACCIDENT. HE WOULDNT SAY 
WHO TOLD HIM. WE QUESTIONED 
15:31 :44 HIM ABOUT THE DRIVER. HEW ANTED TO REMAIN 
SLIENT. NO ONE WAS IN THE VEHICLE. 
15:32:20 SOUTH BOLTJ'ID ON GOVT. 
15:32:53 Defendant: WRIGHT, RICHARD 
ex 
15:33:02 Add Ins: LEYK, JOSHUA 
THE PERSON ON THE PHONE TOLD ME HE HAD BEEN IN 
THE ACCIDENT. I DIDNT HAVE A 
15:33:28 VIDEO PHONE. APART FROM THE VERBAL 
IDENTIFICATION NO 
15:33:58 Judge: Friedlander, Penny 
EXCUSES WITNESS 
15:34:03 State Attorney: Reierson, James 
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STATE RESTS 
15:34:22 Defendant: WRIGHT, RICHARD 
STATE VAILD TO PROVE I WAS THE SUBJECT DRIVING. 
15:34:47 Judge: Friedlander, Penny 
MR. BLANCHARD STATED ONE MALE. MR. DEWITT SAW 
ONE PERSON. DEPT MEEHAN AND 
15:35:25 DEPT LEYK TESIFIED THEY WERE AT THE HOME AND 
IDENTIFIED THE VEHICLE, YOUR 
15:35:50 WIFE CALLED TO SEE IF YOU WERE OK. SLIP ON THE 
ICE BUT YOU WERE OK. DEPT LEYK 
15:36:14 TOOK THE PHONE AND SPOKE WITH A MAN MR WRIGHT 
WHO CONFIRMED HE SLIPPED ON THE 
15:36:38 ICE. DENY YOU DIRECT VERDICT 
15:37:12 Defendant: WPJGHT, PJCP ..ARD 
RECALL DEPT LEYK 
15:37:27 Add Ins: LEYK, JOSHUA 
STILL UNDER OATH. THE WIFE WAS UPSET AT THE 
TIME. I WOULD ASSUME SO. HE TOLD 
15:38:49 ME HE WASNT THE ONE DRIVING THE VEHICLE. I ASKED 
WHO WAS DRIVING THE 
15:39:09 VEHICLE. SOME ONE ELSE COULD HAVE BEEN DRIVING. 
NO PHOTO LINE UP. THERE WERE 
15:39:45 OTHER EMPLOYEES 
15:40:02 State Attorney: Reierson, James 
ex 
15:40:07 Add Ins: LEYK, JOSHUA 
I DIDNT FEEL A NEED FOR A PHOTO LINE UP. ONLY 
ONE PERSON DRIVING 
15:40:59 Defendant: WRIGHT, RICHARD 
NOTHING FURTHER 
15:41:10 State Attorney: Reierson, James 
NO REBUTTAL 
15:41:13 12118/09 MR. DEWITT AND MR. BLANCHARD SAW A JEEP 
CHEROKE. THEY SAW THE 
15:41:50 VEHICLE HIT THE SIGN. WENTDOWNTONETAAND 
WAYNE AND MADE A RIGHT TURN WITH 
15:42:10 OUT A COMPLETE STOP. NORTH BOUND CARS, CAR 
TURNED IN FRONT OF THEM. ROADS 
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15:42:30 WEREVERY ICY. MADE A LEFT HAND TURN ON CETA AND 
WAYNE SAW THE VEHICLE PASS 
15:42:50 THE. DRIVER HIT THE HORN AND THE JEEP MADE A 
ROLLING TURN AT PRAIRE. THEY 
15:43:08 WENTBACK TO THEIR SHOP. MR. BLANCHARD GOT THE 
LICENSE PLATE NUMBER AND CALLED 
15:43:27 DISPATCH. MR. MEEHAN AND MR, LEYK WENT TO THE 
SCENE. MR. BLANCHARD AND MR. 
15:43:56 DEWITT SAID NO EFFORT TO STOP MADE. JEEP DIDNT 
MAKE A COMPLETE STOP. 
15:44:18 TESTIMONY OF THE DEPT. THEY SPOKE WITH THE WIFE 
OF MR. DEWITT. SHE CALLED HER 
15:44:43 HUSBAND AND BOTH DEPT HEAR A C;LEAR VOICE THAT 
THE MALE WAS OK HE SLIDE AND 
15:45:03 HIT A SIGN. MR. LEYK TOOK THE PHONE AND SPOKE 
WITH MR. WRIGHT. HE SLIPPED HIT 
15:45:34 THE SIGN AND WASNT I-L~lUJED. ONCE ON SHERiv1Al'.J THE 
OFFICERS SAW A JEEP CHEROKE. 
15:45:58 BUSINESS OF MR. WRIGHT. MATCHED THE DAMAGE AS 
THE SAME JEEP CHEROKE. THEY 
15:46:24 WENT INTO SPEAK WITH MR. WRIGHT. THE VOICE WAS 
THE SAME SOUNDING VOUCE FROM 
15:46:48 THE PHONE. STATE BELIEVES THEY HAVE MET THE 
ELEMENTS MR WRIGHT WAS THE 
15:47:17 DRIVER. UNLESS HE WAS THE UNIAMOUS DRIVER. 
REQUEST A GUILTY VERDICT 
15:47:40 Defendant: WRIGHT, RICHARD 
NOT DENYING THAT THE VEHICLE WAS MINE IN THE 
ACCIDENT THE TWO WITNESSES 
15:48:05 WERENT ABLE TO IDENTIFY THE DRIVER, THE DEPT 
DIDNT IDENTIFY THE DRIVER. MR. 
15:48:34 LEYK WASNT SURE IF IT STATED THAT THE VEHICLE 
WAS IN AN ACCIDENT AND I AM OK. 
15:48:56 I WAS CLAMING DOWN MY WIFE. AND I WOULD HAVE 
EXPLAINED TO HER LATER. THERE 
15:49:20 WAS A STATEMENT BY THE DEFENDANT STATING HE 
WASNT INVOLVED. THERE IS NOT 
15:49:40 ENOUGH EVIDENCE 100 %THE DEFENDANT WAS DRIVING 
THE VEHICLE 
15:50:08 Judge: Friedlander, Penny 
MR. BLANCHARD AND MR. DEWITT WERE DRIVING SOUTH 
BOUND. THEY OBSERVED A BLACK 
15:50:37 GRAND CHEROKE. TURNING ON NETA AND HIT A SPEED 
LIMIT SIGN AND BREAKING IT 
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15:51:04 
15:51:30 
15:51:58 
15:52:19 
15:52:44 
15:53:16 
15:53:39 
15:54:10 
1 C .c A .,..,'7 
l.J • .J'T.~ I 
15:54:54 
15:55:17 
15:55:34 
15:55:58 
15:56:20 
15:57:17 
15:57:42 
15:58:06 
15:58:24 
15:58:30 
15:58:51 
15:58:59 
15:59:22 
DOWN. ICY CONDITIONS. LICENSE NUMBER WAS 
OBTAINED BY MR. BLANCHARD. AND 
CALLED LAW ENFORCMENT. THE COURT FINDS MR. 
DEWITT AND MR. BLANCHARD STATED 
SINGLE MAN IN THE VEHICLE. DEPT MEEHAN AND DEPT 
LEYK IDENTIFIED THE LICENSE 
NUMBER AND WENT TO THE HOME. AND MADE CONTACT 
WITH A WOMEN WHO WAS IDENTIFIED 
AS THE DEFENDANT'S WIFE. THE DEPT WENT TO THE 
SCENE.A SIGN WAS BROKEN SOME 
FRAGMENTS FROM A BLACK VEHICLE THEY TOOK WITH 
THEM. WOMEN MADE A CELL PHONE 
CALL HEARD A MALE VOICE. NO ONE TESTIFIED THE 
EXACT WORDS. REASONABLE VIEW 
SHE WAS CALLING HER HUSBAND. DEPT LEYK PICKED UP 
THE CELL PHONE AND SPOKE 
WITJI THE SAlvffi PERSON. DEPT LEYK TESTIFIED TP~ T 
HE CONFIRMED THE VOICE AS 
RICHARD WRIGHT. HE STATED HE WAS IN AN ACCIDENT 
AND WAS OK. HE SAID HE 
SLIPPED ON THE ICE AND HIT A SIGN AND WAS GOING 
TO REPORT IT., DEPT MET MR. 
WRIGHT AT HIS PLACE OF BUSINESS. SAW THE JEEP/. 
LICENSE AND DESCRIBTION 
MATCHED HE DENIED ANY INVOLVEMENT. BEYOND A 
REASONABLEDOUBTTHESTATEPROVED 
THEIR CASE. FINDING OF GUILT. WITNESSES WERE 
CONSIST ANT. COURT FINDS BEYONDS 
A REASONABLE DOUBT IT WAS MR WRIGHT. I FIND FOR 
THE STATE. 
Defendant: WRIGHT, RICHARD 
REQUEST TIME TO CONSULT WITH AN A TTY TO APPEAL. 
Judge: Friedlander, Penny 
I WILL SET THE DISPO. 
YOU WILL RECIEVE NOTICE 
State Attorney: Reierson, James 
THE STATE HAS NO PRIOR CRIMINAL HISTORY. 
ENTITLED TO A WITHHELD JDMT. REQUEST 
A SENTENCING 
RECOMMENDING SUSPENDED JAIL AND SLP. WOULD LIKE 
TO COMPLETE THIS 
NO NEED FOR DELAY 
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15:59:58 
16:00:36 
16:00:57 
16:01:42 
16:02:05 
16:02:14 
16:03:15 
16:03:49 
16:04:42 
16:04:58 
16:05:05 
16:06:10 
16:06:37 
16:07:22 
16:07:52 
16:08:32 
16:08:41 
16:09:40 
Judge: Friedlander, Penny 
ACCIDENT WAS NOT REPORTED 
REVIEWS WITHHELD JDMT 
I WOULD PLACE YOU ON UNSUPERVISED PROBATION. 
I WOULD BE INCLINED TO WITHHOLD JDMT 
Defendant: WRIGHT, RICHARD 
I WILL GO FORWARD 
State Attorney: Reierson, James 
STANDARD MISD 180/175 DAYS JAIL CAN DO THE DAYS 
ON SLP 40 HRS REST OF THE 
SIGN REQUEST THAT BE LEFT OPEN. NO FINE. 1 YR 
UNSUP PROBATION. NO PRIOR 
CRIMINAL HISTORY. HE BECAMED CONCERNED. MEETS 
THE GOALS OF SENTENCING 
Defendant: WRIGHT, RICHARD 
I WOULD LIKE THE COURT TO WITHHOLD JDMT 
Add Ins: CLERK 
SWEARS IN DEFENDANT 
Defendant: WRIGHT, RICHARD 
NO PRIOR CONVICTIONS. NOTHING FURTHER 
Judge: Friedlander, Penny 
WITHHOLD JDMT. PAY FINE WITHIN 30 DAYS. LEAVE 
THE RESTITUTION OPEN FOR 30 
DAYS. I WILL ORDER THE REST UNLESS YOU OBJECT TO 
IT. THEY MUST SERVE YOU THE 
~yJtEMO OF RESTITUTION YOU HAVE 14 DAYS TO OBJECT 
TO THE RESTITUTION. COMPLETE 
16HRS ON THE SLP BY 5/1110. 1 YR UNSUP PROBATION 
WITH CONDITIONS. 
Defendant: WRIGHT, RICHARD 
ACCEPT SERVICE BY MAIL 
ACCEPT WITHHELD JDMT 
Stop recording 
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Court Minutes: 
Session: FRIEDLAN030110P 
Session Date: 03/01/2010 
Judge: Friedlander, Penny 
Reporter: 
Clerk(s): Stone, Emma 
State Attorney(s): 
Nixon, Amy 
Reierson, James 
Public Defender(s): 
Prob. Officer(s): 
Court interpreter(s): 
Case ID: 0009 
Case number: CR2009-25609 
Plaintiff: 
Plaintiff Attorney: 
Defendant WRIGHT, RICHARD 
Pers. Attorney: 
Co-Defendant(s): 
State Attorney: Reierson, James 
Public Defender: 
Division: MAG 
Session Time: 11 :33 
Previous audio and annotations can be found in case: 0007 
Additional audio and annotations can be found in case: 0010. 
03/0112010 
14:34:46 
Recording Started: 
14:34:46 
Case recalled 
Court Minutes Session: FRIEDLAN03011 OP 
Courtroom: Courtroom7 
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14:34:54 Add Ins: TRIAL, COURT 
14:34:55 State Attorney: Reierson, James 
14:34:59 Defendant: WRIGHT, RICHARD 
14:35:15 Judge: Friedlander, Penny 
THERE WAS A TRAFFIC SESSION. YOU WERE ADVISED OF 
RIGHTS 
14:35:26 Defendant: WRIGHT, RICHARD 
THA TS CORRECT. SOUGHT COURT TRIAL 
14:35:33 AT THE PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE WE FILED A MOTION 
w1TH THE STATE 
14:36:34 State Attorney: Reierson, James 
THERE IS SOMETHING FROM 1118/10. 
14:36:46 Defendant: WRIGHT, RICHARD 
I RECIEVED NOTHING 
14:37:18 State Attorney: Reierson, James 
THE DOC THAT MR. WRIGHT GAVE US HAS THE INTIALS 
FROM THE LEGAL ASSISTANT. 
14:37:38 THERE WERE THINGS REQUESTEDHEDONTHAVE. 
NOTHING IN THE FILE. I DIDNT 
14:37:52 RECIEVE ANY CALLS FROM MR. WRIGHT. THE POLICE 
REPORT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO 
i4:38:09 HIM 
14:38:16 Judge: Friedlander, Penny 
THE FORM OF DISCOVERY NEEDS TO FILED. THE 
REQUEST MUST BE UN WRITING WITH THE 
14:38:43 ORIGINAL DOCMENT. YOU DIDNT CONFORM TO THE IDAHO 
CODE. YOUR STATEMENT IS 
14:39:20 UNTIMELY 
14:40:01 Defendant: WRIGHT, RICHARD 
I WISH TO REVIEW THAT 
14:40:13 Stop recording 
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F'IRST JliDICL's1 '1ISTRICT COURT, STATEOF' IDAHO, c-- TY OF KOOTENAI 
324 W. GARDE .\'E\'UE, P.O. BOX 9000, COEUR D'ALE~ _ WAHO 83816-9000 
STATE OF IDAHO V 
RICHARD WILLIAM 'WRIGHT 
66EALVIS RD 
HAYDEN, ID 83835 CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
ID ~~ ~ AGENCY: HAYDEN POLICE DEPT B '" ~ PFfY 
CASE# CR-2009-0025609 CITATION# 124306 i\JTI: "'"\v--.e. 
CHARGE: 149-1301 ACCIDENT-LEAVING THE SCENE OR FAILING TO STOP FOR DAMAGE ACCIDEN . 
AMENDED: ________________________________________________________________________ ___ 
The defendant having been fully advised of his/her statutory and constitutional rights including the right to be represented by counsel, and 
0 Been advised of right to court appointed counsel if indigent 
0 Defendant waived right to counsel 
0 Defendant represented by counsel 
D Judgment--Not Guilty 
~udgment on Trial--Guilty 
0 JUJigment, Plea of Guilty i Rim1fS Waived 
~thheld Judgment Mc;epted 
D Judgment for Defendant I Infraction 
D Judgment for State I Infraction 
0 Dismissed ____________ _ 0 Bond Forfeited I Conviction Entered - Case Closed 
0 Bond Forfeited I Dismissed 
MONIES ORDERED PAID: A $2.00 handling fee will be imposed on each installment. g ljne I Penalty $ which includes costs, and probation fee if applicable. 
[!?Pay within 30 days of today, or enroll in time payment program BEFORE due date. 
Suspended$ _______ _ 
0 Community Service hours by Setup Fee$ _______ Insurance Fee$ ______ _ 
~ ~t sign up wi hin 7 
~eimbu~e-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-~~~-~-~~~­
ril1festitution-H-ZJt.111tL../ki..~U~~~~t.tG.~!!!......Ul.U---2(Lj~~"-4-~~~'4-L.2'::..2.~~~fk.~~~~~ 
0 Bond Exonerated, provided th any deposit shall first be applied pursuant to ld o ode 19-2923 in satisfaction of outstanding 1nes, fees 
and costs with any remainder to be refunded to the posting party. D ~~t~~~~~om defeodant to pay restitution +/or infractions from bond. 
D No Contact Order, as condition of bond, terminated. ~'CJ 
INCARCERATION ORDERED: 
0 Jail days, Suspended days, Credit days, Unscheduled Jail days are imposed & will 
be scheduled by the Adult Misdemeanor Probation Office, or Court, for violations of the terms below or on the attached addendum. 
0 Report to Jail Release D Work Release Authorization (if you qualify). ~eriff's Community Labor Program in lieu of Jail (if you qualify) 16 hours by T /t/t 0 Must sign up within 7 days. 
Follow the Labor Program schedule and policies. 
0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------DRIVING PRIVILEGES SUSPENDED days commencing, _____________________ ___ 
REINSTATEMENT OF DRIVING PRIVILEGES MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED before you can drive. Apply to DRIVER'S SERVICES, P.O. Box 7129, 
Boise, ID. 83707-1129. 
0 Temporary Driving Privileges Granted commencing, ________________________ _ 
To, from and for work purposes I required medical care I court ordered alcohol program I community service. Must carry proof of work 
schedule and liability insurance at all times. Not valid if insurance expires. 
PROBATION ORDERED FOR / YEAR(S) ON THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS: 0Supervised- See Addendum 
CB'1jplate no federal, state or local laws more serious than an infraction. DCommit no similar offenses. 
CB1Vlaintain liability insurance on any vehicle that you drive. 
0 Do not operate a motor vehicle with any alcohol or controlled substances in your bloodstream. 
D You must submit to any blood alcohol concentration test requested of you, with reasonable cause, by a peace officer. 
0 Obtain a Substance Abuse/Battery Evaluation, and file proof of evaluation, within days. 
D Enroll in & complete program. File proof of completion within days. 
lXI Notify the court, in writing, of any address change within 1 0 days. Agrees to accept future service by mail at the last known address. 
0 Interlock ignition device required on vehicle for year(s). To be installed per attached addendum. 
0 Other _____________________________________ _ 
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THE SUSPENDED PENALTIESARESUBJECTTOYOUR COMPLIANCE WITH AL 
THE DEFENDANTHASTHE RIGHTTOAPPEAL 
THIS JUDGMENT WITHIN 42 DAYS 
Copies To\ 
Oef. 1Q.I Def. Atty. ~1tiu~~~~~------=~~ [ 1 Other [ 1 Comm. Servo [ 1 Jail (fax 446-1407) 
[ [KCft'1o fax 44l> 1307 (re: NCO) (re:NCO) [ [0, SeN. fax - [ I ALdHDrfax 44l> 1661 [I AMP (fax 44l> 1990) Date I I Deputy Clerk--.l-'''-VV-\::~---\p~-=--________________________ _ 
KC 001 
~ or~rr:,rr r r f ~j J I : l: \. i · " 
BARRY McHUGH 
Prosecuting Attorney 
501 Government Way/Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
Telephone: (208) 446-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 446-1833 
ASSIGNED ATTORNEY 
JIM REIERSON 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Tm FlKST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD W. WRIGHT, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CR-M09-25609 
MEMORANDUM OF RESTITUTION 
COMES NOW, JIM REIERSON, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Kootenai County, Idaho, 
and hereby requests in the following additional amount( s) to be paid to the Kootenai County Clerk, 
324 West Garden, Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 in the form of cash, certified check or money order: 
City of Hayden 
8960 N Government Way 
Hayden, Idaho 83835 
DATED this 
$156.34 
JIM REfiE~SON 
DeputyYrosecuting Attorney 
MEMORANDUM OF RESTITUTION: Page 1 
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) 
! I~ 
/ day of ____ -+/ __ 
I
1'f
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the Mday of ~ , 2010, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing was hand delivered to: 
RICHARD WRIGHT 
66 E ALVIS ROAD 
HAYDEN, ID 83835 
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tifY  day ,  
MAR-31-1996 04:56 P.02/02 
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· ...... 
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··~:,. ..... 'lw~'!'-· -·~ .-• .. ·:·-.. 
· · 8930 N Government W~ay Hnyden, Idaho 83835 
~ 
.Hm 
Listed below is the cost to replace the speed limit si~ and 'DOst for accident report #09-30585 
1 Speed limit sign $38.00 
2 Galvanized square post $ 40.00 
3 Anchor$ 15.75 
4 Stiffener sleeve $9.75 
5 Labor 2 hours at$ 26.42 per hour total $ 52.84labor cost 
Total cost ofreplacin~ speed limit si~ $ 156.34 
If you have any question you can reach me at 208-660-6060 thank you 
Wane Holecek 
Phone: (208) 772-44!! 
* Fnx: (208) 762-2282 (208) 77:!-6522 
\\'eb: v.:v.,:w.cityoOu•:;·denid.us 
TOTAL P.02 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) Case No. CR09-25609 
) 
Plaintiff, ) CIVIL JUDGMENT 
) 
RICHARD W. WRIGHT, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
Judgment is hereby entered against the defendant, Richard W. Wright, in the amount(s) that 
follow. Such amounts to bear statutory interest from the date indicated and shall be paid to the 
Kootenai County Clerk, 324 W. Garden, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, 83 814 in the form of cash, certified 
check or money order: 
City of Hayden 
8960 N Government Way 
Hayden, Idaho 83835 
$156.34 
This judgment is entered pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-5304 and 20-520(3) and shall 
include statutory interest pursuant to Idaho Code 28-22-1 04(2) accruing from ~ ~';l.,CJ I tJ 
CIVIL JUDGMENT: Page 1 
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together with all postjuagmem attome) 's fees and costs extended in the collection of this judgment 
H- ' 
as allowed by law. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Judgment shall be entered upon the records Kootenai 
County as a public record. 
Entered this ~y of~~) '2010. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the~ day of ffiOJJ] ~)!) , 2010, that a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing was mailed/delivered by regular U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, Interoffice Mail, Hand 
Delivered, or Faxed to: < 
Prosecutor 4lfl 0·1533 \1 ~ 
KCPSB ____ _ 
Bonding Co. ___ _ 
lfY)n ~I 'DB n Lf1h 4t I . 
Defense Attorney Defendan--t _fiW __ v __ k_.~ .,_ 1 ,J 1 ~tL·L.J Auditor~lf~·llfl/Ja Ut !kPolice Agency CttltJVI 
Other ______ ~-----------
ISP 208-884-7197 
DANIEL ENGLISH 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
, Deputy 
CIVIL JUDGMENT: Page2 
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1 Richard K. Kuck, ISB NO. 3875 
2 RICHARD K. KUCK, PLLC P.O. Box 1320 
3 Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1320 
Tel: 208-667-3600 
4 Fax: 208-667-3379 
richk@rklaw.com 
5 Attorney for Appellant 
6 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
7 
8 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
9 STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
v. 
Plaintiff/Respondent, ) 
) 
) 
RICHARD W. WRIGHT, 
) 
) 
) 
Defendant/ Appellant. ) 
11--------------------------__J 
Case No. CR-2009-0025609 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Hon. Penny Friedlander 
Fee Category: L-2 
Filing Fee: $53.00 
COMES NOW the above-named Appellant, by and through his attorney, Richard 
K. Kuck, RICHARD K. KUCK, PLLC, Coeur d' Aiene, Idaho, and pursuant to I.M.C.R. 
18 17 and I.C.R. 54.1 and I.C.R. 54.4 gives notice that: 
19 1. The Appellant appeals his conviction of a violation ofldaho Code§ 49-1301 
20 entered by the Hon. Penny Friedlander, Magistrate Judge, following a court trial held on 
21 March 1, 2010. 
22 
23 
24 
25 
The Appellant states as follows: 
1. Designation of Parties: 
(a) The Appellant is the Defendant, Richard W. Wright. The Appellant's counsel 
26 is Richard K. Kuck. The Appellant's counsel's contact information is: 
27 Richard K. Kuck 
28 RICHARD K. KUCK, PLLC 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
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11 ________________________ ~) 
18 r c. r
I e 
21 ,
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
408 Sherman A venue, Suite 205 
P.O. Box 1320 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1320 
(P) (208) 667-3600 
(F) (208) 667-3379 
E-mail: richk@rklaw.com. 
(b) The Respondent is the State ofidaho and the Respondent's counsel is Barry 
McHugh, Prosecuting attorney for Kootenai County, Idaho. The assigned deputy 
prosecuting attorney is Jim Reierson. The Respondent's counsel's contact information is: 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
Jim Reierson 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Kootenai County 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 816-9000 
(P) (208) 446-1800 
(F) (208) 446-1833 
E-mail: jreierson@kcgov.us 
2. Designation of Appeal: Pursuant to I.C.R. 54.1 the Appellant has the right to 
appeal to the District Court from the withheld judgment operating as a final conviction of 
a violation of Idaho Code § 49-1301 entered by the Court on March 1, 2010 following a 
trial to the Court. 18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
3. Designation oflssues: 
(a) Preliminary Statement oflssues on Appeal. 
(1) Whether a driver can properly be found to have committed a violation ofldaho 
Code§ 49-1301 following a single vehicle collision between that driver's vehicle and a 
fixture adjacent to a roadway where the driver was the sole occupant of his vehicle, was 
24 
25 not injured, when the total damage to both the vehicle and the fixture was less than 
26 $1,500.00 combined and when the driver did not remain at the scene. 
27 4. Sealing of Record: There has been no order entered sealing the record ofthis 
28 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
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1 matter. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
5. Designation of Transcript: 
(a) Is a reporter's transcript requested? A standard transcript of the March 1, 2010 
trial of this case is requested. 
(b) The Appellant requests that the transcript be delivered in electronic format: A 
hard copy of the transcript is not requested. 
6. Designation of Record: This is an appeal from the Magistrates Division to the 
District Court in Kootenai County and so a Clerk's Record is not required. 
10 
11 
7. Designation of Exhibits: This is an appeal of a criminal case and there are no 
12 requested exhibits aside from the contents of the Court's file. 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
8. I certify that: 
(a) A hard copy of this Notice of Appeal on each reporter of whom a transcript has 
been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
(1) Transcriptionist, Clerk of the Court for Kootenai County by filing of 
this Notice of Appeal. 
(b) That the Clerk ofthe District Court will be paid the estimated transcript fee 
20 according to the practice established for payment by the Clerk of the Court for Kootenai 
21 County, Idaho. 
22 
(c) That because this is an appeal from the Magistrates Division to the District 
23 
Court, no independent Clerk's Record on Appeal will be prepared. 
24 
25 (d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
26 (e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served. 
27 
28 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
DATED this0 day of April2010. 
RICHARD K. KUCK, PLLC 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
8 I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the __ day of April2010, I caused to be served a 
9 true and correct copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Barry McHugh 
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney 
Attn: Jim Reierson 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 816-9000 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid. 
[X] Fax transmission 208-446-1833 
[ ] Hand delivered. 
[ ] Overnight mail. 
RICHARD K. KUCK, PLLC 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
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1 Richard K. Kuck, ISB No. 3875 
2 
RICHARD K. kUCK, PLLC 
ttomey at Law 
2010 M~~ l 1 
3 P.O. Box 1320 
408 Sherman Avenue, Ste. 205 
4 Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1320 
5 
Tel: 208-667-3600 
Fax:208-667-3379 
6 ttomey For Defendant/Appellant 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1l 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) Case No. 2009-0025609 
Plaintiff, ) 
v. ) MOTION FOR STAY OF 
) WDGMENT DURING APPEAL 
RICHARD WILLIAM WRIGHT, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
) 
COMES NOW RICHARD WILLIAM WRIGHT, the Defendant in the above-
captioned matter, by and through his attorney Richard K. Kuck, RICHARD K. KUCK, 
PLLC, and respectfully moves the Court for entry of an order staying the operation and 
effect of the withheld judgment granted to the Defendant by the Honorable Penny 
Friedlander on March 1, 2010 pending a decision of the appeal ftled in this matter. 
On March 1, 2010 the Defendant was found guilty following a court trial of a 
violation of Idaho Code § 49-1301 as a result of a single vehicle accident. The Court 
'thheldjudgment for a period of one (1) year and placed the Defendant on probation. 
By notice dated March 4, 2010 the Idaho Department of Transportation notified the 
Defen~t that his driving privileges were being withdrawn for a period of one (1) year 
commencing on March 19,2010. The Defendant's Notice of Appeal was timelyflled on 
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY STAY 
OF JUDGMENT DURING APPEAL- 1 
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1 April 9, 2010. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
The entry of an Order staying the operation of the withheld judgment during the 
pendency of the appeal is requested upon the following grounds: 
1. On March I, 2010 following a court trial, the Defendant, a long-time police 
6 officer in the State of Florida, who appeared in this case pro-se, was found to have violated 
7 Idaho Code § 49-1301, on a factual background suggesting that at approximately 7:55 a.m. 
8 his vehicle slid off a roadway on black ice and knocked over a speed limit sign. Mr. 
9 
Wright then drove back onto the roadway and continued to his business in downtown 
10 
Coeur d, Alene. Shortly after the collision, Mr. Wright was contacted by a law 
11 
12 enforcement officer by telephone. Mr. Wright explained the accident and said that he had 
13 intended to report the incident using what he presumed would be the type of self-reporting 
14 form that he was familiar with from the State fo Florida for use with incidents involving 
15 
negligible damage to the property, measured monetarily. 
16 
17 
Mr. Wright's vehicle was the only vehicle involved in the incident and the 
18 investigating officer estimated the damage to the vehicle to be $500.00. Idaho law did not 
19 require that Mr. Wright remain at the scene of the collision with the street sign. Because 
20 e damage caused by the collision was less than $1,500.00 total, he was not required to 
21 immediately report the collision to law enforcement. Rather, his duty was established by 
22 
23 
Idaho Code § 49-1304 and that was to use reasonable efforts to notify the owner of the 
street sign ofthe damage to it. The facts do not implicate Idaho Code§ 49-1301. 24 
25 In the case of Munns v. Swift Transportation Conmany, 138 Idaho 108 (Idaho 
26 2002) the Idaho Supreme Court strongly suggested that Idaho Code § 49-130 I has no 
27 application to an accident where the only vehicle damaged is the owner's vehicle and the 
28 
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY STAY 
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1 only other damage is to personal property: 
2 
3 
4 
"In the case before us, where the property damage caused by the accident 
was to the front bumper of Swift's truck and to a runaway horse, the 
applicability of the statute [I.C. § 49-1301] is not obvious." 
5 
Munns v. Swift Transportation Company, 138 Idaho at 111. 
6 2. The legal duty of a driver who leaves the roadway and strikes a speed limit sign 
7 is not that created by Idaho Code § 49-13 01, but rather that imposed by Idaho Code § 49-
8 1304 entit!ed'Duty Upon Striking Fixtures Upon or Adjacent To A Highway.' That section 
9 
requires only that a motorist use reasonable efforts to notify the owner of the damaged 
10 
personal property and does not require that a motorist remain at the scene of an accident. A 
11 
12 violation ofldaho Code§ 49-1304 does not trigger the administrative one (1) year drivers 
13 license suspension. 
14 3. In its decision in Munns, cited above, the Idaho Supreme Court also suggested 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
that Idaho Code § 49-1301 may be too ambiguous to be applied to a one-vehicle collision 
with personal property: 
"The inherent ambiguity in the statute precludes a conclusion that Swift 
Transportation Co. Inc., and its driver were negligent as a matter of law for 
violating the statute by not remaining at the scene of the accident with the 
horse." 
Munns v. Swift Transportation Company, 138 Idaho at 111. 
4. For the reasons stated by the Idaho Supreme Court in Munns, it is within the 
23 realm of fair argument that this pro-se Defendant was charged with, and subsequently 
24 convicted of, a violation of a statute which he could not have violated under the specific 
25 
facts of this case. It is also within the realm of reason that a Court on appeal could rule in 
26 
this case that Idaho Code§ 49-1301 is either unconstitutionally over-broad or vague as 
27 
28 
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1 applied to the facts of this case or could restrict its application to a different set of facts. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
5. The Defendant has paid to the Clerk of the Court the financial penalty imposed 
by the Court as a term of the withheld judgment. 
6. The Defendant timely requested a hearing before a Hearing Officer of the Idaho 
6 Deparlment of Transportation and a telephonic hearing was held on ApriL 5, 2010. 
7 Following the hearing, the Idaho Department of Transportation has withdrawn the 
8 Defendant's driving privileges until March 19, 2011. The Hea..ring Officer concluded that 
9 
10 
e operation of Idaho Code§§ 49-101 and 49-326 require the mandatory one (1) year 
drivers license suspension based only upon the withheld judgment granted to the 
11 
12 Defendant in this case following trial. 
13 7. If the Court does not stay the operation of the judgment pending the outcome of 
14 the appeal, the Defendant will in all likelihood suffer most, if not all, of the one-year 
15 
16 
17 
administrative drivers license suspension before his appeal may be heard and decided. 
8. The Defendant served as a law enforcement officer in the State of Florida for 
18 
thirty-fours years before opening a coffee house and eatery in downtown Coeur d'Alene. 
19 The Defendant resides in Hayden. Idaho and must commute approximately seven (7) miles 
20 each way to work each day. 
21 
22 
23 
9. The Defendant's loss of driving privileges during the pendency of his appeal 
would constitute an extreme hardship and in the event that the Defendant prevails on his 
appeal, an unjust hardship. Given facts ofthis case and the Defendant's long service as a 
24 
25 law enforcement officer, the people of the State ofldaho would not be subjected to any 
26 greater risk of personal harm or property damage were the Defendant permitted to drive 
27 pending the outcome of his appeal. Should the Defendant not prevail on his appeal he will 
28 
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1 suffer the loss of his driving privileges for the statutorily prescribed period of time. A stay 
2 of the March I, 2010 judgment entered in this matter is necessary to prevent manifest 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
injustice. 
DATED this tftdayofMay 2010 
RICHARD K. KUCK, PLLC 
c:t~ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
11 I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the)~ day of May 2010 I caused to be served a 
12 true and correct copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Barry McHugh 
Attn: Jim Reierson 
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid. 
(X] Fax transmission 208-446-1833 
[ ] Hand delivered. 
RICHARD K. KUCK, PLLC 
MOTJON FOR TEMPORARY STAY 
OF JUDGMENT DURING APPEAL- 5 
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Court Minutes: 
Session: MITCHELL060110P 
Session Date: 06/0112010 
Judge: Mitchell, John 
Reporter: Foland, Julie 
Clerk(s): Clausen, Jeanne 
State Attorney(s): 
Eck.ti.art, A.n.·m 
V erharen, Art 
Public Defender(s): 
Neils, Martin 
Szott, Paul 
Prob. Officer(s): 
Court interpreter(s): 
Case ID: 0005 
06/01/2010 
15:44:55 
15:44:55 
Case number: CR2009-25609 
Plaintiff: 
Plaintiff Attorney: 
Defendant: Wright, Richard 
Pers. Attorney: 
Co-Defendant( s ): 
State Attorney: Verharen, Art 
Public Defender: 
Recording Started: 
Case called 
Court Minutes Session: MITCHELL06011 OP 
Division: DIST 
Session Time: 13: 11 
Courtroom: CourtroomS 
Page 17, ... 
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15:45:01 Judge: Mitchell, John 
Calls case- deft present and represented by Mr. 
Kuck; Mr. Verharen for the 
15:45:19 state; stay on motion to appeal 
15:45:26 State Attorney: Verharen, Art 
no objection 
15:45:39 Add Ins: Kuck, Richard 
supplies a proposed order 
15:45:46 State Attorney: Verharen, Art 
no obj to form of order 
15:45:56 Judge: Mitchell, John 
also have this noticed up before Judge 
Fiiedlander 
15:46:21 Add Ins: Kuck, Richard 
will vacated hearing before Judge Friedlandeer 
15:46:49 Stop recording 
(Off Record) 
Court Minutes Session: MITCHELL06011 OP Page 18, ... 
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Richard K. Kuck, ISB No. 3875 
RICHARD K. KUCK, PLLC 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1320 
408 Sherman A venue, Ste. 205 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1320 
Tel: 208-667-3600 
Fax: 208-667-3379 
Attorney For Defendant/ Appellant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
V. 
RICHARD WILLIAM WRIGHT, 
) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
Case No. 2009-0025609 
ORDER TO STAY AND ARREST 
JUDGMENT DURING APPEAL 
14 ) 11----------------------------
15 
16 
17 
THIS MATTER IS BEFORE THE COURT ON THE Motion of the Defendant for 
an order staying, pending a decision of the appeal filed in this matter, the operation and 
18 effect of the withheld judgment granted to the Defendant by the Honorable Penny 
19 Friedlander on March 1, 2010. 
20 The record reflects that on March 1, 2010 the Defendant was found guilty 
21 following a court trial of a violation ofldaho Code § 49-1301 as a result of a single vehicle 
22 
23 
accident with a speed limit sign. The trial court withheld judgment for a period of one (1) 
year and placed the Defendant on probation during that time. 
24 
25 By notice dated March 4, 2010 the Idaho Department of Transportation notified the 
26 Defendant that his driving privileges were being withdrawn for a period of one ( 1) year 
27 commencing on March 19,2010. The Defendant's Notice of Appeal ofthe underlying 
28 
ORDER FOR STAY AND ARREST 
OF JUDGMENT DURING APPEAL - 1 
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18 
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27  t
1 conviction and judgment was timely filed on April9, 2010. 
2 
3 
4 
The Defendant has requested an Order staying the operation of the withheld 
·udgment during the pendency of the appeal on the grounds that he was improperly 
5 
convicted of violating Idaho Code§ 49-1301. 
6 In its decision in the case of Munns v. Swift Transportation Company, 138 Idaho 
7 1 08 (Idaho 2002) the Idaho Supreme Court questioned the applicability of Idaho Code § 
8 49-1301 to an accident where a collision involved only the driver's vehicle and personmal 
9 
10 
11 
12 
property belonging to another. The issue appears to be one of first impression in the State 
of Idaho. 
The record reflects that the Defendant has paid to the Clerk of the Court the 
13 financial penalty imposed by the Court as a condition of the withheld judgment. 
14 The Court finds and concludes that if the operation of the withheld judgment is not 
15 
16 
17 
stayed pending the outcome of the appeal that the Defendant will suffer a protracted 
drivers iicense suspension before his appeai may be heard and decided and that the 
18 suspension would constitute an extreme, unjust and irreversible hardship in the event that 
19 the Defendant prevails on the appeal. 
20 The Court further concludes that a stay of the operation of the March 1, 2010 
21 
22 
23 
24 
withheld judgment entered in this matter is necessary to prevent manifest injustice. 
ORDER 
NOW THEREFORE, based upon the foregoing discussion, IT IS HEREBY 
25 ORDERED that the operation ofthe withheld judgment entered by the trial court on 
26 March 1, 2010 be, and is hereby arrested and stayed until the further order of this Court. 
27 
28 
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1 DATED this \ ~1'ay of June 2010 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
CERTIFICATE OF 
7 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the -1--- day of June 2010 I caused to be served a 
8 true and correct copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and 
9 addressed to the following: 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Barry McHugh 
Attn: Jim Reierson 
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid. 
[X] Fax transmission 208-446-1833 
[ ] Hand delivered. 
Richard K. Kuck 
RICHARD K. KUCK, PLLC 
P.O. Box 1320 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1320 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid. 
[X] Fax transmission 208-667-3600 
[ ] Hand delivered. 
DAN J. ENGLISH 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
By: I 
Deputy 
g~~~~~i~~~~~EA~ST~L--~3---------------------.. -.. -_-_-__ -_-. __ -_-. ~~------~----_-_-
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TABLE OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
1. Statutes 
a. Idaho Code§ 49-1301 
b. Idaho Code§ 49-1302 
c. Idaho Code § 49-1303 
d. Idaho Code§ 49-1304 
e. Idaho Code § 49-1305 
2. Case Law 
a. Standards of Review 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope. 
A finding of guilt will not be overturned on appeal where there is 
substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have 
found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essentia1 
elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Herrera-Brito, 
131 Idaho 383, 385, 957 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Ct.App.1998); State v. 
Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104, 822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct.App.l991). 
State v. Stone, 147 Idaho 890, 216 P.3d 648 (Idaho App. 2009) (rev. denied 
Sept 25, 2009.) 
Statutory Interpretation 
"The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which we 
exercise free review.'' McLean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 
Idaho 810, 813, 135 P.3d 756,759 (2006). "This Court must construe a 
statute to give effect to the intent of the legislature." Carrier v. Lake 
Pend Oreille School Dist. # 84, 142 Idaho 804, 807, 134 P.3d 655, 658 
{2006). "It must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words 
must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute 
must be construed as a whole." McLean v. Maverik Country Stores, 
Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813, 135 P.3d 756, 759 (2006) (citations omitted). 
"Statutes that are in pari materia must be construed together to effect 
legislative intent. Statutes are in pari materia if they relate to the same 
subject." City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Indep. Highway Dist., 139 
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Idaho 65, 69, 72 P.3d 905, 909 (2003) (citations omitted). 
Paolini v. Alberston's. Inc., 143 Idaho 547, 149 P.3d 822, 824 (Idaho 2006). 
Denial of the Right to Counsel 
"A criminal defendant has the constitutional right to assistance of 
counsel at all critical stages of the criminal process. State v. Ruth, 102 
Idaho 638, 641, 637 P.2d 415,418 (1981); State v. Blevins, 108 Idaho 
239, 242, 697 P.2d 1253, 1256 (Ct.App.l985). The defendant's right of 
counsel includes legal representation during probation revocation 
proceedings. State v. Young, 122 Idaho 278,283, 833 P.2d911, 916 
(1992); State v. Lindsay, 124 Idaho 825, 828, 864 P.2d 663, 666 
(Ct.App.1993). Thus, in the absence of a valid waiver, King was 
entitled to be represented by counsel at the November 1, 1996, 
probation revocation hearing. A waiver of the right to counsel is valid 
only if it was effected knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently. Ruth, 
102 Idaho at 642, 637 P.2d at 419; Lindsay, 124 Idaho at 828, 864 
P.2d at 666. The burden is upon the state to show that a waiver of a 
constitutional right was voluntary, knowing and intelligent. State v. 
Culbertson, 105 Idaho 128, 130,666 P.2d 1139, 1141 (1983); State v. 
Wuthrich, 112 Idaho 360,364,732 P.2d 329, 333 (Ct.App.1986). We 
examine the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a 
waiver is va1id. State v. Mitchell, 104 Idaho 493, 498, 660 P.2d 1336, 
1342 (1983); State v. Buzo, 121 Idaho 324, 327, 824 P.2d 899, 902 
(Ct.App.1991). Questions regarding whether a defendant's waiver of 
the right to counsel was voluntary, knowing and intelligent are 
essentially questions of fact turning upon the defendant's state of mind. 
State v. Spradlin, 119 Idaho 1030, 1036, 812 P.2d 744, 750 
(Ct.App.l991); Blevins, 108 Idaho at 243, 697 P.2d at 1257. These 
issues, however, "possess such constitutional significance" that they 
require independent review on appeal. Id. Therefore, we review this 
iinme de novo. 
State v. King, 131 Idaho 374, 376, 957 P.2d 352, 354 {Idaho App. 1998). 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - iii 
p.4 
Richard W. Wright 39483 45 of 183
.
, ,
, , .1
, ,
. ,
.I
,
.
, , ,
nn
. .
, , ,
,
.1
, , (
Jul 2? 2010 16:53 Richard K. Kuck, PLLC 20866?33?9 
Applicability of Idaho Code § 49-1301 
"In the case before us, where the property damage 
caused by the accident was to the front bumper of 
Swift's truck and to a runaway horse, the applicability 
ofthe statute [l.C. § 49-1301] is not obvious." 
Munns v. Swift Transportation Company, 138 Idaho 108 (Idaho 2002) 
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INTRODUCTION 
This is the appe81 of the conviction following a court trial of the Defendant, pro-se, of a 
violation of Idaho Code§ 49-1301 following a single vehicle accident involving only the 
Defendant'& vehicle nnd o. speed limit sign which Wll.S lmookod over. 
The incident occurred at 7:55 a.m. on a very icy roadway as the Defendant drove to work. 
No evidence was introduced at trial as to the value of the damage done to the Defendant's 
vehicle nor to the speed limit sign. Additionally, no evidence was jntroduced at trial as to the 
identity of the 'owner' of the speed limit sign or of any efforts undertaken by the Defendant to 
notify the owner of the speed limit sign of the accident. 
Immediately after the trial court announced that it had found the Defendant guilty of the 
Idaho Code§ 49-1301 violation, the Defendant requested the assistance of counsel before 
proceeding further. 
The trial court recognized the Defendant's right to counsel at sentencing and stated that 
she would set the case for disposition. 
The prosecutor objected to a delay in sentencing and explained that the state's position 
would be that the Defendant would be entitled to a withheld judgment. The Defendant stated that 
he did not understand what a withheld judgment entailed in Idaho. A colloquy then ensued 
between the prosecutor and the trial court through which the trial court provided advise to the 
Defendant on withheld judgments in Idaho. 
Notably for this appeal the trial court advised the defendant that a withheld judgment 
would not act as a conviction unless there was a probation violation and also failed to advise the 
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Defendant that if he accepted a withheld judgment he would be subjected to a mandatory 
administrative one (1) year driver's license suspension as a result. 
Following the trial court's inaccurate and incomplete explanation of the ramifications of 
the entry of a withheld judgment in Idaho, the Defendant agreed to immediately proceed to 
sentencing without counsel. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 18, 2009, at about 7:55a.m., Defendant/Appellant, Richard W. Wright, 
was driving his Black 1996 Jeep on Nita Street near its intersection with Government Way, in 
Hayden, Idaho. The road conditions were very icy. Mr. Wright's Jeep left the road and knocked 
over a speed limit sign. Mr. Wright drove his vehicle back onto the roadway and continued to his 
business, a cafe called 'City Perc,' in downtown Coeur d'Alene. 
A following motorist observed the event and called 911 to provide a description of the 
event and of tlte vel'!Jc!e involved. A police officer drove to M__r, Wright's residence and talked 
with Mr. Wright's wife, who called Mr. Wright at his business. The officer asked to speak with 
Mr. Wright and Mr. Wright advised the officer that his vehicle had slid off Nita Street, knocked 
over a street sign and that he had intended to report the accident on a 'self-report form.' 
The police officer then drove to Mr. Wright's business and cited him with a violation of 
Idaho Code§ 49-1301 
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Mr. Wright pleaded not guilty to the citation and on March 1, 2010 a court trial was held 
before the Honorable Penny Friedlander, Magistrate Judge. Mr. Wright appeared pro-se. 
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After the parties wrangled through an issue regarding the State's failure to provide any 
response to the Defendant's written request for discovery, the State called four witnesses at trial, 
Mr. Donald Blanchard and Mr. Timothy DeWitt, the driver and a passenger of a car who 
observed the incident, and Deputies Joshua Leyk and Patrick Meehan. 
Mr. Blanchard testified generally that he observed a black jeep slide on ice over a curb 
and knock down a 'standard street sign' which said '25 miles an hour' on it (Tr. pp. 9-1 0). Mr. 
Blanchard testified that following the collision with the street sign the Jeep 'continued back out' 
and turned southbound on Wayne (Tr. p. 10, 11. 2-4). Mr. DeWitt did not testify regarding his 
actual observations of the incident (See Generally Tr. p. 17 ,11. 13-24). Deputy Meehan testified 
that after he received a report of the incident, including the license plate, he drove to the scene 
and observed a speed limit sign broken up at the base and on the ground and that he also 
observed part of a 'covering that goes over the side of a vehicle to protect it from door dings' 
lying on the ground (Tr. pp. 23-34.). 
Deputy Leyk testified that after the report of the collision he drove to the Defendant's 
home and spoke with his wife and told her that the Defendant had been involved in an accident 
(Tr. p. 33). Deputy Leyk testified that Mrs. Wright called Mr. Wright and overheard the 
conversation in which Mr. Wright told Mrs. Wright that he had slid on ice, hit a traffic sign and 
knocked it down, but that he was "fine and not hurt" (Tr. pp. 34,.35). 
Deputy Leyk then spoke with the individual he believed was Mr. Wright and that during 
that conversation Mr. Wright had told him he had "slipped on the ice on Government and 
knocked over a traffic sign and that he had intended to report the accident to law enforcement 
through, uh, what- what he quoted as saying it was a self-report form. (Tr. p. 36, 11. 15-23). Mr. 
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Wright explained to Deputy Leyk that he was former law enforcement and that was the process 
he was familiar with as far as reporting an accident (Tr. P. 36, 11. 23-25). 
Deputy Leyk then erroneously advised Mr. Wright that "per Idaho Code, he's required to 
immediately notify law enforcement of any accident" (Tr. pp. 36-37). 
In closing the State's theory was that Mr. Wright was guilty of the offense charged 
because he had not reported the collision to law enforcement (Tr. p. 51, 11. 14-22). 
The State introduced no evidence of the ownership of the street sign, no evidence of the 
value of the damage done to the street sign and no evidence of the value of the damage done to 
the Jeep. The record is also entirely devoid of any evidence from either party regarding whether 
or not the accident had been reported to the owner of the sign, an essential element of the State's 
proof under Idaho Code§ 49-1304. 
Following trial the court convicted Mr. Wright of a violation of Idaho Code § 49-1301 
(Tr. p. 57; 11. 9-10). 
The Court then asked Mr. Wright if he was prepared to proceed to sentencing (Tr. p. 57. 
ll. 11-12). Mr. Wright requested an opportunity to consult with counsel (Tr. p.57, 11. 13-14). 
The trial court then agreed to set the case for disposition in order to provide Mr. Wright 
the opportunity to consult with counsel (Tr. p. 57.1115-16). However, at that point the prosecutor 
objected to a delay in sentencing and stated that he would not oppose the entry of a withheld 
judgment in the case (Tr. p. 58, 111-20). 
Then, at the prosecuting attorney's suggestion, and following Mr. Wright's request for 
advise regarding what a withheld judgment entailed, the trial court advised Mr. Wright of the 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF- 4 
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legal consequences and ramifications of a withheld judgment (Tr. pp. 58-60). 
The trial court's advise to Mr. Wright regarding the proposed withheld judgment was 
both legally incorrect and incomplete. The trial court advised Mr. Wright that a withheld 
judgment was not a conviction and failed to advise Mr. Wright that the withheld judgment would 
carry with it the administrative revocation of his driving privileges for a mandatory period of one 
(1) year (Tr. pp. 58-60). 
Following the advise of the prosecuting attorney and the trial court, Mr. Wright agreed to 
proceed to sentencing on March 1, 2010 without the assistance of counsel and the trial court 
imposed the withheld judgment (Tr. pp. 60-65). 
For context, though certainly not part of the record of this matter, Mr. Wright was later 
notified by the Idaho Depanment of Transportation that pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 49-1301 and 
49-325 his driving privileges were being administratively withdrawn for a period of one (1) year 
as a result of the March 1, 2010 withheld judgment. This appeal follows. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The Appellant raises the following issues on appeal: 
I. The evidence at trial was insufficient for the trial court to convict the Defendant 
of a violation of Idaho Code§ 49-1301 
A. Idaho Code§ 49-1301 does not apply to collisions between a 
vehicle and personal property where the factors set forth in Idaho 
Code§ 49-1305 are not implicated. 
B. The State of Idaho failed to prove at trial each essential element 
of the charged violation of Idaho Code § 49-1301. 
APPELLA-l'lrS OPENING BRTRF - 5 
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ll. The Defendant was denied his Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel by the 
conduct of the prosecuting attorney and the trial court. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The applicable standards of review are as follows: 
1. Sufficiency of the Evidence 
Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope. A finding 
of guilt will not be overturned on appeal where there is substantial evidence upon 
which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its 
burden of proving the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
State v. Herrera-Brita, 131 Idaho 383, 385, 957 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Ct.App.1998)~ 
State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104, 822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct.App.l991). 
State v. Stone, 147 Idaho 890, 216 P.3d 648 (Idaho App. 2009) (rev. denied Sept 25, 2009.) 
2. Statutory Interpretation 
"The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which we exercise free 
review." McLean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813, 135 P.3d 
756, 759 (2006). "This Court must construe a statute to give effect to the intent of 
the legislature." Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille School Dist. # 84, 142 Idaho 804, 
807, 134 P.3d 655,658 (2006). "It must begin with the literal words of the statute; 
those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the 
statute must be construed as a whole." McLean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 
142 Idaho 810, 813, 135 P.3d 756,759 (2006) (citations omitted). "Statutes that 
are in pari materia must be construed together to effect legislative intent. Statutes 
axe in pari materia if they relate to the same subject." City of Sandpoint v. 
Sandpoint Indep. Highway Dist., 139 Idaho 65, 69, 72 P.3d 905, 909 (2003) 
(citations omitted). 
Paolini v. Alberston's, Inc., 143 Idaho 547, 149 P.3d 822, 824 (Idaho 2006). 
3. Denial of the Ri&ht to Counsel 
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"A criminal defendant has the constitutiona1 right to assistance of counsel at all 
critical stages of the criminal process. State v. Ruth, 102 Idaho 638, 641,637 P.2d 
415, 418 (1981); State v. Blevins, 108 Idaho 239, 242, 697 P.2d 1253, 1256 
(Ct.App.l985). The defendant's right of counsel includes legal representation 
during probation revocation proceedings. State v. Young, 122 Idaho 278, 283, 833 
P.2d 911,916 (1992); State v. Lindsay, 124 Idaho 825, 828, 864 P.2d 663, 666 
(Ct.App.l993). Thus, in the absence of a valid waiver, King was entitled to be 
represented by counsel at the November 1, 1996, probation revocation hearing. A 
waiver of the right to counsel is valid only if it was effected knowingly, 
voluntarily and inte1ligently. Ruth, 102 Idaho at 642, 637 P.2d at 419; Lindsay, 
124 Idaho at 828, 864 P.2d at 666. The burden is upon the state to show that a 
waiver of a constitutional right was voluntary, knowing and intel1igent. State v. 
Culbertson, 105 Idaho 128, 130, 666 P.2d 1139, 1141 (1983); State v. Wuthrich, 
112 Idaho 360, 364, 732 P.2d 329, 333 (Ct.App.1986). We examine the totality of 
the circumstances in detennining whether a waiver is valid. State v. Mitchell, 104 
Idaho 493, 498, 660 P.2d 1336, 1342 (1983); State v. Buzo, 121 Idaho 324, 327, 
824 P.2d 899,902 (Ct.App.1991). Questions regarding whether a defendant's 
waiver of the right to counsel was voluntary, knowing and intelligent are 
essentially questions of fact turning upon the defendant's state of mind. State v. 
Spradlin, 119 Idaho 1030, 1036. 812 P.2d 744, 750 (Ct.App;1991); Blevins, lOS 
Idaho at 243,697 P.2d at 1257. These issues, however, "possess such 
constitutional significance" that they require independent review on appeal. Id. 
Therefore, we review this issue de novo. 
State y. Kin2. 13lldaho 374, 376, 957 P.2d 352, 354 (Idaho App. 1998). 
ARGUMENT 
I. The evidence at trial was insufficient for the trial court to convict the Defendant of a 
violation of Idaho Code § 49-1301 
A. Idaho Code § 49-1301 does not apply to collisions between a vehicle and 
personal property where the factors set forth in Id.abo Code§ 49-1305 are 
not implicated. 
The only evidence the State produced at trial was that the Defendant's vehicle had left the 
roadway after sliding on ice, knocked a street sign down and failed to immediately report the 
event to law enforcement. Initially, as a matter of law, the State completely failed to prove that 
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the Defendant had any duty to report the accident to law enforcement at all. 
The argument flows from the statutory scheme of Title 49, Chapter 13. Not all accidents 
must be reported to law enforcement. Idaho Code§ 49-1305 defines which accidents are 
reportable. That section provides: 
§ 49-1305. IMMEDIATE NOTICE OF ACCIDENTS 
(I) The driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or 
death of any person, or damage to the property of any one (1) person in excess of 
one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500) shall immediately, by the quickest 
means of communication, give notice of the accident to the local police 
department if the accident occurs within a city, otherwise to the office of the 
county sheriff or the nearest office of the state police. 
The driver of a vehicle involved in a collision not involving injury or death and which does not 
involve damage to the property of any person in excess of $1,500.00 has no legal duty to report 
the accident to law enforcement. In this case, there is absolutely no evidence of injury or death 
and absolutely no evidence of the value of the damage to the speed limit sign or to Mr. Wright's 
vehicle. Without such evidence, no rational trier of fact could have believed the State's theory 
that Mr. Wright had a legal duty to report the accident to law enforcement. 
The legal duty of a driver involved in a collision with a fixture located upon or adjacent 
to a highway is established by Idaho Code§ 49-1304. That section provides: 
§ 49-1304. DUTY UPON STRIKING FIXTURES UPON OR 
ADJACENT TO A IDGHW AY 
The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in damage to 
fixtures or other property legally upon or adjacent to a highway shaH take 
reasonable steps to locate and notify the owner or person in charge of the property 
of the fact, of his name and address, the name of his insurance agent or company 
if he has automobile liability insurance, the motor vehicle registration number of 
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the vehicle he is driving, and upon request and if available exhibit his driver's 
license. 
In this case, the State provided no evidence that the street sign was legally upon or adjacent to 
the highway. But more importantly, the State provided absolutely no evidence of the owner or 
person in charge of the property, and no evidence from the owner or person in charge of the 
property of whether or not that person or entity had been notified by Mr. Wright of the 
information required by idaho Code§ 49-i304. in the absence of the proof of any factor 
requiring notification of law enforcement of the accident under Idaho Code § 49-1305, for 
collisions involving damage to a fixture adjacent to the highway, Idaho Code § 49-1304 
establishes the driver's duty. 
The State having produced no evidence at trial that the requirements of Idaho Code § 49-
1304 were not satisfied in this case. the only remaining issue relating to sufficient of the evidence 
is whether some other section of Idaho Code could define some requirements of law that was 
unsatisfied by Mr. Wright that would have required him to remain at the scene of the accident to 
fulfill. That brings us to the legislative garbage codified as Idaho Code§ 49-1301, the section 
the Defendant was convicted of violating in this case. 
Idaho Code§ 49-1301 provides in its entirety: 
§ 49-13(H. ACCIDENTS INVOLVING DAMAGE TO 
VEmCLE 
(1) The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident, either on public or 
private property open to the public, resulting only in damage to a vehicle which is 
driven or attended by any person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of 
the accident, or as close as possible, and shall immediately return to, and in every 
event shall remain at, the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the 
requirements of law. 
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(2) For any accident which occurs on a divided, controlled-access highway or 
interstate highway of the state highway system, a stop as required by subsection 
(1) of this section shall be made by moving the vehicle into a safe refuge on the 
shoulder, emergency lane or median whenever such moving of a vehicle may be 
done safely and the vehicle is capable of being normally and safely driven, does 
not require towing, and may be operated under its own power in its customary 
manner without further damage or hazard to itself, to the traffic elements or to the 
roadway. 
(a) For any other highway, a stop as required by subsection (1) of this section 
shall be made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary. 
(b) The driver or any other person who has removed a motor vehicle from the 
main-traveled part of the road as provided in this subsection before the arrival of a 
law enforcement officer shall not be considered liable or at fault regarding the 
cause of the accident solely by reason of moving the vehicle pursuant to this 
subsection. 
(3) Any person failing to stop or to comply with the requirements under thes~ 
circumstances shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. 
(4) The department shall revoke for a period of one (1) year the driver's license, 
privileges or permit to drive, or the nonresident operating privilege, of any person 
convicted of a violation of the provisions of subsection (1) of this section. 
(5) Notlting herein shall be construed to interfere with the duty of any city, county 
or state police officer to investigate and detect crime and enforce the penal, traffic 
or highway laws of this state or any political subdivision. 
The only potentially relevant section ofldaho Code§ 49-1301 is subsection (1): 
(1) The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident, either on 
public or private property open to the public, resulting only in 
damage to a vehicle which is driven or attended by any person 
shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident, or 
as close as possible, and shall immediately return to, and in every 
event shall remain at, the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled 
the requirements of law. 
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The Idaho Supreme Court, with all of its collective years and wisdom construing Idaho statutes, 
could not see the application of Idaho Code§ 49-1301 to a collision involving only the driver's 
vehicle and a horse. 
In the case of Munns v. Swift Transportation Company, 138 Idaho 108 (Idaho 2002) the 
Idaho Supreme Court strongly suggested that Idaho Code§ 49-1301 has no application to an 
accident where the only vehicle damaged is the owner's vehicle and the only other damage is to 
personal property, in that case a horse. The facts in Munns are simple. A tractor-trailer owned by 
Swift Transportation Company struck a horse in the roadway and continued on its way leaving 
the horse in the road to be later struck by a vehicle in which Munns was riding. Though 
evaluated on different grounds and not decided by that case, the issue of the applicability of 
Idaho Code § 49-1301 to a collision like the collision between Mr. Wright and the speed limit 
sign caused the Idaho Supreme Court concern. The Court discussed its concerns as follows: 
"In the case before us, where the property damage caused by the accident was to 
the front bumper of Swift's truck and to a runaway horse, the applicability of the 
statute [l.C. § 49-1301] is not obvious." 
Munns v. Swift Transportation Company,l38Idaho at 111. 
The Munns Court also struggled with the "inherent ambiguity" of the statute: 
"The inherent ambiguity in the statute precludes a conclusion that Swift 
Transportation Co. Inc., and its driver were negligent as a matter of law for 
violating the statute by not remaining at the scene of the accident with the horse." 
Munns v. Swift Transportation Company, 138 Idaho at 111. 
B. The State of Idaho failed to prove at trial each essential element of the charged 
violation of Idaho Code§ 49-1301. 
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The essential elements of a violation of Idaho Code§ 49-1301 according to the plain 
language of the statute are as follows: 
l.The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident, 
2. either on public or private property open to the public, 
3. resulting only in damage to a vehicle, 
4. which is driven or attended by any person, 
5. shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident, or as close as possible, 
and, 
6. shall immediately return to, and in every event shall remain at, the scene of the 
accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of law. 
Aside from the idea expressed in Munns that Idaho Code§ 49-1301 simply does not apply to one 
vehicle collisions with personal property, to prove a violation of Idaho Code§ 49-1301. the State 
must present evidence of each of the foregoing elements. 
In this case the record is entirely devoid of any evidence that the street sign was either on 
public property or private property open to the public. 
The record of this case is also conclusive that the accident in issue did not result in 
damage only to a vehicle. 
Idaho Code§ 49-1302 is illustrative as to whether the statutory phrase "an accident 
resulting in damage to any vehicle which is driven or attended by any person" refers to the driver 
involved in a single vehicle accident, or only to an accident involving at least a second vehicle. 
Idaho Code § 49-1302 provides in the relevant portion: 
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9-1302. DUTY TO GIVE INFORMATION IN ACCIDENT INVOL VNG 
DAMAGE TO A VEIDCLE 
(1) The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in damage 
to any vehicle which is driven or attended by any person shall, at the scene of the 
accident, give his name, address and, if available, at the scene of the accident, he 
shall exhibit his driver's license. proof of registration and certificate or proof of 
liability insurance to the person struck or to the driver or person attending any 
vehicle collided with. 
Construed together \'"lith I~"~~lto Code§ 49-1302, it is clear th.at t.lte statutory language of 
Idaho Code § 49-130 l referring to ''the driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in 
damage to any vehicle which is driven or attended by any person" refers not to a driver involved 
in a single vehicle collision with personal property, as was suggested by the Supreme Court in 
Munns, but rather only to a driver of a second vehicle involved in the collision. The language of 
Idaho Code§§ 49-1301 and 49-1302 are identical in that regard, and the identical language in 
Idaho Code § 49-1302 clearly is restricted only to the driver of a second or other vehicle 
involved in the accident. 
Finally, because the State failed to produce any evidence that the street sign was owned 
or the property of any person or entity, or was on public property or private property open to the 
public, even if Idaho Code§ 49-1301 has any legal application to the facts of this case, no 
rational trier-of-fact could have concluded that the State had proved that Mr. Wright had any 
legal duty to remain at the scene of the accident. 
II. The Defendant was denied his Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel 
The right of a Defendant in crimina] proceeding to be represented by counsel at each 
critical stage is well understood in Idaho . 
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A defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel extends 
to all critical stages of the prosecution where his substantial rights may be 
affected, and sentencing is one such stage. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134, 88 
S.Ct. 254, 256, 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967). The right to competent counsel attaches 
also when the defendant is deciding whether to plead guilty. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 
U.S. 52, 56, 106 S.Ct. 366, 369, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). See generally McMann v. 
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 769-72, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1448-49, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 
(1970). 
State v. Retarnoza, 125 Idaho 792,796,874 P.2d 603,607 (Idaho App. 1994). In this case, Mr. 
Wright clearly requested the opportunity to consult with counsel prior to proceeding to 
sentencing (Tr. p. 56, ll. 11-14). The trial court then prepared to set the matter for disposition 
(Tr. p. 56, ll. 15-16). The State then interposed an objection to delaying sentencing and tried to 
induce the Defendant into waiving his previously asserted right to counsel by enticing him with a 
withheld judgment. The prosecutor then invited the Court to explain to the Defendant how a 
withheld judgment operates in Idaho (Tr. p. 59, 1. 10-11) and the trial court then rendered the 
Defendant information on the process and ramifications of a withheld judgment. Following the 
Court's explanation, the Defendant agreed to proceed to sentencing without counsel. That the 
right to counsel is a fundamental right that can only be waived by a knowing, voluntary and 
intelligent waiver by the Defendant is beyond dispute under Idaho law. 
During its explanation of the workings, effects and ramifications of withheld judgments 
in Idaho, the trial erred in a couple of material respects. First, the trial court advised Mr. Wright 
that a withheld judgment would not operate as a conviction unless there was a later probation 
violation (Tr. pp. 59-60). Secondly, the trial court failed to advise Mr. Wright that Idaho Code§ 
49-325 ovenides Idaho Code§ 49-1301 and imposes a mandatory one (1) year license revocation 
even where judgment is withheld to a violation of Idaho Code§ 49-1301. The trial courts advise 
also flies in the face of the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Sharp, that a 
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withheld judgment operates as a conviction in Idaho until the case is dismissed following the 
Defendant's successful completion of probation. 
Because the Defendant's request for counsel was overcome by erroneous and incomplete 
legal advise and information provided by the prosecutor and the trial court, the Defendant's 
waiver of his right to counsel was not knowing, voluntary or intelligent and the judgment 
imposed in this case should be vacated and set aside and this matter remanded for sentencing. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the conviction of the Defendant should be set aside and 
this case dismissed, or at the very least, the judgment should be set aside and this matter 
remanded for sentencing. 
remanded for sentencing at which the Defendant can avail himself of his fundamental right to 
counsel. 
RESPECTFl.JLLY SUBMITI'ED this:~ day of July 2010. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~y of July 2010 I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy ofthe foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Barry McHugh 
Attn: Jim Reierson 
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid. 
[X] Fu transmission 208-446-1833 
[ ] Hand delivered. 
RICHARD K. KUCK, PLLC 
Attorney for the Defendant/ Appellant 
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BARRY McHUGH 
Prosecuting Attorney 
501 Government Way/Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814-1800 
Telephone: (208) 446-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 446-1833 
Assigned Attorney: 
JIM REIERSON 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CASE NUMBER CR-09-0025609 
MEMORANDUM OPPOSING 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 
RICHARD W. WRIGHT, 
Defendant. 
I. ISSUES PRESENTED 
A. Whether Evidence At Trial Was Sufficient To Convict The Defendant Of A 
Violation of Idaho Code §49-1301. 
B. Whether Conduct Of Prosecuting Attorney And The Trial Court Denied The 
Defendant's Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 1, 2010, the Defendant, Richard Wright ("Defendant") was found guilty of a 
violation ofldaho Code ("I.C.") § 49-1301 during a bench trial before the Honorable Magistrate 
Penny Friedlander (Hr'g Tr. pg. 57). The Court made several findings of fact. 
The Defendant was the driver of a motor vehicle involved in an accident (!d. at 56-57). 
The accident occurred on December 18, 2009 where the Defendant was driving a black Grand 
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Cherokee vehicle on Nita St. near its intersection with Government Way (Id. at 53). While 
traveling easterly on Nita St., the Defendant slid off the street, struck a speed limit sign and 
knocked the speed limit sign down. (!d.). After the Defendant knocked the speed limit sign 
down, he became aware of the broken sign and damage to his vehicle but intended to file a self-
report form of the accident at a later time (!d. at 56). 
The Court supported its fmdings of fact based on the testimony of Mr. Blanchard, Mr. 
Dewitt, Deputy Meehan, and Deputy Leyk. On December 18,2009, Mr. Blanchard and Mr. 
Dewitt observed a black Grand Cherokee vehicle slide offNita St. and strike a speed limit sign 
(Id. at 53). They obtained the license plate number of the vehicle, notified law enforcement and 
were able to identify a single driver of the vehicle that appeared to be male. (Id. at 54). 
Deputy Meehan and Deputy Leyk obtained the license plate number and confirmed that 
at the scene of the accident, there was a broken speed limit sign and fragments of a black vehicle 
(!d.). After observing the scene ofthe accident, they made contact with the Defendant's wife, 
Mrs. Wright, at her residence, and Mrs. Wright called her husband, Mr. Wright by cell phone (!d. 
at 55). During this phone call, Deputy Leyk was able to talk to the Defendant and validated his 
identity as Richard W. Wright (!d.). During this conversation, the Defendant confirmed that he 
did slide on ice near Government Way and had knocked over a sign (!d. at 56). 
Following the cell phone call, Deputy Meehan and Deputy Leyk met the Defendant at his 
place of employment (ld. ). At his place of employment, they observed a Jeep Grand Cherokee 
that had the same license plate number as the vehicle identified by dispatch as being involved in 
the accident. (!d.) Also, the deputies saw vehicle fragments and damage that matched the scene 
of the vehicle accident. (!d.). At this point, the Defendant denied any involvement of driving and 
the accident (!d.). 
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After the bench trial, the Defendant was convicted of a violation ofl.C. 49-1301 (Id. at 
57). The Court offered the Defendant the opportunity to set out disposition for a later time, and 
the Defendant requested time to consult an attorney for an appeal (!d.). The Court was prepared 
to set out disposition, but the prosecuting attorney notified the Court of the Defendant's ability to 
obtain a withheld judgment (!d. at 57-58). 
The Court again notified the Defendant that he could postpone disposition but was 
prepared to grant the Defendant a withheld judgment (!d. at 59). The Court explained to the 
Defendant what a withheld judgment was, and the Defendant indicated that he would like the 
withheld judgment (!d. at 60). Subsequently, the Court imposed a withheld judgment for the 
Defendant (Id. at 63). 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. The Evidence Presented At Trial Was Sufficient For The Trial Court To Convict 
The Defendant Of A Violation Of I. C. §49-1301. 
The State presented sufficient evidence at trial for the Defendant's conviction under I.C. 
§49-1301. Appellate review ofthe sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope. State v. Stone, 
147 Idaho 890, 892 (Idaho Ct. App. 2009). A finding of guilt will not be overturned where there 
is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the 
prosecution sustained it's burden of proving the essential elements ofthe crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt. !d. The appellate court should not substitute their view for that of the trier of 
fact with regards to the credibility of witnesses, the weight given to testimony, and the 
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. !d. Additionally, the appellate court will 
examine the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution. Id 
The Defendant erroneously stated that I.C. §49-1301 does not apply to a collision 
between a vehicle and personal property where the factors sets forth in I.C. §49-1305 are not 
MEMORANDUM OPPOSING APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 3 
Richard W. Wright 39483 65 of 183
 I
I
I
I
I
 t
 t
I
I
implicated. These statutes present two different criminal charges rather than interdependent 
elements of one criminal charge, and within the bounds of prosecutorial discretion, the State may 
pursue one charge over another. In this case, the State pursued prosecution of the Defendant for 
leaving the scene of an accident under I. C. §49-130 1 rather than failure to give immediate notice 
of an accident under I.C. §49-1305. The Court did find that the Defendant satisfied the elements 
of the misdemeanor charge of leaving the scene of the accident and appropriately convicted the 
defendant ofthat crime. (Hr'g Tr. pg. 57). 
The Defendant makes a similarly erroneous argument when he contends that the State has 
not fulfilled its burden of proving a violation ofl.C. §49-1301 because it did not satisfy the 
elements of §49-1304. Again, the criminal charge ofleaving the scene of an accident is a 
different from the failure to locate and notify the owner of fixtures upon or adjacent to a 
highway. The State did not pursue a criminal charge of §49-1304 against the Defendant, so it is 
not required to prove the essential elements of that charge in addition to the statutory elements 
provided in §49-1301. Under prosecutorial discretion, the State charged the Defendant with a 
misdemeanor of leaving the scene of an accident. 
Next, the Defendant argues the Idaho Supreme Court's interpretation of what Defendant 
calls "the legislative garbage" codified in I.C. §49-1301. In Munns v. Swift Transp. Co., the 
Court held that the applicability ofl.C. 49-1301 is not obvious where the property damage 
caused by an accident was to the front bumper of the defendant's truck and to a runaway horse. 
138 Idaho 108, 111 (Idaho 2002). In a case involving damage between a vehicle and personal 
property, the Court concluded that the applicability ofl.C. §49-1301 was not "obvious" but did 
not conclude that the applicability was non-existent. 
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The Defendant contends that the Supreme Court would strongly suggest no application of 
I.C. §49-1301 in an accident involving a vehicle and a speed limit sign; however, the Court did 
not explicitly ban the applicability ofthe statute to cases involving damage to vehicles and 
personal property. Id. The Court in Munns was concerned with determining whether the 
defendant driver was negligent rather than whether the defendant satisfied the elements of a 
misdemeanor charge of leaving the scene of an accident. !d. Moreover, it is the State's 
understanding that the Defendant's culpability is not an element ofi.C. §49-1301, nor is it an 
issue that Defendant has brought on appeal. 
Finally, the Defendant argues that the State failed to prove each essential element ofi.C. 
§49-1301 at trial. The Defendant's opening brief only contends that the State has failed to prove 
two elements. First, he alleges that the record is devoid of any evidence that the street sign was 
either on public property or private property open to the public. The trial record shows that Mr. 
Blanchard and Mr. Dewitt witnessed the Defendant's vehicle slide offNita Rd. and knock over a 
speed limit sign located on Nita St. near the Government Way intersection. (Hr'g Tr. pg. 53). 
The Court found this element of location to be true beyond a reasonable doubt. (!d.). Nita St., 
where the speed limit sign was located, is public property open to the public for vehicle 
transportation. 
Second, the Defendant alleges that the accident did not result in damage only to a vehicle. 
The Defendant erroneously construes I.C. §49-1302 to clarify the meaning ofi.C. §49-1301. He 
contends that I.C. §49-1302 mandates that an accident involve damage to two vehicles rather 
than one vehicle. As indicated supra, both of these statutes are separate criminal charges as I.C. 
§49-1301 involves a duty to remain at the scene of an accident involving a single vehicle while 
I. C. §49-1302 involves a duty to give information in an accident involving two vehicles. Further, 
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the Idaho Legislature intended for both of these statutes to be separate criminal charges as 
subsection (3) ofl.C. §49-1301 & §49-1302 have the same but separate penalties for violations 
of each particular charge. Additionally, the State proved there was damage to the Defendant's 
vehicle as there were car fragments and damage at the scene of the crime and at the Defendant's 
place of employment. (Hr' g Tr. pg. 56). 
Thus, the State did present sufficient evidence for Defendant's violation ofl.C. §49-1301 
at trial because the State established each essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Additionally, the State exercised proper prosecutorial discretion because it had sufficient 
evidence to pursue a violation of §49-1301 
B. The Defendant Knowingly, Intelligently, and Voluntarily Waived His Sixth 
Amendment Right To Counsel. 
Prior to the sentencing proceeding, the Defendant gave a knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. A defendant's right to counsel 
extends to all critical stages of the prosecution where substantial rights may be affected, and 
sentencing is such a stage. Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 562 (Idaho 2006). The defendant 
may waive his right to counsel. I. C. 19-857. In assessing the sufficiency of a defendant's waiver 
of counsel, the defendant's technical legal knowledge is not relevant to whether he knowingly 
exercised his right to defend himself prose. State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 747 (Idaho 2007). 
Instead, the court is to consider the "totality of the circumstances" in determining the validity of 
a defendant's waiver of counsel. Jd. 
The Defendant disputes he gave a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver under the 
circumstances at trial. At the time of conviction, the Court asked the Defendant if he wished to 
proceed with disposition or wait and have it set out for a later time. (Hr'g Tr. pg. 57). The 
Defendant stated he would like to consult an attorney regarding an appeal, and the State 
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suggested a withheld judgment for the Defendant in light of extending disposition. (Id. at 57-58). 
The Court stated it would be inclined to grant a withheld judgment but again, reiterated that 
disposition would be set out for another time if the Defendant wanted a later date. (Id. at 59). The 
Court explained what a withheld judgment entailed but stated again that it would be a fair request 
and required by law to set out the sentencing date if Defendant wanted to. (!d. at 60). The 
Defendant was made quite clear that he could have the assistance of counsel for sentencing as the 
Court explicitly informed him on three occasions, but he chose to waive counsel and proceed 
with the disposition. 
Further, the Defendant argues that he did not have proper waiver of counsel because he 
was given erroneous and incomplete legal information provided by the prosecutor and the trial 
court. While the Defendant did not provide a citation for US. v. Sharp, the Idaho Supreme Court 
has stated that a withheld judgment operates as a conviction until the case is dismissed following 
probation. US. v. Sharp, 145 Idaho 403, 407 (Idaho 2008). The trial record does not substantially 
support the Defendants contention that the trial court advised the Defendant that a withheld 
judgment would not operate as a conviction unless there is a later probation violation. (Hr' g Tr. 
pg. 60). 
But even if the Court's explanation of a withheld conviction was incorrect, the 
explanation would amount to harmless error. Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which 
does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Idaho Criminal Rule 52. The Defendant 
argues that the trial court failed to advise him of the mandatory one (1) year license revocation 
imposed by I.C. §49-325 overriding §49-1301. First, I.C. §49-325 does not override §49-1301 
for purposes of the license revocation as §49-1301(4) clearly states "the department shall revoke 
for a period of one year the driver's license, privileges, or permit to drive of any person 
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convicted of a violation of the provisions of subsection ( 1) of this section." Secondly, the 
Defendant would still face a mandatory driver's license revocation despite any disposition he 
received. Whether the Defendant received a withheld judgment or another disposition, he still 
faces a mandatory driver's license suspension upon conviction ofl.C. §49-1301. 
Thus, under the totality of the circumstances, Defendant did make a sufficient waiver of 
counsel at disposition because his waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Additionally, 
it is not clear from the record that the Defendant was given erroneous or incomplete legal 
information, but even if the information was partially incorrect, the result amounted to harmless 
error. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The State provided sufficient evidence at trial for the Defendant's conviction under I. C. 
§49-1301. Additionally, the Defendant's waiver of counsel at sentencing was made knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily. For those foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests this 
Court affirm the conviction and disposition of the trial court. 
DATED this _{kday of August, 2010. 
~Nv~~b f;rc 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the [Zr' day of JiM~ , 2009, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing was caused to be mailed, faxed, and/or hand-delivered to: 
Richard K. Kuck 
Attorney for the Defendant. 
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PURSUANT TO THE COURT'S briefing schedule, the Appellant respectfully submits 
this reply to the State's Memorandum Opposing AppeJlant's Opening Brief. As characterized by 
the Appellant's Opening Brief, there are several fundamental issues presented by this appeal: 
1) Does Idaho Code§ 49-1301 apply to a single vehicle co11ision involving damage only 
to the driver's vehic1e and another's personal property? 
2. If Idaho Code§ 49-1301 does apply to a single vehicle collision involving damage 
only to the driver's vehicle and another's personal property, what does the statute require an 
involved driver to do to meet its requirements? 
3) If, Idaho Code§ 49-1301 does apply to a single vehicle collision involving damage 
only to the driver's vehicle and another's personal property, did the State prove all elements of 
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt? 
4) Was the Appellant denied his Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel when his waiver of 
that right was induced when he requested counsel, but was persuaded to waive the right by 
erroneous legal advice rendered by the trial court? 
It is the Appellant's view that the only issue that need be addressed by the Court relates to 
the third issue stated above: did the state prove at trial each of the essential elements of the 
offense of a violation of Idaho Code § 49-1301? 
Contrary to the State's theory as the Appellant views it, Idaho Code§ 49-1301 does not 
impose upon drivers the generalized duty to remain at the scene of an accident until law 
enforcement arrives. 
1. ARGUMENT 
In its Memorandum Opposing Appellant's Opening Brief the State argues rhat Idaho 
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Code§ 49-1301 and Idaho Code§ 49-1304 constitute 'different criminal charges ratherthan 
interdependent elements of one criminal charge, and that within the bounds of prosecutorial 
discretion, the State may pursue one charge over another.' (See: State's Memorandum Opposing 
at4). The unstated extension to the State's argument is that it elected to pursue this case as a 
violation ofldaho Code§ 49-1301 as opposed to the separate and distinct violation ofldaho 
Code § 49-1304. 
Initially, as a legal matter, the Idaho Supreme Court presumably was not joking when it 
stated it could not find any obvious application of Idaho Code§ 49-1301 to a single vehicle 
collision resulting in damage to only that single vehicle and a horse. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Munns v. Swift Transportation Co., Inc. clearly viewed 
Idaho Code§ 49-1301 as having app1ication only to a collision involving two separate vehicles: 
'Idaho Code section 49-1301(1) directs the driver of any vehicle involved in an 
accident to immediately stop and to remain at the scene until he has fulfilled the 
requirements of law. The statute prescribes the duty owed by the drivers in an 
accident to each other, presumably to a1low information gathering concerning the 
accident. However, the statute qualifies "an accident" by Jimiting it to one 
"resulling in only damage to a vehicle which is driven or attended by a person." In 
the case before us, where the property damage caused by the accident was to the 
front bumper of Swift's truck and to a runaway horse, the appbcability of the 
statute is not obvious.' 
Munns v. Swift Transportation Co., Inc. 138 Idaho 108, 58. P.3d 92, 95 (Idaho 2002). The 
Supreme Court's analysis clearly was that the statutory phrase 'resulting in only damage to a 
vehicle which is driven or attended by a person' does not include the vehicle driven by the driver 
who had the duty to provide information. There is no utility in remaining at the scene of an 
accident to provide information to yourself. 
As a factual matter, a wizened local defense attorney often included in his closing 
remarks the notion of a 'Scottish verdict.' The argument being that whether an accused actually 
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committed an offense is not relevant in a criminal proceeding where each of the essential 
elements of an offense were 'not proved' by the State. 
FundamentaJiy the issue goes to the sufficiency of the evidence introduced at trial. It is 
the Appellant's argument that the Court need not reach the issue of whether Idaho Code§ 49-
1301 could apply to the facts of this case because as a matter of evidence, the State failed to 
prove each essential element of that offense at trial 
The argument is set forth in detail in the Appe11ant's Opening Brief. As its counter, the 
State argues that it need not prove the elements of Idaho Code § 49-1304 in order to prove a 
violation ofldaho Code § 49-1301 because the two are separate and distinct charges. Accepting 
the State's assertion, the issue is what elements must be proven to prove a violation of Idaho 
Code§ 49-1301? In essence, it seems that the State's proof must include at least proof that a 
driver left the scene of an accident involving 1) only damage to a vehicle, 2) driven or attended 
by a person, and 3) without fu]fiJiing the requirements of law. 
Assuming for the point of argument that the statute can apply to a single vehicle collision 
with a speed limit sign, what then did the State at trial prove in order to meet its burden of proof? 
It is prudent to start by looking at what the State did not prove. Notably absent from the State's 
recitation of facts in its Memorandum in Opposition is any evidence produced at trial regarding 
the monetary value of the damage to the speed limit sign that was damaged in the collision. 
Additionally, the evidence produced by the State at trial was that no person suffered any injury or 
death in or as a result of the accident at issue. Those points are critical. In the absence of damage 
to a vehicle or other personal property of one person exceeding $1,500.00, and in the absence of 
any injury or death to any person, there is no duty for any driver involved in an accident to notify 
law enforcement of that accident..Th.at statute was likely enacted for the purposes of protecting 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 4 
p.5 
Richard W. Wright 39483 76 of 183
s:J6673
l
 
lla
 t
I  
 J
l I
Sep 14 2010 16:59 Richard K. Kuck, PLLC 2flq6673379 
law enforcement from the rigors of having to 1nvestigate and attend every slide-off and fender 
bender occuning on Idaho's roadways. The legislative policy of the State ofldaho is that non-
injury accidents involving Jess than $1,500.00 damage to any person's property need not be 
reported to law enforcement. The only evidence introduced at trial, and thus the only finding 
made by the Court regarding the Defendant's actions following the collision, was that the 
Defendant did not report the accident to law enforcement. Report1ng the accident to law 
enforcement is something the Defendant had absolutely no legal duty to do. 
The State seems to believe that there is some generalized duty to remain at the scene of 
every accident until law enforcement is notified and arrives. That belief is simply not consistent 
with Idaho law. 
Idaho Code Section 49-1301 is exactly what the Munns Court stated it is. It is a statute 
that requires that drivers involved in multiple car collisions remain at the scene of the collision 
until they have exchanged information. If the accident involves injury or death or if the damage 
to any one person's personal property exceeds $1,500,.00. only then must law enforcement be 
notified. 
The evidence introduced at the trial of this case was that the Appellant's vehicle slid off a 
roadway on ice, knocked over a speed limit sign, and returned to the roadway. There was no 
evidence introduced regarding the value of damage done to either the Appellant's vehicle or to 
the speed limit sign. There was no evidence introduced to identify the owner of the speed limit 
sign, nor any evidence introduced regarding the steps undertaken by the Appellant to locate or 
notify the owner of the speed limit sign. 
The State argues that the Appellant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his 
right to counsel, or that if he did not that the trial court's erroneous explanation of the 
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ramifications and consequences of a withheld judgment amounted to harmless error because it 
' 
did not affect the substantial rights of the Defendant. The Right to Counsel is definitionally a 
substantial right. Whether, the sentence imposed would have had differing effect if the 
sentencing hearing had been delayed and counsel obtained or not is of no moment to whether a 
substantial right of the Defendant had been affected by the way the post trial proceedings 
transpired. Factually, though not capable of inclusion in the record of this appeal, had the 
Defendant obtained counsel he wouJd have certainly been advised to move for a judgment of 
acquittal, a new trial, or moved to arrest the judgment in the trial court. Those things he was 
deprived of because due to the advise he received at trial from the State and the Court he did not 
seek counsel until he was advised by the Department of Transportation that his drivers license 
was to be suspended. 
The waiver of counsel was not knowing, intelligent or voluntary and if the conviction is 
not vacated for the reasons set forth above. this matter should be remanded for re-sentencing at 
which time the Appellant can avail himself of those post-trial remedies deprived him by the 
passage of time following his waiver of the right to counsel. 
The Appellant respectfully incorporates each of the arguments raised in his Opening Brief 
into this Reply Brief and no arguments raised by the Appellant in his opening brief is waived. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this JY!ctay of September 2010 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~day of September 2010 I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
Barry McHugh 
Attn: Jim Reierson 
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid. 
[X] Fax transmission 208-446-1833 
[ ] Hand delivered. 
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Judge Mitchell ~~V\___ Clerk Shari Rohrbach 
Court Reporter Julie Foland 
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Time Sp~l Note 
04:05:17 PM J Callis, Richard Kuck for appellant, Jim Reierson present for the 
state. I've read the briefs. 
04:05:54 PM Criminal rules indicate either party could notice this up for hearing 
and I finally noticed this up. We're here for argument. 
04:06:26 PM This is a case where a veh left the road and knocked over a 
speed limit sign. The question is what does the law require the 
driver to do. I cited a case law, in 49-301 Sup Court said there 
wasn't a connection. The questions is is that a catch-all statute or 
a stand-alone statute. I can't find Idaho case law on that issue. If 
the statute applies was the evidence support conviction. I thnk 49-
Kuck 301 doesn't apply. The one that applies 49-1304. Was trial 
evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction, as I laid out in the brief 
is was not. The theory at trial was that the officer's testimony was 
concerned that the accident was not immediately reported. My 
argument is it's not an immediately reportable accident. 49-1305 
does not apply. 49-1304 doesn't require anything but reasonable 
attempts. 
I 04:11:59 PM IJ II He left the scene, he went to work, he lied to the officer. I 
04:12:15 PM There's no requirement he stay at the scene. There were two 
police contacts. On the phone he told the officer his veh slid off 
and he hit a sign. There's not duty to report. The duty is to report 
Kuck to the owner of the sign. There's no evidence as to who owned 
the sign. Argues re: statutes. There is no other veh here. Reads 
statute, the word "only" creates confusion in 49-1301. 49-1302 
requires another veh. 
I 04:16:58 PM IJ II Reads 49-1302. I 
~:18:04PM IKuck II He was going to fill out a self report form. I 
:18:23 PM IJ II What evidence is there he satisfied 49-1301? I 
: 04:18:35 PM IKuck 111304 identifies the duty. I 
I 04:19:07 PM IIJ II He didn't do the duty. How can you claim he did? I 
I 04:19:41 PM I Kuck The statute says only to another veh. 1301 doesn't apply to single 
veh accident. 
04:20:46 PM J It applies to any accident iwth a veh. That describes your clients 
situation. 
II 04:21:03 PM II II There's nobody there to inform about the sign. There's no I 
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II Kuck evidence he did or did not inform anyone. 
~nM~·· ;24:27P~ 1301 does not tell him what he has to do. 
:2"':Gr' ~~~ J I+ C><:ll\11:> ho r~n·t leave. 
04:25:06 PM Until he fulfills the requirement of law, so the question is what are 
Kuck the requirements? He was contacted by law enforcement within 
15 minutes. 
04:26:02 PM He didn't do any of the things he was required to do. How can you 
J raise this argument when it wasn't raised before Judge 
Friedlander? 
04:26:54 PM Kuck Error can be reviewed on appeal. 
04:29:49 PM The other argument as to do with events following trial. The 
discussion after the Court announced its decision, Mr Wright 
requested counsel for sentencing. He requested counsel prior to 
proceeding to sentencing. 
04:31:15 PM J Requested counsel for sentencing or appeal? 
I 04:31:26 PM I Kuck Reads from transcript. 
I 04:31:41 PM I J Request for counsel for an appeal. 
04:31:52 PM The trial court said the case would be set for disp and allow him 
the right to counsel. Then the pros objected and indicated he'd be 
Kuck eligible for a w/held. The Court then explained a w/held. And a lie 
suspension if a conviction was entered, if there was a violation of 
probation. 
04:36:54 PM He requested counsel, the court was going to set disp. Then the 
pros objected. Waiver of right to counsel must be done voluntarily. 
The remedy is to remand so he can have right to counsel. He paid 
his fine, then got a letter saying his license was suspended which 
prompts a call to counsel. 
04:39:15 PM I handled this at trial. I'd rely on the brief the state submitted. 49-
1305 doesn't apply. Evidence was sufficient at trial. Def did 
nothing under 49-1301. The officers took fragments found at the 
scene that matched his car. He left the scene and went 
downtown. The record shows that Judge Friedlander explained his 
rights. As far as the contention he asked for counsel, he was 
PA asking about an attorney for appeal. The judge asked if he wanted to proceed to disp. He wanted to go ahead. I was not giving legal 
advice at the court hearing, I wanted to make sure the judge 
understood he may not understand a withheld. The transcript is 
clear that the def did not have to proceed to sentencing just 
because the state wanted to proceed. He was not happy with the 
lie susp. Statute is clear the dept will susp the lie. Ask the court to 
deny the appellants motion. 
II 04:46:42 PM II II Argues re: Supreme Court ruling and this case. Ask the court to 
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04:50:57 PM J 
04:51:11 p 
04:51:11 p End 
protect right to counsel. Matter should be remanded and we can 
proceed with post trial remedies. 
Will take this under advisement and get a decision out as soon as 
I can. 
Produced by FTR Gold™ 
www. fortherecord .com 
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S'IATE OF IDAHO 
County of KOOTENAI )" 
FILED-------"s"'--· -----'-~-~ -_1_/ _ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
vs. 
RICHARD WRIGHT, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
----------------------------~) 
Case No. CRM 2009 25609 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER ON APPEAL 
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND. 
Defendant Richard W. Wright (Wright) appeals from an Order of Magistrate Judge Penny 
Friedlander, finding him guilty of the misdemeanor violation ofldaho Code§ 49-1301 (Accidents 
Involving Damage to Vehicle) (Tr. P. 56, Ll. 13-15), and subsequently sentencing him to a withheld 
judgment. The citation itself calls out a violation of I. C. § 49-1301. 
The evidence establishes on the morning ofDecember 18,2009, Wright was the driver of an 
automobile which, due to icy conditions, went off of the road, struck a speed limit sign, knocked the 
sign down, and then reentered the roadway. Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 2. A court trial was held 
on March 1, 2010, in which Wright represented himself pro se. At the conclusion of the trial, 
Magistrate Judge Penny Friedlander found Wright guilty of violating I.C. § 49-1301 beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Tr., p. 56, Ll. 13-15. 
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Following the conviction, Judge Friedlander inquired whether Wright was prepared to 
proceed to disposition, and Wright requested additional time to consult with an attorney for appeal. 
The precise dialogue was as follows: 
Q. [the Court] So at this time I do find for the State beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Mr. Wright, do you wish to proceed to disposition today or would you like to wait 
and have me set this? 
A. [Mr. Wright] I would request time to consult with an attorney for an appeal. 
Tr., p. 57, Ll. 11-14. The deputy prosecutor for the State then stated: "because this is somewhat of 
an unusual case, but I really don't think that uh, there's really any need to have any delay on 
sentencing." Tr., p. 58, LL. 11-13. The State indicated on the record it would recommend a 
withheld judgment, with which the Court agreed. Tr., p. 58, Ll. 3-4; p. 59, Ll. 2-3. After explaining 
what a withheld judgment is, the Court withheld judgment for a period of one year, setting certain 
conditions. Tr., p. 63, Ll. 3-16. 
Wright filed his Notice of Appeal on April 9, 2010, setting forth the question of whether I.C. 
§ 49-1301 is applicable to single-vehicle collisions between a driver's vehicle and a fixture where the 
driver failed to remain on the scene. Notice of Appeal, p. 2, ~ 3(a)(1). Wright filed his opening brief 
on July 28, 2010, one day late pursuant to the Notice of Settling Transcript on Appeal and Briefing 
Schedule filed June 22, 2010. Wright argued the State failed to prove each essential element to the 
charged violation and that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in light of the 
Court's explaining a withheld judgment. Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 7-14. On August 12, 2010, 
the State timely filed its Memorandum Opposing Appellant's Opening Brief. On September 5, 2010, 
Wright timely filed his Reply Brief. After that, neither Wright nor the State noticed the matter for 
argument on appeal pursuant to I.C.R. 54.16. On March 1, 2011, this matter was noticed-up by this 
Court for oral argument on May 10, 2011. Oral argument was held on May 10, 2011, and the Court 
took the matter under advisement. 
I 
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
Appeals from the magistrate's division shall be heard by the district court as an appellate 
proceeding unless the district court orders a trial de novo. Idaho Criminal Rule 54.2. Where a 
district court acts in an appellate capacity on an appeal taken from the magistrate's division, and a 
further appeal is taken, appellate courts review the record independently of, but with due regard for, 
the decision of the district court. State v. Bailey, 117 Idaho 941, 942, 792 P.2d 966, 967 (Ct.App. 
1990). In reviewing claims of violations of constitutional rights, appellate courts defer to factual 
findings not found to be clearly erroneous, but exercise free review of whether constitutional 
requirements were met. State v. Anderson, 140 Idaho 484, 488, 95 P.3d 635, 639 (2004) (citing State 
v. Weber, 116 Idaho 449, 776 P.2d 458 (1989)). 
On appeal, where a defendant stands convicted, the evidence is viewed in the light 
most favorable to the prosecution and the reviewing court is precluded from 
substituting its judgment for that of the jury as to the credibility of witnesses, the 
weight of the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. 
State v. Allen, 129 Idaho 556, 558, 929 P.2d 118, 120 (1996) (quoting State v. Gardiner, 127 Idaho 
156, 163,898 P.2d 615,622 (Ct.App. 1995)). A judgment of conviction will not be overturned on 
appeal when substantial and competent evidence, though it may be conflicting, supports the 
judgment. State v. Warner, 97 Idaho 204, 206, 541 P.2d 977, 979 (1975) (citing State v. Shannon, 95 
Idaho 299,303, 507 P.2d 808, 812 (1973). 
In general, the failure to raise an issue before the trial court waives that issue for purposes of 
appeal. State v. Lenon, 143 Idaho 415,417, 146 P.3d 681, 683 (Ct.App. 2005), citing State v. Fodge, 
121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992). However, in the case of fundamental error in a 
criminal case, we may consider the issue even though no objection was made at time of trial. !d., 
citing State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho 249, 251, 486 P .2d 260, 262 ( 1971 ). 
I 
I 
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III. ANALYSIS ON APPEAL. 
A. WRIGHT DID NOT RAISE THE ISSUE OF LACK OF PROOF/PROPER 
CHARGING BEFORE THE MAGISTRATE. 
At trial, Wright focused his argument on the witnesses had not identified him as the driver. 
Tr. p. 52, Ll. 6-11. Wright argued before the magistrate that " ... there is not enough evidence to rule 
uh, 100 percent that the defendant was driving the vehicle and that somebody else could have been 
driving that vehicle." Tr. p. 53, Ll. 2-6. That argument ignores the fact that only one person was 
driving the Jeep Cherokee in question. Judge Friedlander commented on that fact. Tr., p. 54, Ll. 4-
6. That argument ignores the fact that Wright eventually confessed on the phone to law enforcement. 
Tr. p. 36, Ll. 20-25. The citing officer, Kootenai County Sheriff Deputy Joshua J. Leyk, testified 
that when he confronted Wright about the accident, Wright said he was aware that he'd knocked over 
the sign, that he was a former law enforcement officer and that he intended to use the "self-report 
form" that he was familiar with. Tr. p. 36, Ll. 20-25. Judge Friedlander commented on the fact that 
Wright admitted to law enforcement he had knocked over the sign. Tr. p. 55, L 24- p. 56, L. 2. 
Wright's arguments on appeal are that a charge under I.C. § 49-1301 was improper and there 
was insufficient evidence at trial to support a conviction under I.C. § 49-1301. Wright's arguments 
on appeal ignore the fact that he did not raise either of those issues before Judge Friedlander at trial. 
In State v. Lenon, 143 Idaho 415, 417, 146 P .3d 681, 683 (Ct.App. 2005), the Idaho Court of 
Appeals held: 
In general, the failure to raise an issue before the trial court waives that 
issueforpurposesofappeal. Statev. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192,195, 824P.2d 123, 
126 (1992). However, in the case of fundamental error in a criminal case, we may 
consider the issue even though no objection was made at time of trial. State v. 
Haggard, 94 Idaho 249, 251, 486 P .2d 260, 262 ( 1971 ). In Rutherford, we 
allowed a claim of breach of a plea agreement to be raised for the first time on 
appeal because "a breach of a plea bargain agreement by the state affects the 
voluntariness of the guilty plea and is fundamental error." !d. at 915, 693 P.2d at 
111 7. FN3 Based on the ruling in Rutherford, Lenon argues that appellate review of 
his claim should not be ba..rred merely because he failed to pursue it in the district 
court. 
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FN3. The Idaho Supreme Court recently adopted 
Rutherford's reasoning in State v. Jafek, 141 Idaho 71, 74, 106 P.3d 
397, 400 (2005). 
We disagree, for fundamental error review is not necessarily appropriate 
where the record shows more than a mere failure to object. The prevailing 
definition of fundamental error in Idaho is expressed in State v. Sarabia, 125 
Idaho 815, 818, 875 P.2d 227, 230 (1994) (quoting State v. Knowlton, 123 Idaho 
916, 918, 854 P.2d 259, 261 (1993)): 
Error that is fundamental must be such error as goes to the 
foundation or basis of a defendant's rights or must go to the 
foundation of the case or take from the defendant a right which was 
essential to his defense and which no court could or ought to 
permit him to waive. Each case win of necessity, under such a rule, 
stand on its own merits. Out of the facts in each case will arise the 
law. 
The fundamental error doctrine is premised on the obligation to see that a 
defendant receives a fair trial, State v. Lewis, 126 Idaho 77, 80-81, 878 P.2d 776, 
779-80 (1994); State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho 249,251,486 P.2d 260, 262 (1971), 
and is intended to remedy situations where an alleged error may have deprived the 
defendant of his or her constitutional right to a fair proceeding. State v. Kuhn, 139 
Idaho 710, 715, 85 P.3d 1109, 1114 (Ct.App.2003); State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 
445, 448, 816 P.2d 1002, 1005 (Ct.App.1991). The fundamental error embodied 
in a breach of a plea agreement may be raised on appeal in the absence of an 
objection at trial because, as this Court stated in Rutherford, "[m]ere silence or the 
failure to object" is insufficient to waive the fundamental rights implicated in a 
guilty plea. Id at 915, 693 P.2d at 1117. 
In this case, however, the record demonstrates that Lenon did not overlook 
or merely fail to object to the alleged violation of the plea agreement. Following 
his sentencing, Lenon moved to withdraw his guilty plea or obtain specific 
performance of the agreement because of the prosecutor's alleged breach. This 
motion establishes that Lenon was fully aware of his rights relative to the alleged 
breach. He subsequently withdrew this motion, however, presumably for strategic 
reasons, and thereby prevented the district court from addressing it. Any error 
remains only because Lenon elected not to pursue his challenge in the trial court-
not because he or the trial court failed to recognize it prior to appeal. 
If Lenon had pursued the motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the district 
court could have developed a record on this issue and, if the district court's ruling 
had then been appealed, this Court would have had the benefit of that record. 
Although Rutherford holds that claims of breach of a plea agreement may be 
heard for the first time on appeal, our case law also dictates that such a claim 
should be considered for the first time on appeal only if the record provided is 
sufficient for that purpose. State v. Wills, 140 Idaho 773, 775, 102 P.3d 380, 382 
(Ct.App.2004); State v. Jones, 139 Idaho 299, 301, 77 P.3d 988, 990 
(Ct.App.2003); State v. Kellis, 129 Idaho 730, 733-34, 932 P.2d 358, 361-62 
(Ct.App.1997). Thus, although claims of breach of a plea agreement may be 
heard initially on appeal with a less-than-fully-developed record, there is a 
preference for a complete record developed in the trial court. Here, by raising and 
then abandoning the motion for a remedy for the alleged breach, Lenon 
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purposefully limited the thoroughness of the record on appeal. We will not reward 
this tactic, referred to by the State as "forum shopping," by hearing the appeal on 
the intentionally limited record. Because Lenon consciously chose to prevent the 
trial court from addressing the alleged error, we will not consider the issue on 
appeal as a claim of fundamental error. It is appropriate here to apply the general 
rule that an appellate court ''will not 'review a trial court's alleged error on appeal 
unless the record discloses an adverse ruling which forms the basis for the 
assignment of error.'" State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378, 384, 987 P.2d 290, 296 
(1999) (quoting State v. Fisher, 123 Idaho 481,485, 849 P.2d 942,946 (1993)). 
Because we find the fundamental error doctrine inapplicable to this case, 
we decline to consider Lenon's only claim of error. The judgment of conviction is 
therefore affirmed. 
143 Idaho 415,417-18, 146 P.3d 681,683-84. While it is doubtful Wright's failure to raise these 
issues with the trial court were part of a purposeful limitation of the record by Wright on appeal, 
Wright nevertheless precluded Judge Friedlander from considering these issues at trial and 
developing a proper record for appeal. 
As the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Hadley, 122 Idaho 728, 731, 838 P. 2d 331, 334 
(Ct.App. 1992) held: 
Failure to raise constitutional and statutory issues below is a waiver of the 
right to raise the issues on appeal. White hawk v. State, 119 Idaho 168, 804 P .2d 
341 (Ct.App.1991). An exception to this rule is triggered, however, ifthe issue 
embodies a fundamental error committed by the lower court. A fundamental error 
is one which so profoundly distorts the proceedings that it produces manifest 
injustice depriving the defendant of his fundamental right to due process. State v. 
Lavy, supra. 
This Court concludes Wright failed to raise the issue of insufficient evidence at trial to support a 
conviction under I.C. § 49-1301, and accordingly, Wright has waived his right to hear that issue on 
appeal. Wright also did not raise this issue in his brief on appeal (nor did the State). At oral 
argument, counsel for Wright argued fundamental error was committed in that Wright couldn't have 
been convicted of a crime under a statute that does not apply. This Court finds that claim by 
Wright's counsel does not arise to a level of fundamental error. However, in order to make that 
determination that these issues do not arise to a level of fundamental error, this Court must examine 
the merits of Wright's claim of insufficient evidence. 
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B. WRIGHT WAS PROPERLY CHARGED WITH AND CONVICTED OF A 
VIOLATION OF IDAHO CODE§ 49-1301. 
In his opening brief, Wright argues the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict him under 
Idaho Code§ 49-1301 (Accidents Involving Damage to Vehicle); in part because§ 49-1301 does not 
apply to single-vehicle accidents of the type at issue here, and in part because the State failed to 
prove each essential element beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 7-13. 
Wright argues the State failed to prove that he had any duty to report his accident and his striking the 
speed limit sign. Jd, pp. 7-8. According to Wright, this is because the State did not prove that a 
violation ofl.C. § 49-1305 (Immediate Notice of Accidents), which requires a driver involved in an 
accident resulting in injury or death of anyone, or damage to property valued in excess of $1 ,500 to 
immediately notify the nearest police station or sheriff's department. !d., pp. 7-11. Wright states 
I.C. § 49-1304 (Duty Upon Striking Fixtures Upon or Adjacent to a Highway) sets forth the duties of 
an individual upon striking of fixtures on or adjacent to a highway. !d., pp. 7-8. Wright notes for the 
Court that I. C. § 49-1304 requires a fixture or other property to be legally on or adjacent to a 
roadway, but that the State never submitted any evidence of the speed limit signs legality vis a vis its 
location, or evidence of any injury to any person. !d., p. 8. Wright wholly ignores the fact that he 
was not charged with a violation ofi.C. § 49-1304. 
Wright spends much effort pointing out that there was "no evidence of the value of damage 
done to the street sign". Id., pp. 4, 8; Notice of Appeal, p. 2, ~ 3. Wright seems to ignore the fact 
that value of the sign hit only comes into play in a violation ofi.C. § 49-1405, a violation of which 
Wright was not charged. "Immediate notice" is required when the accident involves injury of a 
person, death of a person, or damage to a person over $1,500.00. Idaho Code§ 49-1405 was not 
alleged in the present case. 
A violation ofldaho Code§ 49-1301 is what was charged, and it requires an immediate stop 
at the scene or as close as possible, and an immediate return to the scene until one has fulfilled the 
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requirements of law. Wright did none ofthese things. Thus, Wright violated I.C. § 49-1301. 
Wright's counsel's oral argument was that I.C. § 49-1301 sets forth no duty. Wright is false in that 
claim. The statute reads: 
The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident, either on public or private property 
open to the public, resulting only in damage to a vehicle which is driven or attended 
by any person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident, or as 
close as possible, and shall immediately return to, and in every event shall remain at, 
the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the requirements oflaw. 
Wright's duty was to "immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident ... and in every event 
shall remain at the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of the law." Wright 
didn't stop, he kept going and he ran away from what he had done. Wright didn't remain at the 
scene of the accident. Wright's counsel's argument at oral argument was we don't know what the 
"requirements oflaw" were in this situation. Under I.C. § 49-1304, "Duty upon striking fixtures 
upon or adjacent to a highway", the driver shall take reasonable steps to locate and notify the owner 
or person in charge of the property of the fact. Wright was not charged with a violation ofl.C. § 49-
1304, but in any event, \X/ right did not do the things that are required under that statute. So, if that 
statute was tried by agreement by the parties, then Wright is guilty of violating that statute as well. 
Wright never stopped. Wright went to work and told no one of what happened. In fact, when 
Deputy Leyk and Deputy Mehan contacted Wright's wife and watched Wright's wife call Wright at 
work (Tr. p. 25, L. 17- p. 27, L. 4), Wright told his wife he'd hit the sign and knocked it down (Tr. 
p. 34, Ll. 14-18), and then Deputy Leyk got on the phone and Wright told Deputy Leyk the same 
thing over the phone. Tr. p. 35, L. 25 - p. 36, L. 18. However, when Deputy Leyk arrived at 
Wright's work, Wright changed his story and lied to Deputy Leyk. Deputy Leyk testified: 
Mr. Wright denied have- having any involvement in driving the vehicle at the 
time of the accident. He told me had had been advised his vehicle had been in an 
accident, but- and would not say who was driving the vehicle at the time. 
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Tr. p. 42, Ll. 1-7. There is simply no way Wright took "reasonable steps" under I. C. § 49-1304, to 
notify the owner of the sign when he fled the scene, stayed at his business, and then changed his 
story to Deputy Leyk; thus, there is no way Wright "fulfilled the requirements of law" under I. C. § 
49-1301. If Wright is a former law enforcement officer, as he told Deputy Leyk, Wright does little to 
uphold the reputation of those sworn to serve and protect by subsequently lying to Deputy Leyk. 
Counsel for Wright, without any legal citation, makes the following claim: "The driver of a 
vehicle involved in a collision not involving injury or death and which does not involve damage to 
property of any person in excess of $1,500.00 has no legal duty to report the accident to law 
enforcement." Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 8. Perhaps the reason there is no citation to any legal 
authority is there is no legal authority that would support such a claim. Such an unsubstantiated 
claim is not supported by a plain reading ofi.C. § 49-1301 and I.C. § 49-1304. 
Wright cites to Munns v. Swift Transportation Co., 138 Idaho 108, 111, 58 P.3d 92, 95 
(2002), for the proposition that I. C. § 49-1301 does not apply to cases in which there is only minor 
da.mage to the driver's vehicle and to personal property. !d., pp. 10-1 L Munns was a negligence 
case in which the truck driver for Swift Transportation Co. hit and killed horse on Highway 20 
between Rexburg and Idaho Falls, Idaho, and kept going, the dead horse being left in the highway. 
Munns came along later when it was dark and rainy, and hit the horse in the middle ofthe road, and 
Munns was seriously injured. 138 Idaho 108, 109, 58 P.3d 92, 93. The Idaho Supreme Court held 
the negligence per se instruction should not have been given to the jury because " ... I. C. § 49-1301 
cannot be held to define conduct that would give rise to negligence per se under the facts of this 
case." 138 Idaho 108, 111, 58 P.3d 92, 95. The basis for that decision was that I.C. § 49-1301 
"directs the driver of any vehicle involved in an accident to immediately stop and to remain at the 
scene until he has fulfilled the requirements oflaw." Id. The Idaho Supreme Court noted the 
purpose was "presu..mably to allow i!l..formation conceroing the accident." !d. Wright argues the 
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following quote from the Idaho Supreme Court in Munns helps his argument: "In the case before us, 
where the property damage caused by the accident was to the front bumper of Swift's truck and to a 
runaway horse, the applicability of the statute is not obvious." !d. Nothing about that quote in dicta 
assists Wright. Munns is a negligence case. The quote from that negligence case Wright likes is 
dicta. Even in that setting, all the Idaho Supreme Court said was ''the applicability of the statute is 
not obvious." The Idaho Supreme Court did not find the statute not applicable, unconstitutional or 
invalid. The actual reason (not the dicta) the Idaho Supreme Court found it error to give a 
negligence per se instruction based on I.C. § 49-1301 was: 
Moreover, a second, subsequent accident with the then dead horse was not the 
harm sought to be prevented by the statute. Thus, because the four-part test of 
Sanchez v. Galey has not been met, we conclude that I.C. § 49-1301(1) cannot be 
held to define conduct that would give rise to negligence per se under the facts of 
this case. We hold that Instruction 31 should not have been given to the jury. 
!d. Time and time again at oral argument, counsel for Wright made the following argument: "So 
what is the difference between a semi-truck and a horse, and a SUV and a street sign?" There are a 
lot of differences. First of all, this is a criminal matter in which Wright went off the road and struck 
a speed limit sign. The horse in Munns had to wander onto the roadway, where Wright had to 
wander off the roadway causing the accident breaking a governmental entity's street sign. Wright 
caused this accident. In doing so, Wright violated I.C. § 49-1301. 
Wright then argues the State failed to prove each essential element of the crime charged 
beyond a reasonable doubt. !d., pp. 12-13. Wright states no evidence was introduced at trial that the 
speed limit sign was on public property or property open to the public, or that the accident here 
involved damage beyond that to the driver's (Wright's) vehicle. !d., p. 12. Wright contends I.C. §§ 
1301 and 1302 (Duty to Give Information in an Accident Involving Damage to a Vehicle) must be 
read in conjunction and, when so read, indicate they apply only to accidents involving something 
othei than. a single--vehicle collision v;ith private propeli';. Jd., p. 13. This is a recu..rring theme for 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON APPEAL page 10 
Richard W. Wright 39483 92 of 183
I
I
I
I e
" / wj l . lL i
Wright. He wants at times I. C. §§ 49-1302, 49-1303, 49-1304 and 48-1305 to all be grafted on to I.C 
§ 49-1301 when all Wright was ever charged with and was tried upon, was violating I.C. § 49-1301. 
The State responds it exercised its prosecutorial discretion in charging Wright under I.C. § 
49-1301, irrespective ofthe factors in§ 49-1305 not being present. Memorandum Opposing 
Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 3-4. " ... [T]he criminal charge ofleaving the scene of an accident is a 
[sic] different from the failure to locate and notify the owner of fixtures upon or adjacent to a 
highway." !d., p. 4. The State goes on to argue Munns' inapplicability to this case in light of its 
focus on negligence, not on whether a defendant had committed the elements of the charge of 
leaving the scene of an accident. Id, p. 5. The State points to the trial record showing witnesses had 
personally observed Wright's vehicle slide off the public road and strike the speed limit sign adjacent 
to the public road, and to Judge Friedlander's fmding of the location element beyond a reasonable 
doubt. !d. The State disagrees with Wright's contention, that I.C. § 49-1301 is clarified by§ 49-
1302, arguing that the two subsections contemplate different penalties. !d., pp. 5-6. Finally, the 
State points the Cou.rt to evidence in the record of da..rnage to Wright's ve}licle. ld, p. 6. 
In his response, Wright again argues§ 49-1301 does not contemplate cases in which damage 
results only to the driver's vehicle. Appellant's Reply Brief, p. 3 . 
. . . [T]he statutory phrase 'resulting in only damage to a vehicle which is driven or 
attended by a person' does not include the vehicle driven by the driver who had the 
duty to provide information. There is no utility in remaining at the scene of an 
accident to provide information to yourself. 
!d. The plain language of§ 49-1301 does not limit its application to the exchange of identification 
and insurance information. Indeed, that is not discussed at all in the statute. Wright goes on to 
reiterate his earlier argument that the Court should not reach the question of whether§ 49-1301 
applies to the facts of this case in light of the State's failure to prove each essential element at trial. 
!d., p. 4. 
Again, Idaho Code§ 49-1301 reads in part: 
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The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident, either on public or private property 
open to the public, resulting only in damage to a vehicle which is driven or attended 
by any person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident, or as 
close as possible, and shall immediately return to, and in every event shall remain at, 
the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of law. 
I.C. § 49-1301(1). Any failure to stop or to comply with the Code "shall" amount to a misdemeanor. 
I.C. § 49-1301(3). A conviction under subsection (1) of§ 49-1301, "shall" result in a one-year 
revocation of driving privileges. I.C. § 49-1301(4). 
Statutory construction begins with consideration of the plain language of the statute. State v. 
Rhode, 133 Idaho 459,462,988 P.2d 685,688 (1990) (Where statutory language is plain and 
unambiguous, Courts give effect to the statute as written without engaging in statutory construction.) 
Statutes are to be given their plain, obvious, and rational meaning. State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 
659,978 P.2d 214,219 (1999). Here,§ 49-1301 plainly and unambiguously requires the driver of 
any vehicle involved in an accident on public property, or private property open to the public, and 
resulting in damage to a vehicle, driven or attended by any person, to immediately stop and remain at 
the scene. The term "accident" is further defined at I. C. § 49-1 02(3): "'Accident' means any event 
that results in an unintended injury or property damage attributable directly or indirectly to the 
motion of a motor vehicle ... " I. C. § 49-1 02(3) (emphasis added). Wright's argument is simply 
wrong. The language ofl.C. § 49-1301 does not limit the resulting damage to be applicable only if 
damage results to only another vehicle as Wright argues. Had the legislature written I.C. § 49-1301 
such that it is violated where damage results to a vehicle "driven or attended by another person", 
Wright's position may have been tenable. However, I.C. §49-1301 does not read that way. One of 
the underlying purposes of this breadth may well be to ensure drivers involved in any accident are 
not under the influence of intoxicating substances. States have traditional police powers to define 
criminal law and protect the health, safety and welfare of citizens. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 
66, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 2234 (2005) (citing Brecht v. Abrahmson, 507 U.S. 619, 635, 113 S.Ct. 1710 
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(1993); Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707,719, 105 S.Ct. 
2371 (1985)). The Code utilizes a broad approach, referring to any vehicle involved in any event 
causing injury or property damage. I.C §§ 49-1301(1), 49-102(3). 
As argued by the State, the evidence at trial demonstrated Wright was in a vehicle accident, 
and caused property damage to a fixture in addition to damage to his own vehicle. Munns, while 
being the one case to discuss I.C. § 49-1301 in any detail, involved the question of whether a jury 
had been properly instructed as to a driver's duty when involved in an accident between a single 
vehicle and an animal. 138 Idaho 108, 110, 58 P.3d 92, 94. The outcome in Munns, that§ 49-
13 01 (3) does not define conduct which would be negligent per se, (in part because the statute was 
not intended to prevent the harm of an accident with an already-dead horse to a second driver 
(Munns), who strikes a horse left dead in the roadway by a first driver (Swift Transportation)), has no 
direct application to the facts now before the Court. 
But, although Wright's argument about the applicability ofl.C. § 49-1301 must fail, the 
Cou..rt will briefly discuss I.C. § 49-1304, the only one of the several additional statutes ·wright wa..'1ts 
to bring into this appeal which might apply. A question remains whether each essential element of 
the crime charged was proven. Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 1038 (used for violations ofl.C. § 
49-1304) reads: 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Leaving the Scene of an Accident [Involving 
Fixtures], the state must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about [date], 
2. in the state ofldaho, 
3. the defendant [name] was driving a motor vehicle 
4. which was involved in an accident resulting in damage to fixtures or other 
property legally upon or adjacent to a highway, 
5. the defendant had knowledge of the accident, and 
6. the defendant failed to do all of the following: 
a. take reasonable steps to locate the owner or person in charge of the property; 
b. notifY such person of the accident, the defendant's name and address, the 
name of the defendant's insurance agent or company if the defendant had 
automobile liability insurance, a..11d the motor vehicle registration number of the 
vehicle the defendant was driving; and 
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c. exhibit [his] [her] driver's license, if it was available and the defendant was 
requested to exhibit it. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the 
defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty. 
ICJI 1038. In her factual findings, Judge Friedlander noted: on December 18,2009, two witnesses 
observed a Jeep Cherokee slide and strike a speed limit sign on an icy day (Tr., p. 53, Ll. 11-20); 
according to both witnesses, only the driver was in this Jeep Cherokee (Tr. p. 54, Ll. 1-6), law 
enforcement traced the vehicle to Wright based on the witness' license plate report and corroborating 
evidence at the scene (Tr., p. 54, Ll. 7-23); law enforcement contacted Wright's wife at their 
residence, she telephoned Wright, and Deputy Leyk spoke with Wright (Tr., p. 55, Ll. 11-23); Wright 
informed the deputy that he had been in an accident, having slipped on ice and knocked over a traffic 
sign, and that he was going to "self-report" the accident (Tr., pp. 55-56, L. 25, Ll. 1-2); and that 
when law enforcement went to Wright's business/place of employment, they observed damage to the 
vehicle which matched debris found at the scene, but Wright at that point denied being the driver 
(Tr., p. 56, LL 4-12). 
This Court is to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and not 
substitute its judgment for that of Judge Friedlander as to credibility and weight. See State v. Allen, 
129 Idaho 556, 558, 929 P.2d 118, 120. Judge Friedlander was presented with evidence that, on 
December 18,2009, in the State ofidaho, Wright was the driver of a vehicle which was involved in 
an accident, knocking down a speed limit sign on Nita Ave., Wright knew he struck the sign, and 
Wright failed to stop or make any of the notifications contemplated in ,-r 6 ofiCJI 1038. There exists 
substantial evidence supporting each essential element of the crime charged and the crime most 
applicable which was not charged. Even considering Wright's theory that I.C. § 49-1301 does not 
define what the "requirements of the law" are, I.C. § 49-1304 would be the most applicable, and 
Wright fails under that statute as welL 
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C. WRIGHT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS NOT 
VIOLATED. 
Wright's fmal argument is that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated by the 
trial court's error in explaining a withheld judgment to Wright. !d., p. 14. 
Because the Defendant's request for counsel was overcome by erroneous and 
incomplete legal advise [sic] and information provided by the prosecutor and trial 
court, the Defendant's waiver of his right to counsel was not knowing, voluntary or 
intelligent and the judgment imposed in this case should be vacated and set aside and 
this matter remanded for sentencing. 
Id., p. 15. First of all, contrary to Wright's briefing and Wright's counsel's claims at oral argument, 
Wright never asked for an attorney for sentencing. As set forth above, the colloquy pertained to 
appeal. Tr., p. 57, Ll. 11-14. Even if Wright meant to ask for an attorney for purposes of 
sentencing, after such obtuse request by Wright, Judge Friedlander three times offered to continue 
sentencing to a later date. Even if this Court could go so far as to find that Wright invoked his right 
to counsel for sentencing (it can't), Wright subsequently changed his mind and chose to proceed to 
sentencing without an attorney. The State responds to Wright's argument by citing the three 
occasions on which Judge Friedlander offered to set disposition on a later date if Wright wished to 
seek the advice of counsel. Memorandum Opposing Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 6-7. The State 
goes on to argue that, even if Judge Friedlander's explanation of a withheld judgment was incorrect, 
such error would be harmless because Wright's substantial rights were not affected. !d., p. 7. The 
State notes a conviction under I. C. § 49-1301 requires a one-year license suspension pursuant to 
subsection ( 4) regardless of any disposition entered. !d., pp. 7-8. 
Wright replies his waiver of his right to counsel was not knowing, intelligent or voluntary 
because: 
Whether, the sentence imposed would have had differing effect if the sentencing 
hearing had been delayed and counsel obtained or not is of no moment to whether a 
substantial right of the Defendant had been affected by the way to post trial 
proceedings tra.'1spired. 
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Appellant's Reply brief, p. 6. No legal citation is given for this bald statement. 
As noted by both parties, the right to counsel attaches at sentencing. In Brown v. State, 108 
Idaho 655, 656, 701 P.2d 275, 276 (Ct.App. 1985), the Idaho Court of Appeals wrote: 
Our Supreme Court has held that Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution and the 
sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution entitle a defendant 
to representation by counsel at sentencing. State v. [Dennis] Brown, 98 Idaho 209, 
560 P .2d 880 (1977). Thus, "in the absence of a knowing, intelligent and voluntary 
waiver of the right to counsel, the district court may not proceed with the sentencing 
hearing when the defendant is not represented by counsel without some evidence or 
finding that the defendant has discharged his counsel in order to delay or hinder the 
judicial process. !d., at 212, 560 P.2d at 883. 
A knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver, in tum, requires that a defendant be made aware 
of the risks inherent in self-representation. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 
2541 (1975). The burden rests with the State to show a waiver satisfied this standard and if a 
defendant was deprived of the right to counsel by a trial court's acceptance of an invalid waiver, the 
error is fundamental. State v. Hunnel, 125 Idaho 623, 625, 873 P.2d 877, 879 (1994). In State v. 
Jackson, 140 Idaho 636, 97 P.3d 1025 (Ct.App. 2004), the Idaho Court of Appeals reviewed and 
compared cases holding that a specific warning regarding the dangers of self-representation is a 
prerequisite for a constitutionally valid waiver, as opposed to those cases in which a defendant need 
only be aware of the disadvantages of proceeding prose, but did not establish a bright-line rule. 140 
Idaho 636, 640-41, 97 P.3d 1025, 1029-30. The Court wrote: 
We conclude that even if judicial admonitions are not constitutionally required, 
Jackson's waiver here was invalid because the record does not otherwise disclose that 
he, at the time he chose to represent himself, appreciated the risks of proceeding pro 
se. Although Jackson does have a criminal record with charges dating back to 1980, 
and he has demonstrated some ability to file motions and perform legal research, 
nothing in the record indicates that he ever represented himself in previous criminal 
proceedings or that he had received Faretta warnings on a previous occasion. 
Nothing indicates that Jackson understood the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation when he voiced his decision to proceed pro se. The record here is 
insufficient to demonstrate a valid waiver of his right to counsel at trial. 
140 Idaho 636, 641, 97 P.3d 1025, 1030. 
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Here, Judge Friedlander began the Court Trial by ensuring Wright was "advised of your 
rights including your right to a lawyer and court-appointed counsel. Is that correct?" Tr., p. 1, Ll. 8-
10. Wright indicated he had been so advised. Tr., p. 1, L. 11. Wright then stated a pretrial motion 
for discovery had been served upon the State at the pretrial conference, but no reply had been 
received. Tr., p. 1, Ll. 18-22. Prior to disposition, Judge Friedlander welcomed Wright's request for 
additional time to "consult with an attorney for an appeal." Tr, p. 57, Ll. 13-17. Judge Friedlander 
also noted that, although she was inclined to withhold judgment, "if you would care to have this 
matter scheduled for sentencing, even though Mr. Reierson would like to go forward, I would give 
you the time to have it uh, set, and I think that's a fair request and frankly required at law." Tr., p. 
60, Ll. 12-16. In comparing the facts ofthe instant matter to those present in Jackson, here, Wright 
agreed he had received Faretta-type warnings, he unsuccessfully attempted to file a discovery 
motion, and he had no criminal history. Wright stated he wished to consult an attorney about an 
appeal, not disposition following conviction, and as the instant appeal demonstrates, he has had the 
opportunity to do so. Tr., p. 57, Ll. 11-14. Wright's representation on appeal, and Pis opting to 
move forward with disposition in light of Judge Friedlander's willingness to set sentencing out, over 
the State's objection, weigh in favor of the waiver's having been constitutionally valid. This Court 
cannot find that Judge Friedlander accepted an invalid waiver, but rather that Wright opted not to 
continue the date on which disposition would take place. 
Counsel for Wright argues "The trial court[']s advise also flies in the face of the United 
States v. Sharp, that a withheld judgment operates as a conviction in Idaho until the case is dismissed 
following the Defendant's successful completion of probation." Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 14-
15. First, that is not what Judge Friedlander told him. All Judge Friedlander said along those lines is 
"Then you could ---(inadible) ... have a conviction at that point, obviously." Tr. p. 60, Ll. 2-3. 
Second, the citation for the case is United States v. Sharp, 145 Idaho 403, 179 P.3d 1059 (2008). 
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Third, Sharp says a convictions occurs by the verdict of a jury (in this case the verdict was by Judge 
Friedlander) or upon a plea of guilty, and it must precede punishment. 145 Idaho 403, 404, 179 P.3d 
1059, 1060. And nothing about that fact changes the next paragraph of this Court's decision. 
The most important reason there is no invalid waiver is the outcome could not have been any 
different with an attorney. Wright's main complaint seems to be with the fact that even with a 
withheld judgment his driver's license will be suspended (it has not been suspended yet due to the 
stay granted with Wright's appeal). But this license suspension occurs not due to any act of Judge 
Friedlander, but rather, by the Idaho Transportation Department due to automatic operation of the 
statute upon a finding of guilt. Idaho Code§ 49-1301(4) reads: "The department shall revoke for a 
period of one ( 1) year the driver's license, privileges or permit to drive, or the nonresident operating 
privilege, of any person convicted of a violation of subsection (1) of this section." As soon as 
Wright was found guilty by Judge Friedlander, a license suspension by the Idaho Transportation 
Department occurs. That suspension occurs whether Wright received a withheld judgment on his 
misdemeanor conviction or a regular sentence. This license suspension is mandatory, it occurs in 
every single case involving a violation ofi.C. § 49-1301. The fact that this license suspension occurs 
at the hands of the Idaho Department of Transportation is totally out of the hands of Judge 
Friedlander. Thus, even if Wright's right to counsel were violated, such violation is harmless error 
because no substantial right of Wright was affected. Wright could have assembled his own "dream 
team" of lawyers to appear before Judge Friedlander for sentencing, and the Idaho Transportation 
Department would still suspend Wright's license. 
IV. CONCLUSION: 
For the reasons set forth above, Judge Friedlander's conviction and sentence must be 
affirmed. 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the Judgment imposed by Judge Friedlander on March 1, 2010, 
is AFFIRMED in all aspects. This case is REMANDED back to Magistrate Division for any further 
action. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the stay entered on June 1, 2010, by this Court is 
RESCINDED, Wright's license is suspended immediately. 
DATED this 11th day ofMay, 2011 
I hereby certifY that on the II day of May, 20 II copies of the foregoing Order were mailed, postage prepaid, 
or sent by facsimile or interoffice mail to: 
Defense Attorney - Rich~d K. Kuck {0 01-3 371 Honorable Judge Penny Friedlander 
Prosecuting Attorney- L/-L/-&-1 <B 3 ?;;> . :f _ D · 
State ofldaho Transportation Department;{ 08/11~-&73t} 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON APPEAL page 19 
Richard W. Wright 39483 101 of 183
,
 
11
ch<l!" ( 101
torney - - f -I -3 Q r ' 0 .
rt ent ;
Jun 14 2011 4:39PM Richard K. Kuck, PLLC 2086673379 
IN THE DISTRICf COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
v. 
RICHARD W. WRIGHT, 
) 
) Case No. CR-2009 -0025609 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendant/ Appellant, ) 
________________________________ ) 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETIDON FOR REHEARING 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
Richard K. Kuck, ISB No. 3875 
RICHARD K. KUCK, PLLC 
408 Sherman Avenue, Suite 205 
P.O. Box 1320 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1329 
(208) 667-3600 
Fax:(208)667-3379 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENTS 
Barry McHugh 
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
(208) 446-1800 
Fax: (208) 446-1833 
Assigned Attorney: Jim Reierson 
p. 1 
Richard W. Wright 39483 102 of 183
l
-------------------------------) 
m
.  
' l
 (
 l
Jun 14 2011 4:39PM Richard K. Kuck, PLLC 2086673379 p.2 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1. Argument in Support of Rehearing ............................... 2 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING- 1 
Richard W. Wright 39483 103 of 183
I  
Jun 14 2011 4:39PM Richard K. Kuck, PLLC 2086673379 
PURSUANT TO Idaho Appellant Rule 42, Appellant RICHARD W. WRIGHT 
respectfully submits this Memorandum in support of his Petition for Rehearing. 
The issues involved relate to the question of: 
1. Whether Idaho Code§ 49-1301 can apply to a single vehicle collision involving 
damage only to the driver's vehicle and a third-parties' personal property? 
2. If Idaho Code § 49-1301 can apply to a single vehicle collision, did the State prove all 
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt? 
1. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Oral argument on appeal was beard by the Court of May 11, 2011. The Appellant filed 
and served his Petition for Rehearing on June 1, 2011. Idaho Appellate Rule 42 governs 
Petitions for Rehearing. That Rule provides: 
Rule 42. Petition for Rehearing. 
(a) Time for Filing - Filing Fee. Petitions for rehearing must be 
physically filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court, together with 
the filing fee, within 21 days after the filing date of the Court's 
opinion, and must be served upon all parties to the appeal or 
proceeding. If the opinion is modified, other than to correct a 
clerical error, an aggrieved party may physically file another 
petition for rehearing within 21 days from the date of the modified 
opinion and serve all adverse parties in the appeal or proceeding. 
No response to any petition for rehearing shall be made except 
upon direction of the Court. 
(b) Briefs on the Petition. A brief or memorandum in support of the 
petition must be filed within 14 days of the filing date of the 
petition and shall be typeWritten on letter size paper. An original 
and 9 copies of the petition and brief shall be filed with the Clerk 
of the Supreme Court. 
(c) Oral Argument on Petition for Rehearing. There shall be no oral 
argument upon the petition for rehearing of an appeal or 
proceeding unless ordered by the Supreme Court. 
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(d) Notice of Rehearing- Briefs. Copies of an order granting or 
denying a rehearing shall be served by the Clerk of the Supreme 
Court upon all parties to the appeal or proceeding. The order may 
set forth the issues to be reheard, and shall direct the time and order 
for the filing of briefs. A brief in support of or in opposition to a 
petition for rehearing need not be bound nor have any colored 
cover. 
(e) Oral Argument on Rehearing. If the Supreme Court grants a 
petition for rehearing, argument upon rehearing shall be scheduled 
by the Court in the same manner as argument on the merits of an 
appeal or petition. 
!.ARGUMENT 
In its May 11, 2011 Memorandum Decision and Order on Appeal the Court ruled: 
This Court concludes Wright failed to raise the issue of insufficient evidence at 
trial to support a conviction under Idaho Code§ 49-1301, and accordingly, 
Wright has waived his right to hear that issue on appeal. 
May 11, 2011 Memorandum Decision and Order on Appeal, Page 6. 
It is clear however that an error that goes to the foundation of the State's case must be 
regarded as a fundamental error. 
Error that is fundamental must be such error as goes to the foundation or basis of a 
defendant's rights, or go to the foundation of the state's case or take from the 
defendant a right which was essential to his defense and which no court could or 
ought to permit him to waive. 
State y. Lenon, 143 Idaho 415, 146 P.3d 681,683 (Idaho App. 2005). Clearly, a finding by a 
trial court that a defendant is guilty of violating a statute that can have no legal application to the 
case under the facts as developed at trial must rise to the level of fundamental error. 
In his Opening Brief on Appeal the Appellant argued specifically that the evidence at trial 
was insufficient for the trial court to convict the Defendant of a violation of Idaho Code § 49-
1301 because: 
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A. Idaho Code § 49-1301 does not apply to collisions between a vehicle and 
personal property where the factors set forth in Idaho Code § 49-1305 are not 
implicate~ and; 
B. The State of Idaho failed to prove at trial each essential element of the charged 
violation ofldaho Code§ 49-1301. 
In his Opening Brief on Appeal, the Appellant specifically argued that Idaho Code§ 49-1301 
applies only to collisions involving more than vehicle and that if a statute was implicated by the 
facts of this ca...~. it must be Idaho Code§ 49-1304, which defines a driver's duty upon striking 
fixtures legally on or adjacent to the highway. 
In addressing that question the rule of lenity is a critical legal issue which has application 
to this case. The rule of lenity has been adopted in Idaho by the Idaho Supreme Court in the 
following form: 
The rule of lenity states that criminal statutes must be strictly construed in favor 
of defendants. 
State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 175 P.3d 788,792 (Idaho 2008). Construing nearly identical 
language to that of Idaho Code§ 49-1301, the Colorado Supreme Court examined th~ statutory 
language of C.R.S. 42-4-1403 which states: 
"The driver of any vehicle directly involved in an accident resulting only in 
damage to a vehicle which is driven or attended by any person shall immediateJy 
stop such vehicle at the scene of such accident or as close thereto as possible, but 
shall forthwith return to and in every event shall remain at the scene of such 
accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of section 42-4-1403." 
Lumbanly v. Colorado. 625 P.2d. 1026, 1027 (Colo. 1981). Construing that language the 
Colorado Supreme Court held: 
Section 42-4-1402 plainly applies to an accident involving injury to someone 
other than the driver or damage to two or more vehicles. The statute contemplates 
a situation where there are other persons to whom the driver should report 
information about himself. 
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The Colorado Supreme Court reasoned that the lower courts had stretched the application of 
C.R.S. 42-4-1402 too far to try to give it application to a single vehicle collision: 
The county court, in determining that section 42-4-1402 applied to 
the facts in this case, interpreted "any person" in the first sentence of the statute to 
refer back to "the driver." So construed, "accident, '1 as used in the statute, would 
include all one car accidents since the driver and "any person" would be one and 
the same individual. 
The district court affirmed the county court's interpretation of "any person." It 
also interpreted the emphasized "and" in section 42-4-1403(2), p. 3, supra, as an 
"or" in order to make section 42-4-1403 logica1ly applicable to single vehicle 
accidents. 
The defendant argues that the duties of a driver involved in a one car accident 
are prescribed by section 42-4-1406, C.R.S.l973: 
"(1) The driver of a vehicle involved in a traffic accident resulting in injury to or 
death of any person or any property damage shall, after fulfilling the requirements 
of section 42-4-1402 and 42-4-1403(1), give immediate notice of the location of 
such accident and such other information as is specified in section 42-4-1403(2) to 
the nearest office of the duly authorized police authority and, if so directed by the 
police authority, sha11 forthwith and without delay return to and remain at the scene 
of the accident until said police have arrived at the scene and completed their 
investigation thereat." We agree. 
Section 42-4-1406(1) unequivocally applies to a single car accident. 
Apparently, the county court and the district court overlooked or ignored section 
42-4-1406. Instead. they found it necessary to stretch the terms of section 
42-4-1402 to "reasonably effect the legislative intent evidenced by the entire 
statutory scheme." The duty to report a single car accident under section 42-4-1406 
is included within the leaving the scene of the accident ("hit and run") statutory 
scheme. Gammon v. State Dept. of Revenue, 32 Colo.App. 437,513 P.2d 748 
(1973). Therefore, section 42-4-1406, rather than section 42-4-1402, as interpreted 
by the two lower courts, is the provision requiring a driver to report property 
damage in a single car accident. The facts of this case do not support the 
defendant's conviction under section 42-4-1402. 
We reverse and remand to the district court with directions to vacate the 
defendant's conviction. 
Likewise, the Court of Appeals of Kansas has construed language in its Leaving the Scene of an 
Accident statute to require the involvement of at least two (2) vehicles. In that case, State v. 
H.Qlm, 41 Kan.App.2d 1096, 208 P.3d 325 (Kan.App. 2009) the court was construing K.S,A. 8-
1603, which reads in the pertinent part: 
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"The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting only in damage to a 
vehicle or other property which is driven or attended by any person shall 
immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such accident, or as close thereto as 
possible, but shall forthwith return to and in every event shall remain at the scene 
of such accident until he or she has fulfilled the requirements of K.S.A. 8-1604." 
The Kansas statute is substantially identical to Idaho Code§ 49-1301 with the exception that it 
expressly applies when there is damage only to a "vehicle or to other property." Idaho Code 
Section 49-1301 omits any reference to 'other property' and expressly applies only to accidents 
resulting in damage to a vehicle. Like the Colorado Supreme Court, the Kansas Court of Appeals 
held that: 
.. A reading of these statutes appears to require remaining at the scene of a 
noninjury accident only if the property damaged by the damaging driver is 
attended by another person. Therefore a single car accident does not require 
remaining at the scene unless the property the property of some other person is 
damaged. 
State v. Holm, 41 Kan.App.2d 1096, 1100, 208 P.3d. 325, 328 (Kan.App. 2009). It is critical to 
note that the Kansas statute expressly applies to collisions involving damage to personal property. 
Idaho Code§ 49-1301 expressly omits damage to personal property. 
The Supreme Court of Iowa has also interpreted similar statutory language as having no 
application to single vehicle accidents. In State v. Tarbox, 739 N.W.2d 850 (Iowa 2007) the 
Supreme Court of Iowa wrestled with a similar issue. In that case Tarbox crashed his car into a 
concrete wall, suffered a personal injury and fled the area. Tarbox was charged with a violation of 
Iowa Code§ 321.261 which provides: 
"§ 321.261. Death or personal injUries 
1. The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death 
of any person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident or as 
close as possible and if able, shall then return to and remain at the scene of the 
accident in accordance with section 321.263. Every such stop shall be made 
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without obstructing traffic more than is necessary. 
2. Any person failing to stop or to comply with the requirements in subsection 1 of 
this section, in the event of an accident resulting in an injury to any person is guilty 
upon conviction of a serious misdemeanor.". 
The Supreme Court of low~ mk.d that the statutory lftllguage 'accident resulting in injury to, or 
death of any person' does not apply to the driver of a vehicle involved in a single-vehicle 
collision: 
In his petition for further review Christopher Jerome Tarbox asks this court to 
reveiSe the court of appeals decision finding the district court erred when it 
dismissed the nial information charging him with leaving the scene of an accident 
in violation of Iowa Code section 321.261 (2003). Tarbox claims because he was 
involved in a single-vehicle accident, and he was the only person who suffered a 
personal injury, his conduct did not violate section 321.261. Accepting the facts 
alleged by the State in the trial infozmation and minutes as true, we agree with 
Tarbox that his conduct of leaving the scene of the single-vehicle accident did not 
violate section 321.261. Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the court of 
appeals and affmn the decision of the district court. 
There is strong evidence that the same results as reached in Colorado, Arizona, Kansas and 
Iowa would be also be reached in Idw~o. 
Interestingly, ICfl 1305, 1306 and 1307 are not available to counsel through the Idaho 
State Bar Association's Casemaker legal research website. Those instructions provide valuable 
insight. Icn 1306 provides as follows: 
ICJI 1036 LEAVING SCENE OF ACCIDENT- ATTENDED VEinCLE 
INSTRUCI10N NO. __ 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Leaving the Scene of an Accident 
[Involving an Attended Vehic1e], the state must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about [date], 
2. in the state of Idaho, 
3. the defendant [name] was driving a motor vehicle 
4. on public or private property open to the public, 
5. the defendant's vehicle was involved in an accident 
6. which resulted in damage to another vehicle which was driven or attended by a person, 
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7. the defendant had knowledge of the accident, and 
8. either the defendant failed to immediately stop [his] [her] vehicle at the scene of the 
accident, or to stop as close as possible and then immediately return to the scene of the accident, 
or after stopping at or returning to the scene of the accident, the defendant failed to remain at the 
scene until [he] [she] had done the following: 
(a) given his or her name and address: 
(b) given the name of his or her insurance agent or company. if the 
defendant had automobile liability insurance; 
(c) given the vehicle registration number of the vehicle the 
defendant was driving; and 
(d) if available, exhibited [his) [her] driver's license to the driver of 
or person attending the other vehicle involved in the collision. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find 
the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty. 
Comment 
I.C. §§ 49-1301 & 49-1302. Although the statute does not expressly require that 
the defendant have knowledge of the accident, it is an essential element of the 
offense. State v. Parish, 79 Idaho 75,310 P.2d 1082 (1957). 
If the duty to stop at the scene of an accident is triggered in a single vehicle collision situation by 
th.e statutory ianguage "vehicle driven or attended by any person" if interpreted as including the 
cited driver's own vehicle, that interpretation expressly conflicts with the mandatory proof of the 
involvement of "another vehicle" as set forth in ICll 1306(6). The statutory language "vehicle 
driven or or attended by any person" clearly does not apply to damage sustained by the cited 
driver's own vehicle and the statute that the Appellant likely did violate, Idaho Code§ 49-1304 
does not require that a driver stop and remain at the scene of an accident. 
To interpret Idaho Code§ 49-1301 as having application to a single vehicle collision 
would result in legal absurdities. 
Idaho, Idaho Code§ 49-102(3) defines the tenn 'accident:' 
"Accident"' means any event that results in an unintended injury or property 
damage attributable directly or indirectly to the motion of a motor vehicle." 
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The statutory term 'accident' does not limit the threshold damage to personal property to damage 
above a certain monetary value. If Idaho Code§ 49-1301 to any sing1e vehicle collision, then the 
driver of that single vehicle has the duty to stop, return to and remain at the scene of any 
'accident' which results from damage to any windshield, any paint chip or any dent caused by a 
rock tossed up by the motion of the driver's vehicle, or by the motion of any other motor vehicle. 
Or perhaps to the accumulation of road tar caused by driving on a recently oiled road that 
f 
damages the driver's vehicle's clear coat. Or any damage or dent caused by any baseball, 
basketball or soccer ball while the driver's vehicle is in motion on a public roadway or private 
roadway open to the public, such as a highschool parking lot or the parking area of any public 
playfield. 
Aside from ICll 1306, the Idaho Supreme Court has also telegraphed fairly clearly that it 
does not see the application of Idaho Code§ 49-1301, in the case of Munns v. Swift 
Transportation Company, Munns v. Swift Transportation Company, 138 Idaho 108 (Idaho 2002) 
in which the Idaho Supreme Court clearly mused that: 
"The inherent ambiguity in the statute precludes a conclusion that Swift 
Transportation Co. Inc., and its driver were negligent as a matter of law for 
violating the statute by not remaining at the scene of the accident with the horse." 
Munns v. Swift Transportation Company, 138 Idaho at 111. The rule of lenity requires that the 
'inherent ambiguity' in the statute must be strictly construed in favor of the Defendant/Appellant, 
Richard W. Wright. 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellant Rule 42, the Defendant} Appellant respectfully requests that 
the Court grant his Petition for Rehearing and order and direct such further briefing and argument 
as the Court may deem most appropriate under the Rule. 
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RESPEcrFULLY SUBMITTED this ~y of June 2011. 
RICHARD K. KUCK, PLLC 
Richard K. Kuck 
Attorney for-Defendantl Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1'-fiA.day of June 2011 I caused to be served a true and 
conect copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Barry McHugh 
Attn: Jim Reierson 
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid. 
[X] Fax transmission 208-446-1833 
[ ] Hand delivered. 
RICHARD K. KUCK, PLLC 
ci~ 
Attorney for the Defendant/Appellant 
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Lumbardy v. People, 625 P.2d 1026 (Colo. 1981) 
Page 1026 
625 P.2d 1026 (Colo. 1981) 
Frank Duane LUMBARDY, Petitioner, 
v. 
The PEOPLE of the state of Colorado, Respondent. 
No. 79SC58. 
Supreme Court of Colorado, En Bane 
March 23, 1981 
Nelson & Phillips, P. C., Donald R. Nelson, Lakewood, for petitioner. 
p. 13 
Page 1 of4 
Nolan L. Brown, Dist. Atty., First Judicial Dist., Charles James Carroll, Deputy Disl Atty., 
Golden, for respondent. 
DUBOFSKY, Justice. 
The defendant, Frank Duane Lumbardy, appeals his conviction under section 42-4-1402, 
C.R.S.1973 (1980 Supp.) (a part of the state's "hit and run• statutory scheme}, for leaving the scene of 
an accident and failing to report the accident. Because we conclude that section 42-4-1402 applies only 
to accidents involving damage to a vehicle which Is driven or attended by another person, it cannot 
serve as the basis of the defendant's conviction for leaving the scene of a single car accident. We 
therefore reverse. 
In the early t;tvening of March 19, 1978, the defendant drove off West 55th Avenue between 
Vance and Wadsworth in Arvada. His 1974 van came to rest in a V-shaped drainage ditch. The 
defendant, who was uninjured, was helped from his van by a friend who happened to drive past. The 
friend took the defendant to the defendant's 
Page 1027 
son's residence less than a mile from the accident site. The son called a towing company, and 
was told that an employee of the towing company would report the accident to the police. 
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Shortly thereafter the son drove to the accident location. The pollee, who had arrived at the 
scene, questioned him about the accident. He replied that his father had been driving the van. Two 
pollee officers then accompanied the son back to his residence, questioned the defendant, and 
returned with the defendant to the accident location. The defendant was arrested for driving under the 
influence of intoxicatir.g liquor, section 42-4-1202(1)(a), C.R.S.1973, and leaving the scene of an 
accident, section 42-4-1402. 
Trial was to the court. At the close of the People's case, the county judge dismissed the 
charge of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. At the close of the evidence, the judge 
convictt!d tbe. defendant of_violatina sec:tionh42-4d -1.402. l11ltTheddistrict court affirmed the defendant's conv1ct1on. vve granted cemoran tO" revieW t e ecJSIOn o the I Strict eourt ana now reverse. 
The defendant was charged and convicted under section 42-4-1402, C.R.S.1973 (1980 
Supp.): 
"The driver of any vehide directly involved In an accident resulting only in damage to a vehicle 
which is driven or attended by any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such 
accident or as close thereto as possible but shall forthwith return to and in every event shall remain at 
the scene of such accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of section 42-4-1403 ... " 
(Emphasis added.) 
Section 42-4-1403, C.R.S.1973, provides: 
"(1) The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in Injury to or death of any person or 
damage to any vehicle which is driven or attended by any person shall give his name, his address, and 
the regb:~L• c:diu•~ "un-.bar of ttle vehiele he io driving 3nd shall upon requ~t eYhihit hiR driver's licenst to 
the person struck or the driver or occupant of or person attending any vehicle collided with ... " 
(2) In the event that none of the persons specified are in condition to receive the information to 
which they otherwise would be entitled under subsection (1) of this section and no police officer is 
present, the driver of any vehicle involved in such accident ... shall forthwith report such accident to the 
nearest office of a duly authorized pollee authority as required in section 42-4-1406 and submit thereto 
the Information specified in subsection (1) ofthis section." 
(Emphasis added.) 
An identical Arizona "hit and run" statute requiring the operator of a vehicle involved in an 
accident causing personal injury to divulge his name, address, and the registration number of his 
vehicle to the person injured was described by the Arizona Supreme Court as 
" ... designed to 'prohibit drivers of motor cars from seeking to evade civil or criminal liability by 
escaping, before their identity can be established, and from leaving persons injured in collisions, in 
distress or danger, for want of proper medical or surgical treatment.' State v. Severance, 120 Vt. 268, 
136 A.2d 425, 428. The gist of the offense is in concealing, or attempting to conceal the identity of one 
involved In an automobile accident wherein personal injuries are sustained. People v. Nails, 10 111.2d 
M11/?.011 
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279,139 N.E.2d 744, 62A.L.R.2d 1124." 
State v. Mt11igan, 87 Ariz. 165 at 169, 349 P.2d 180 at 183 (1960). 
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Section 42-4-1402 plainly applies to an accident involving injury to someone other than the 
driver or damage to two or more vehicles. The statute contemplates a situation where there are other 
persons to 
Page 1028 
whom the driver should report information about himself. 
The county court, in determining that section 42-4-1402 applied to the facts in this case, 
interpreted "any person" in the first sentence of the statute to refer back to "the driver." So construed, 
"accident," as used in the statute, would include all one car accidents since the driver and "any person" 
would be one and the same individual. 
The district court affirmed the county court's interpretation of "any person." 1t also interpreted 
the emphasized "and" In section 42-4-1403(2), p. 3, supra, as an "or'' in order to make section 42-4-
1403 logically applicable to single vehicle accidents. 
The defendant argues that the duties of a driver involved in a one car accident are prescribed 
by section 42-4-1406, C.R.S.1973: 
"(1) The driver of a vehicle involved in a traffic accident resulting in injury to or death of any person 
or any property damage shall, after fulfilling the requirements of section 42-4-1402 and 42-4-1403(1), 
give immediate notice of the location of such accident and such other Information as is specified in 
section 42-4-1403(2) to the nearest office of the duly authorized pollee authority and, If so directed by 
the police authority, shall forthwith and without delay return to and remain at the scene of the accident 
until said police have arrived at the scene and completed their investig~tion thereat." 
(Emphasis added.) We agree. 121 
court and~3i~~o1m~1Jr~&'i»~ricP~~gna l~'l!~$.,~~~i~~-~~~~~g~~~1r¥i=w~ 
stretch the terms of section 42-4-1402 to "reasonably effect the legislative intent evidenced by the 
entire statutory scheme." The duty to report a single car accident under section 42-4-1406 is included 
within the leaving the scene of the accident C'hit and run .. ) statutory scheme. Gammon v. State Dept. of 
Revenue, 32 Colo.App. 437,513 P.2d 748 (1973). Therefore, section 42-4-1406, rather than section 
42-4-1402, as Interpreted by the two lower courts, is the provision requiring a driver to report property 
S~a'~~m~~~l.~.lb~~ldent. l41 The facts of this case do not support the defendant's conviction 
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We reverse and remand to the district court with directions to vacate the defendanrs 
conviction. 
Notes: 
[11 The defendant was fined $40.00 and assessed $8.00 in costs. 
l2l We note that section 42-4-1406(1) requires drivers to comply with the requirements of section 42-4-
1403{1). Our holding that section 42-4-1406 rather than section 42-4-1402 defines the duties incumbent upon 
the operator of a vehicle involved in a one car accident should not be construed to relieve the driver of that 
vehicle of the duty to render reasonable assistance to a passenger Injured in such an accident See sections 
42-4-1401(1} and 42-4-1403{1). 
131 Subsection (1) of section 42.-4-1406 does not specify the amount of property damage required to 
trigger the reporting requirement of the statute. Here the damage was minimal, consisting of additional 
scrapes to an already battered van. The People, however, point out that the car was disabled because it was 
wedged In the ditch, and that police assistance was necessary to stop traffic on 55th Avenue while the van 
was winched from the ditch. We express no opinion as to whether ttle evidence here was sufficient to support 
a conviction under section 42-4-1406. Cf. State v. Patterson, 47 N.J. 450, 221 A.2d 526 (1966) (A "hit and run" 
statute was not properly invoked when the only damage caused by the defendant's vehicle was a small area 
of loosened bark on a tree.) 
141 Compare the language In section 42-4-1406 that ''the driver of a vehicle involved In a traffic accident 
resulting in ... any property aamage ... "with the language in section 42-4-1402 that "the driver of any vehicle 
directly involved in an accident resulting only in damage to a vehicle which Is driven or attended by any 
person ... " 
II t:../1 'l/')/\11 
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41 Kan.App.2d 1096 
STATE of Kansas, Appellee, 
v. 
Tyler David HOLM, Appellant. 
No. 100,943. 
Court of Appeals of Kansas. 
May 29,2009 
-----~--- ------·~~~------~~~-"f""'r<" ........ ~~-......,_,...., ... ___ _ 
Page326 
Syllabus by the Court 
K.S.A. 8-1602, K.S.A. 8-1603, K.S.A. 8-1604, and K.S.A.2008 Supp. 8-1606 are analyzed 
and applied. 
Kevin P. Shepherd, of Topeka, for the appellant. 
Joanna Labastida, legal intern, Jamie L Karasek, assistant district attorney, Robert D. 
Hecht, district attorney, and Steve Six, attomey general, for the appellee. 
Before GREENE, P.J., PIERRON and STANDRIDGE, JJ. 
PIERRON, J. 
Tyler David Holm appeals his misdemeanor convictions for leaving the scene of an accident 
and failure to report an accident He argues there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions. 
We reverse and remand. 
~/1 'l P,(\1 1 
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In December 2007, the State charged Holm with one count each of leaving the scene of an 
accident, pursuant to K.S.A. 8-1603 (a class C misdemeanor), failure to report an accident, pursuant to 
KS.A.2008 Supp. 8-1606 (a class A misdemeanor), and no lfability insurance, pursuant to K.S.A.2008 
Supp. 40-3104 (a class B misdemeanor). 
According to the trial testimony of Shawnee County Sheriffs Deputy Craig Cochran, these 
charges arose around 2:20a.m. on November 9, 2007, when he received a dispatch to investigate a 
possible vehicle accident. The Sheriffs Department received a report after two passing motorists 
observed a single-vehicle accident at the 6500 block of SW 69th Street in Shawnee County. Upon 
arrival at the scene, Cochran observed a GMC Safari van in the south ditch rolled over onto its hood. 
No driver was present at the scene. Out of concern for the drivers' safety, Cochran waited at the scene 
for more than an hour, followed footprints leading from (41 Kan.App.2d 1097] the van, and called the 
Topeka Police Department helicopter to search for the driver. 
From the license plate, Cochran was able to ascertain that Holm was the van's owner. 
Sheriffs deputies attempted to contact Holm both at the scene and the fotlowing day but were 
unsuccessful. Holm did not return the deputies' calls until12:15 a.m. on November 10, 2007, more than 
22 hours after the initial accident report. 
In an undated voluntary statement later provided to deputies and subsequently introduced at 
trial, Holm admitted he was the driver and he had" swerved to miss a deer and crashed [his] van." He 
further stated he had failed to report the accident because his phone was not wor'rdng. At trial, Holm 
affirmed these admissions. 
A bench trial was held on January 22, 2008. Holm presented proof of his liability insurance, 
and the district court dismissed the charge of no liability insurance. The court then found Holm guilty of 
leaving the scene of an accident and failure to report and imposed a $250 fine for each conviction. 
Despite Holm's conviction at a bench trial, the abstracts of his convictions indicated that he pled guilty 
to both charges. 
As a result of the errors in the abstracts, Holm filed a motion to withdraw his plea In April 
2008. At a motions hearing in July 2008, Holm withdrew this motion and moved the district court to 
enter an order allowing him to appeal out of time pursuant to State v. Ortiz, 230 Kan. 733, 640 P.2d 
1255 (1982). The court granted him leave to file a late appeal because he proceeded prose and the 
trial transcript demonstrated that he was 
Page327 
never apprised of his right to appeal. The errors in the abstracts were corrected by a September 
30, 2008, nunc pro tunc order, which evidenced that Holm was convicted by trial and not guilty pleas. 
After the court granted Holm's motion to appeal out of time, he filed a notice of appeal, challenging his 
conviction and sentence. 
On appeal, Holm argues there was Insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions for leaving 
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the scene of an automobile accident, pursuant to K.S.A. B-1603, and failure to report an 
automobile accident, pursuant to K.S.A.2008 Supp. 8-1606. When a criminal defendant challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence, " the standard of review is whether, after review of all the evidence, viewed 
In (41 Kan.App.2d 1098] the light most favorable to the prosecution, the appellate court is convinced 
that a rational factflnder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations 
omitted.)" State v. GutietTez, 285 Kan. 332, 336, 172 P.3d 18 (2007). A conviction of even the gravest 
offense may be proven by circumstantial evidence. State v. Garcia, 285 Kan. 1, 22, 169 P.3d 1069 
(2007). 
Holm•s sufficiency argument also requires us to Interpret the statutory requirements in K.S.A. 
B-1603, KS.A. 8-1604, and K.S.A.2008 Supp. 8-1606. Interpretation of a statute is a question of law 
over which this court exercises unlimited review. State v. Storey, 286 Kan. 7, 9-10, 179 P.3d 1137 
(2008). The most fundamental rule of statut~ construction Is that the intent of the legislature governs if 
that intent can be ascertained. Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Kline, 283 Kan. 64, 77, 150 P .3d 892 
(2007). This intent should be ascertained first through the statute's language while" giving ordinary 
words their ordinary meaning. [Citation omitted.)" State v. Stallings, 284 Kan. 741, 742, 163 P.3d 1232 
(2007). If a statute is plain and unambiguous, a court should not speculate as to the legislative intent 
behind it and add meaning " not readily found in it.... It Is only if the statute's language or text is unclear 
or ambiguous that we move to the next analytical step, applying canons of construction or relying on 
legislative history construing the statute to effect the legislature's intent." In re K.M.H., 285 Kan. 53, 79, 
169 P.3d 1025 (2007). 
Within the criminal context, statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the accused. Any 
reasonable doubt as to the meaning of the statute Is decided in favor of the accused. Nonetheless, this 
rule of strict construction Is subordinate to the rule that judicial interpretation must be reasonable and 
sensible to effect legislative design and intent. State v. Paul, 285 Kan. 658, 662, 175 P.3d 840 (2008). 
Holm's first argument on appeal is that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his 
conviction for leaving the scene of an accident. K.S.A. 8-1603 reads in pertinent part: 
" The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting only in damage to a vehicle or 
other property which is driven or attended by any person shall immediately stop such 
vehicle at the scene of such accident, or as close thereto as [41 Kan.App.2d 1099] 
possible, but shall forthwith retum to and In every event shafl remain at the scene of such 
accident until he or she has fulfilled the requirements of K.S.A. 8-1604 .... Any person 
failing to stop or comply with said requirements under such circumstances shall be guilty 
of a misdemeanor and, urn conviction, shall be punished as provided In K.S.A. B-
2116." (Emphasis added. ' 
In order to avoid a violation of K.S.A. 8-1603, the driver of the vehicle must comply with the 
reporting requirements in K.S.A. 8-1604. 
"(a) The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any 
person, or damage to any vehicle or other property which is driven or attended by any 
person, shall give such person•s name, address and the registration number of the vehicle 
such person is driving, and upon request shall exhibit such person's license or permit to 
drive, the name of the company with which there is In effect a policy of motor vehicle 
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liability insurance covering the vehicle involved in the accident and the policy number of 
such policy to any person injured in such accident or to the driver or occupant of or person 
attending any vehicle or other property damaged in such accident, and 
Page328 
shall give such information and upon request exhibit such license or permit and the name 
of the insurer and policy number, to any police officer at the scene of the accident or who 
is investigating the acddent and shall render tD any person injured in such accident 
reasonable assistance, including the carrying, or the making of arrangements for the 
carrying of such person to a physician, surgeon or hospital for medical or surgical 
treatment If it is apparent that such treatment is necessary, or if such carrying is 
requested by the Injured person . 
.. (b) In the event that none of the persons specitled are in condition to receive the 
information to which they otherwise would be entitled under subsection (a) of this section, 
and no pollee officer is present, the driver of any vehicle Involved in such accident after 
fulfilling all other requirements of K.S.A. 8·1602, and amendments thereto, and subsection 
(a) of this section, insofar as possible on such person's part to be performed, shall 
forthwith report such acddent to the nearest office of a duly authorized pollee authority 
and submit thereto the information specified in subsection (a} of this section." 
K.S.A. 8-1602(a) reads as follows: 
11 (a) The driver of any vehicle involved in an acddent resulting in injury to or death of any 
person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such accident, or as close 
thereto as possible, but shall then forthwith return to and in every event shall remain at 
the scene of the accident until he or she has fulfilled the requirements of K.S.A. 8-1604. 
Every such stop shall be made without obstructing traffic more than Is necessary." 
[41 Kan.App.2d 11 00) A reading of these sta1utes appears to require remaining at the 
scene of a noninjury accident only if the property damaged by the damaging driver is attended by 
another person. Therefore, a single-car, noninjury accident does not require remaining at the scene 
unless the property of some other person is damaged. 
,. 
Holm's conviction for failure to report an accident is also unsustainable. K.S.A.2008 Supp. 8-
1606 provides three alternative requirements for reporting an accident to law enforcement officials. 
Only the first of these Is relevant for our purposes and provides: 
• The driver of a vehide Involved in an accident resulting In injury to, great bodily harm to 
or death of any person or total damage to all property to an apparent extent of $1,000 or 
more shall give notice immediately of such accident, by the quickest means of 
communication, to the nearest office of a duly authorized police autllority. 11 K.S.A.2008 
Supp. 8-1606(a). 
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K.S.A.2008 Supp. 8-1606 only requires reporting requirements for noninjury property accidents if 
there is at least $1,000 in property damage. In construing K.S.A.2008 Supp. 8-16061n the light most 
favorable to the defendant, as we are required to do, Holm's conviction cannot stand. K.S.A.2008 Supp. 
8-1606 fails to criminalize the failure to report accidents with property damage less than $1,000. The 
State failed to lntr.oduce evidence to document an apparent $1,000 In damage to Holm's van or the 
ditch where it ianded, although such damage may have occurred. As a result, there was insufficient 
evidence to support Holm's conviction for failure to report. 
Reversed and remanded. 
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739 N.W.ld 850 {Iowa 2007) 
STATE of Iowa, Appellant 
v. 
2086673379 
Christopher Jerome TARBOX, Appellee. 
No. 05-1281. 
Supreme Court of Iowa 
October 5, 2007 
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals. 
p.22 
Page 1 of7 
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Sylvia A. Lewis, District Associate 
Judge. 
Page851 
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Cristen Douglass, Assistant Attorney General, J. Patrick 
. White, County Attorney, and Meredith Rich-Chappell, Assistant County Attorney, for appellant. 
Steven E. Ballard and Patrick J. Ford of Leff Law Firm, L.L.P., Iowa City, for appellee. 
WIGGINS, Justice. 
In his petition for further review Christopher Jerome Tarbox asks this court to reverse the 
court of appeals decision finding the district court erred when it dismissed the trial information charging 
him with leaving the scene of an accident in violation of Iowa Code section 321.261 (2003). Tarbox 
claims because he was involved In a single-vehicle accident, and he was the only person who suffered 
a personal injury, his conduct did not violate section 321.261. Accepting the facts alleged by the State 
in the trial information and minutes as true, we agree with Tarbox that his conduct of leaving the scene 
of the single-vehicle accident did not violate section 321.261. Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the 
court of appeals and affirm the decision of the district court. 
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The State charged Tarbox with leaving the scene of a personal injury accident in violation of 
Iowa Code section 321.261. Tarbox filed a motion to dismiss the trial information claiming first, the trial 
information did not establish he was the driver of the vehicle at the time of the accident, and second, 
the driver of the vehicle had no duty to perform the duties required by section 321.261. The State filed a 
notice of additional testimony addressing Tarbox's first claim. The State also filed a resistance 
responding to both issues raised by Tarbox. 
The district court granted Tarbox's motion to dismiss finding none of the driver's statutory 
duties required by section 321.261 apply when there is a single-vehicle accident resulting in an Injury to 
the driver. The State appealed the decision of the district court claiming it erred in dismissing the trial 
information. We transferred 
Page852 
the case to our court of appeals. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case to the 
district court for trial. Tarbox then petitioned our court for further review, which we granted. 
rr. Issue. 
In this appeal we must decide whether the district court erred when It dismissed the trial 
information. 
Ill. Standard of Review. 
This court reviews a district court's order to dismiss a trial information for correction of errors 
at law. State v. Petersen, 678 N.W.2d 611, 613 (Iowa 2004).1n reviewing the dismissal of the trial 
information, we accept the facts alleged by the State in the information and attached minutes as true. 
State v. Gonzalez, 718 N.W.2d 304, 307 {Iowa 2006). We will reverse the district court's dismissal if the 
- facts alleged by the State "charge a crime as a matter of law." ld. Additionally, we review questions of 
statutory interpretation for correction of errors at law. /d. 
IV. Facts. 
According to the trial information we accept the following facts as true. On December 17, 
2004, three witnesses observed a beige Mitsubishi Galant traveling north on Governor Street, a one-
way street In Iowa City. As the vehicle approached the intersection of Governor Street and Iowa 
Avenue, the driver lost control and hit a cement wall. The vehicle came to a complete stop. The cement 
wall was not located on private property, and other than damage to the Galant, no other property 
damage occurred. 
After the Galant stopped, the three witnesses saw the only occupant of the vehicle, a white 
L 11 "'I"'"' • 
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male approximately six feet tall wHh brown hair, exit the Galant from the driver's side. The male 
fled the area and left the vehicle where It had come to rest at the scene. The witnesses observed the 
male had injuries to his face. The witnesses then contacted the Iowa Ctty police. 
!owa City pollee officers Bi!! Welch and Terry Tack arrived on the scene, finding the Galant 
damaged from its collision with the cement wall. The officers found the vehicle's airbags deployed. The 
officers completed an accident report and noted the vehicle's path of travel based on their · 
conversations with the witnesses. During their investigation the officers found a cellular phone close to 
the intersection. The officers took the cellular phone as evidence. They determined the phone belonged 
to Tarbox. After running the license plates of the Galant, they established Marie Rolling Tarbox owned 
the vehicle. 
Later that evening Iowa City police officers Zach Diersen and Marcus Mittvalsky went to 
Tarbox's residence and spoke with him. The officers found Tarbox matched the physical description of 
the driver of the Galant provided by the eyewitnesses. Tarbox had fresh injuries on his face. Based on 
Mittvalsky's experience and training as a former firefighter, he believed these injuries were consistent 
with those caused by airbag deployment. 
V. Analysis. 
The State charged Tarbox with violating section 321.261. Section 321.261 (1) provides: 
rt]he driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to . . . any person 
shall Immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the acddent or as close as possible and 
if able, shall then return to and remain at the scene of the accident in accordance with 
section 321.263. 
Iowa Code§ 321.261(1). Accordingly, "lt]he first duty of the driver of a vehicle involved in an 
automobile accident under 
Page853 
321.261 is to stop .... " State v. Sebben, 185 N.W.2d 771, 774 (Iowa 1971). Second, the driver "has 
the additional duties specified in {section] 321.263, each of which are separate and distinct under the 
statute." /d. Section 321.263(1) states: 
The driver of a vehicle involved In an accident resulting in injury to or death of a person 
or damage to a vehicle which is driven or attended by a person shall give the driver's 
name, address, and the registration number of the vehicle the driver is driving and shall 
upon request and if available exhibit the driver's driver's license to the person struck, the 
driver or occupant of, or the person attending the vehicle involved in the accident and 
shall render to a person Injured In the accident reasonable assistance, including the 
transporting or arranging for the transporting of the person for medical treatment if it is 
apparent that medical treatment Is necessary or if transpormtion for medical treatment is 
,. 11" J,..l't&11 1 
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Iowa Code§ 321.263(1). Our resolution of the issue on appeal depends on our construction of 
these statutes. 
The goal of statutory construction Is to determine legislative Intent. A uen v. Alcoholic 
Beverages Div., 679 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Iowa 2004). Legislative intent is determined from the words 
chosen by the legislature, not what it should or might have said. State v. Doh/man, 725 N.W.2d 428, 
431 (Iowa 2006). Absent a statutory definition or an established meaning in the law, we give words 
used by the legislature their ordinary and common meaning by considering, among other things, the 
context in which they are used. /d. Under the guise of construction, we may not extend. enlarge, or 
otherwise change the meaning of a statute. Auen, 679 N.W.2d at 590. Finally, this court strictly 
construes criminal statutes with doubts resolved in the accused's favor. Gonzalez, 718 N. W.2d at 308. 
Tarbox concedes for purposes of this appeal that section 321.261 applies to single-vehicle 
accidents when a person is injured. We have previously held section 321.261 first creates a duty 
requiring the driver to stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident or as close as possible. Sebben, 185 
N.W.2d at 774. 
The facts alleged in the trial information state, after Tarbox crashed the vehicle into a cement 
wall on Governor Street, the vehicle "came to a complete stop." Further, the State does not argue 
Tarbox failed to meet the statutory duty to stop, rather it argues Tarbox did not remain at the scene to 
provide identifying information. Consequently, Tarbox did not violate the first duty of section 321.261 
requiring a driver to stop at the accident scene. 
After stopping the vehicle, the driver must remain at the scene to comply with the additional, 
separate, and distinct duties required under section 321.263. /d. To comply with the duties under 
section 321.263(1), the driver has a duty to provide Identifying information to the person struck, the 
driver of the other vehicle involved In the accident, an occupant of the vehicle Involved in the accident, 
or a person attending the vehicle involved in the accident. Iowa Code § 321.263(1 ). Tarbox's vehicle did 
not strike any person. The accident did not involve a driver of another vehicle or an occupant of any 
vehicle. 
· The State argues in its brief, "a driver has a duty to remain at the scene to provide identifying 
information to law enforcement or eyewitnesses who can then summon aid." T~ detennine whether the 
State's argument is correct, we must look to the sta,utory scheme employed by the legislature in 
chapter 321. See State v. McSorley, 549 N.W.2d 807, 809 (rewa 1996) (holding statutes "must be 
construed 
Page 854 
in light of their common purpose and Intent so as to produce a harmonious body of legislation"). 
Two sections in chapter 321 incorporate the duties of section 321.263. 
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The first reference to section 321.263 is in section 321.261(1). Section 321.261 requires the 
driver to stop and provide Identifying Information to the persons listed in section 321.263(1) when the 
accident involves personal injury or death. Iowa Code§ 321.261. The second reference to section 
321.263 is in section 321.262. Under section 321.262 the driver must stop and provide identifying 
information to the persons listed In section 321.263(1) If the driver Is involved in an accident "resulting 
only in damage to a vehicle which is driven or attended by any person." ld. § 321.262. Neither section 
321.261 (1) nor section 321.262 gives any Indication police officers or eyewitnesses are persons 
attending the vehicle under section 321.263(1). 
The reason the State argues pollee officers and eyewitnesses should be considered persons 
attending the vehicle is so they can summon aid. However, another section in chapter 321 leads us to 
conclude otheiWise. Section 321.266 requires a person involved in an accident causing personal injury 
to another, to contact the authorities immediately. /d.§ 321.266. Presumably. when a person contacts 
the authorities an inquiry would be made as to the nature of the accident and whether any injuries were 
sustained. At that p01nt the dispatcher would send the necessary authorities and medical personnel to 
the scene to render aid. Interpreting section 321.263(1) to require that a person involved in an accident 
must remain at the scene to provide identifying information to a police officer or eyewitness so that 
person could then summon aid would be repetitive of the duty under section 321.266, which requires 
the person involved in the accident to contact the authorities. Thus, the State's interpretation of section 
321.263(1) would render section 321.266 superfluous. See Millerv. Westfield Ins. Co., 606 N.W.2d 
301, 305 (Iowa 2000) (stating a fundamental rule of statutory construction Is that a statute will not be 
construed to make any part of it superfluous unless no other construction is reasonably possible). 
We believe the legislature meant the word "attending" as used in section 321.263(1) to mean 
"to be present with." Webster's Third International Dictionary 140 (unabr. ed. 2002). This meaning 
requires the driver involved in an accident with another vehicle to give the identifying information to a 
person present with the other vehicle when the driver or occupant of the vehicle is unavailable. This 
definition is consistent with the duty of a driver under another Iowa Code section, section 321.264. 
Under section 321.264 when a driver collides with an unattended vehicle, the driver is 
required to stop and locate either the owner or operator of the vehicle or leave a written note in a 
conspicuous place on the struck vehicle. Iowa Code§ 321.264. The dichotomy the legislature sets out 
between attended vehicles in section 321.263 and unattended vehicles in section 321.264 confirms that 
"attending" refers to someone who is present with the vehicle rather than one who comes upon the 
· vehicle after the fact. · 
Consequently, the officers and eyewitnesses were not attending the vehicle within the 
meaning of section 321.263(1 ). Therefore, Tarbox eould not have provided identifying information as 
required by the statute, and his failure to remain at the scene was not a violation of section 321.263(1). 
See Sebben, 185 N. W.2d at 775 (stating "since defendant is not required under section 321.263 to give 
information to anyone other than those designated by the statute then where, as 
Page855 
here, no other vehicle is involved and the person struck is instantly killed defendant could not be 
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subjedecl to criminal responsibility because of the legal impossibility of complying with the statute 
requirements to inform"). Thus, as a matter of law Tarbox could not have violated section 321.2f)1. 
The State argues if we do not construe sedion 321261 to require drivers like Tarbox to stay 
at the scene until the police arrive, the statutory purpose of section 321.261 would be frustrated. The 
State claims allowing a person to flee from the scene of an accident allows that person to evade 
possible criminal and civil liability for driving recklessly, driving while intoxicated, driving with a 
suspended or revoked license, or using another's vehicle without permission. This argument does not 
prompt us to interpret the statute differently. 
First, in construing a staMe "[w]e do not speculate as to the probable legislative intent apart 
from the words used in the statute." State v. Adams, 554 N.W.2d 686,689 (Iowa 1996). Second, we 
may not extend, enlarge, or otherwise change the meaning of a statute under the pretext of 
construction. Auen, 679 N.W.2d at 590. Third, penal statutes are not elastic and we must construe 
them strictly against the State. Gonzalez, 718 N.W.2d at 308. 
Finally, the construction we have given section 321.261 does not allow a person, such as 
T~mox. to fl" from the Kene of an acgdent allowi~ that person to evade possible criminal and civil 
liability for driving recklessly, driving while intoxicated, driving with a suspended or revoked license, or 
using another's vehicle without permission under the laws of Iowa. The Code of Iowa requires a person 
involved in an accident causing personal injury to any person to contact the authorities immediately. 
Iowa Code§ 321.266. The State had the option of charging Tarbox with a violation of section 321.266, 
but chose not to do so. 
Accordingly, the district court did not err when it granted Tarbox's motion to dismiss. 
VI. Disposition. 
Accepting the facts alleged by the State in the trial information and minutes as true, we find 
as a matter of law Tarbox did not violate Iowa Code sedion 321.261. Therefore, the district court was 
correct when it granted Tarbox's motion to dismiss. Consequently, we vacate the decision of the court 
of appeals and affirm the order of the district court granting Tarbox's motion to dismiss. 
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT 
AFFIRMED. 
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PURSUANT TO Idaho Appellant Rule 42, Appellant RICHARD W. WRIGHT 
respectfully submits this corrected Memorandum in support of his Petition for Rehearing. The 
corrections pertain to typographical errors in the identification of several Idaho Criminal Jury 
Instructions on Pages 7 and 8 of the original brief and appear in bold type. 
The issues involved relate to the question of: 
1. Whether Idaho Code § 49-1301 can apply to a single vehicle collision involving 
damage only to the driver's vehicle and a third-parties' personal property? 
2. If Idaho Code § 49-1301 can apply to a single vehicle collision, did the State prove all 
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt? 
1. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Oral argument on appeal was heard by the Court of May 11, 2011. The Appellant filed 
and served his Petition for Rehearing on June 1, 2011. Idaho Appellate Rule 42 governs 
Petitions for Rehearing. That Rule provides: 
Rule 42. Petition for Rehearing. 
(a) Time for Filing- Filing Fee. Petitions for rehearing must be 
physically filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court, together with 
the filing fee, within 21 days after the filing date of the Court's 
opinion, and must be served upon all parties to the appeal or 
proceeding. If the opinion is modified, other than to correct a 
clerical error, an aggrieved party may physically file another 
petition for rehearing within 21 days from the date of the modified 
opinion and serve all adverse parties in the appeal or proceeding. 
No response to any petition for rehearing shall be made except 
upon direction of the Court. 
(b) Briefs on the Petition. A brief or memorandum in support of the 
petition must be filed within 14 days of the filing date of the 
petition and shall be typewritten on letter size paper. An original 
and 9 copies of the petition and brief shall be filed with the Clerk 
of the Supreme Court. 
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(c) Oral Argument on Petition for Rehearing. There shall be no oral 
argument upon the petition for rehearing of an appeal or 
proceeding unless ordered by the Supreme Court. 
(d) Notice of Rehearing- Briefs. Copies of an order granting or 
denying a rehearing shall be served by the Clerk of the Supreme 
Court upon all parties to the appeal or proceeding. The order may 
set forth the issues to be reheard, and shall direct the time and order 
for the filing of briefs. A brief in support of or in opposition to a 
petition for rehearing need not be bound nor have any colored 
cover. 
(e) Oral Argument on Rehearing. If the Supreme Court grants a 
petition for rehearing, argument upon rehearing shall be scheduled 
by the Court in the same manner as argument on the merits of an 
appeal or petition. 
I. ARGUMENT 
In its May 11, 2011 Memorandum Decision and Order on Appeal the Court ruled: 
This Court concludes Wright failed to raise the issue of insufficient evidence at 
trial to support a conviction under Idaho Code§ 49-1301, and accordingly, 
Wright has waived his right to hear that issue on appeal. 
May 11, 2011 Memorandum Decision and Order on Appeal, Page 6. 
It is clear however that an error that goes to the foundation of the State's case must be 
regarded as a fundamental error. 
Error that is fundamental must be such error as goes to the foundation or basis of a 
defendant's rights, or go to the foundation of the state's case or take from the 
defendant a right which was essential to his defense and which no court could or 
ought to permit him to waive. 
State v. Lenon, 143 Idaho 415, 146 P.3d 681, 683 (Idaho App. 2005). Clearly, a finding by a 
trial court that a defendant is guilty of violating a statute that can have no legal application to the 
case under the facts as developed at trial must rise to the level of fundamental error. 
In his Opening Brief on Appeal the Appellant argued specifically that the evidence at trial 
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was insufficient for the trial court to convict the Defendant of a violation of Idaho Code § 49-
1301 because: 
A. Idaho Code§ 49-1301 does not apply to collisions between a vehicle and 
personal property where the factors set forth in Idaho Code§ 49-1305 are not 
implicated, and; 
B. The State of Idaho failed to prove at trial each essential element of the charged 
violation of Idaho Code § 49-1301. 
In his Opening Brief on Appeal, the Appellant specifically argued that Idaho Code§ 49-1301 
applies only to collisions involving more than vehicle and that if a statute was implicated by the 
facts of this case, it must be Idaho Code § 49-1304, which defines a driver's duty upon striking 
fixtures legally on or adjacent to the highway. 
In addressing that question the rule of lenity is a critical legal issue which has application 
to this case. The rule of lenity has been adopted in Idaho by the Idaho Supreme Court in the 
following form: 
The rule of lenity states that criminal statutes must be strictly construed in favor 
of defendants. 
State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 175 P.3d 788, 792 (Idaho 2008). Construing nearly identical 
language to that of Idaho Code § 49-1301, the Colorado Supreme Court examined the statutory 
language of C.R.S. 42-4-1403 which states: 
"The driver of any vehicle directly involved in an accident resulting only in 
damage to a vehicle which is driven or attended by any person shall immediately 
stop such vehicle at the scene of such accident or as close thereto as possible, but 
shall forthwith return to and in every event shall remain at the scene of such 
accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of section 42-4-1403." 
Lumbardy v. Colorado, 625 P.2d. 1026, 1027 (Colo. 1981). Construing that language the 
Colorado Supreme Court held: 
Section 42-4-1402 plainly applies to an accident involving injury to someone 
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other than the driver or damage to two or more vehicles. The statute contemplates 
a situation where there are other persons to whom the driver should report 
information about himself. 
The Colorado Supreme Court reasoned that the lower courts had stretched the application of 
C.R.S. 42-4-1402 too far to try to give it application to a single vehicle collision: 
The county court, in determining that section 42-4-1402 applied to 
the facts in this case, interpreted "any person" in the first sentence of the statute to 
refer back to "the driver." So construed, "accident," as used in the statute, would 
include all one car accidents since the driver and "any person" would be one and 
the same individual. 
The district court affirmed the county court's interpretation of "any person." It 
also interpreted the emphasized "and" in section 42-4-1403(2), p. 3, supra, as an 
"or" in order to make section 42-4-1403 logically applicable to single vehicle 
accidents. 
The defendant argues that the duties of a driver involved in a one car accident 
are prescribed by section 42-4-1406, C.R.S.1973: 
"(1) The driver of a vehicle involved in a traffic accident resulting in injury to or 
death of any person or any property damage shall, after fulfilling the requirements 
of section 42-4-1402 and 42-4-1403(1), give immediate notice of the location of 
such accident and such other information as is specified in section 42-4-1403(2) to 
the nearest office of the duly authorized police authority and, if so directed by the 
police authority, shall forthwith and without delay return to and remain at the scene 
of the accident until said police have arrived at the scene and completed their 
investigation thereat." We agree. 
Section 42-4-1406(1) unequivocally applies to a single car accident. 
Apparently, the county court and the district court overlooked or ignored section 
42-4-1406. Instead, they found it necessary to stretch the terms of section 
42-4-1402 to "reasonably effect the legislative intent evidenced by the entire 
statutory scheme." The duty to report a single car accident under section 42-4-1406 
is included within the leaving the scene of the accident ("hit and run") statutory 
scheme. Gammon v. State Dept. of Revenue, 32 Colo.App. 437, 513 P.2d 748 
(1973). Therefore, section 42-4-1406, rather than section 42-4-1402, as interpreted 
by the two lower courts, is the provision requiring a driver to report property 
damage in a single car accident. The facts of this case do not support the 
defendant's conviction under section 42-4-1402. 
We reverse and remand to the district court with directions to vacate the 
defendant's conviction. 
Likewise, the Court of Appeals of Kansas has construed language in its Leaving the Scene of an 
Accident statute to require the involvement of at least two (2) vehicles. In that case, State v. 
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Holm, 41 Kan.App.2d 1096, 208 P.3d 325 (Kan.App. 2009) the court was construing K.S,A. 8-
1603, which reads in the pertinent part: 
"The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting only in damage to a 
vehicle or other property which is driven or attended by any person shall 
immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such accident, or as close thereto as 
possible, but shall forthwith return to and in every event shall remain at the scene 
of such accident until he or she has fulfilled the requirements of K.S.A. 8-1604." 
The Kansas statute is substantially identical to Idaho Code§ 49-1301 with the exception that it 
expressly applies when there is damage only to a "vehicle or to other property." Idaho Code 
Section 49-1301 omits any reference to 'other property' and expressly applies only to accidents 
resulting in damage to a vehicle. Like the Colorado Supreme Court, the Kansas Court of Appeals 
held that: 
"A reading of these statutes appears to require remaining at the scene of a 
noninjury accident only if the property damaged by the damaging driver is 
attended by another person. Therefore a single car accident does not require 
remaining at the scene unless the property the property of some other person is 
damaged. 
State v. Holm, 41 Kan.App.2d 1096, 1100, 208 P.3d. 325, 328 (Kan.App. 2009). It is critical to 
note that the Kansas statute expressly applies to collisions involving damage to personal property. 
Idaho Code§ 49-1301 expressly omits damage to personal property. 
The Supreme Court of Iowa has also interpreted similar statutory language as having no 
application to single vehicle accidents. In State v. Tarbox, 739 N.W.2d 850 (Iowa 2007) the 
Supreme Court of Iowa wrestled with a similar issue. In that case Tarbox crashed his car into a 
concrete wall, suffered a personal injury and fled the area. Tarbox was charged with a violation of 
Iowa Code§ 321.261 which provides: 
"§ 321.261. Death or personal injuries 
1. The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death 
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of any person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident or as 
close as possible and if able, shall then return to and remain at the scene of the 
accident in accordance with section 321.263. Every such stop shall be made 
without obstructing traffic more than is necessary. 
2. Any person failing to stop or to comply with the requirements in subsection 1 of 
this section, in the event of an accident resulting in an injury to any person is guilty 
upon conviction of a serious misdemeanor." 
The Supreme Court of Iowa ruled that the statutory language 'accident resulting in injury to, or 
death of any person' does not apply to the driver of a vehicle involved in a single-vehicle 
collision: 
In his petition for further review Christopher Jerome Tarbox asks this court to 
reverse the court of appeals decision finding the district court erred when it 
dismissed the trial information charging him with leaving the scene of an accident 
in violation oflowa Code section 321.261 (2003). Tarbox claims because he was 
involved in a single-vehicle accident, and he was the only person who suffered a 
personal injury, his conduct did not violate section 321.261. Accepting the facts 
alleged by the State in the trial information and minutes as true, we agree with 
Tarbox that his conduct of leaving the scene of the single-vehicle accident did not 
violate section 321.261. Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the court of 
appeals and affirm the decision of the district court. 
There is strong evidence that the same results as reached in Colorado, Arizona, Kansas and 
Iowa would be also be reached in Idaho. 
Interestingly, ICTI 1035, 1036 and 1037 are not available to counsel through the Idaho 
State Bar Association's Casemaker legal research website. Those instructions provide valuable 
insight. ICTI 1036 provides as follows: 
ICTI 1036 LEAVING SCENE OF ACCIDENT- ATTENDED VEHICLE 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Leaving the Scene of an Accident 
[Involving an Attended Vehicle], the state must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about [date], 
2. in the state of Idaho, 
3. the defendant [name] was driving a motor vehicle 
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4. on public or private property open to the public, 
5. the defendant's vehicle was involved in an accident 
6. which resulted in damage to another vehicle which was driven or attended by a person, 
7. the defendant had knowledge of the accident, and 
8. either the defendant failed to immediately stop [his] [her] vehicle at the scene of the 
accident, or to stop as close as possible and then immediately return to the scene of the accident, 
or after stopping at or returning to the scene of the accident, the defendant failed to remain at the 
scene until [he] [she] had done the following: 
(a) given his or her name and address; 
(b) given the name of his or her insurance agent or company, if the 
defendant had automobile liability insurance; 
(c) given the vehicle registration number of the vehicle the 
defendant was driving; and 
(d) if available, exhibited [his] [her] driver's license to the driver of 
or person attending the other vehicle involved in the collision. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find 
the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty. 
Comment 
I.C. §§ 49-1301 & 49-1302. Although the statute does not expressly require that 
the defendant have knowledge of the accident, it is an essential element of the 
offense. State v. Parish, 79 Idaho 75, 310 P.2d 1082 (1957). 
If the duty to stop at the scene of an accident is triggered in a single vehicle collision situation by 
the statutory language "vehicle driven or attended by any person" if interpreted as including the 
cited driver's own vehicle, that interpretation expressly conflicts with the mandatory proof of the 
involvement of "another vehicle" as set forth in ICJI 1036(6). The statutory language "vehicle 
driven or or attended by any person" clearly does not apply to damage sustained by the cited 
driver's own vehicle and the statute that the Appellant likely did violate, Idaho Code§ 49-1304 
does not require that a driver stop and remain at the scene of an accident. 
To interpret Idaho Code§ 49-1301 as having application to a single vehicle collision 
would result in legal absurdities. 
Idaho, Idaho Code§ 49-102(3) defines the term 'accident:' 
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"Accident" means any event that results in an unintended injury or property 
damage attributable directly or indirectly to the motion of a motor vehicle." 
The statutory term 'accident' does not limit the threshold damage to personal property to damage 
above a certain monetary value. lfldaho Code§ 49-1301 to any single vehicle collision, then the 
driver of that single vehicle has the duty to stop, return to and remain at the scene of any 
'accident' which results from damage to any windshield, any paint chip or any dent caused by a 
rock tossed up by the motion of the driver's vehicle, or by the motion of any other motor vehicle. 
Or perhaps to the accumulation of road tar caused by driving on a recently oiled road that 
damages the driver's vehicle's clear coat. Or any damage or dent caused by any baseball, 
basketball or soccer ball while the driver's vehicle is in motion on a public roadway or private 
roadway open to the public, such as a highschool parking lot or the parking area of any public 
playfield. 
Aside from ICll 1036, the Idaho Supreme Court has also telegraphed fairly clearly that it 
does not see the application ofldaho Code § 49-1301, in the case of Munns v. Swift 
Transportation Company, Munns v. Swift Transportation Company, 138 Idaho 108 (Idaho 2002) 
in which the Idaho Supreme Court clearly mused that: 
"The inherent ambiguity in the statute precludes a conclusion that Swift 
Transportation Co. Inc., and its driver were negligent as a matter of law for 
violating the statute by not remaining at the scene of the accident with the horse." 
Munns v. Swift Transportation Company, 138 Idaho at 111. The rule of lenity requires that the 
'inherent ambiguity' in the statute must be strictly construed in favor of the Defendant/ Appellant, 
Richard W. Wright. 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellant Rule 42, the Defendant/Appellant respectfully requests that 
the Court grant his Petition for Rehearing and order and direct such further briefing and argument 
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as the Court may deem most appropriate under the Rule. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this~ day of June 2011. 
RICHARD K. KUCK, PLLC 
Attorney for Defendant/ Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on theal.__ day of June 2011 I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Barry McHugh 
Attn: Jim Reierson 
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid. 
[X] Fax transmission 208-446-1833 
[ ] Hand delivered. 
RICHARD K. KUCK, PLLC 
~
Attorney for the Defendant/ Appellant 
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1 Richard K. Kuck, ISB No. 3875 
2 
RICHARD K. KUCK, PLLC 
Attorney at Law 
3 P.O. Box 1320 
408 Sherman Avenue, Ste. 205 
4 Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 816-1320 
Tel: 208-667-3600 
5 Fax: 208-667-3379 
6 Attorney For Defendant 
STATE OF IU'\110 ~OUNTY OF KOOTENAI } SS dl~~{tli~ 
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7 
8 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TilE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
V. 
RICHARD WILLIAM WRIGHT, 
) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
11-----------------------------~ 
Case No. 2009-0025609 
MOTION TO MODIFY TERMS OF 
WITilliELD JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW THE DEFENDANT, RICHARD W. WRIGHT, and respectfully 
:<>ves the Cowt for an Order modifying the tenns of the withheld judgment granted to the 
18 Defendant by the Court following a trial on March 1, 2010. 
19 The term of the withheld judgment was for one (1) year. On June 1, 2010, 
20 however, on the motion of the Defendant, the District Court entered an order staying and 
21 
22 
23 
arresting the operation of the Court's March 1, 2010 \\fithheldjudgment pending the 
resolution of the appeal filed by the Defendant in this case which sought review of the 
issue of whether Idaho Code § 49-1301 could have application to a single vehicle 
24 
25 collision. 
26 On May 11. 2011 the District Court affirmed the trial court's conviction of the 
2? Defendant following trial and on June 1, 2011 the Defendant filed his Petition for 
28 
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1 Rehearing before the District Court which is pending at this time. 
2 
3 
4 
The basis for the Defendant's appeal was some language employed in dicta by the 
Idaho Supreme Court in a case titled Munns y, Swift Transportation Company, 138 Idaho 
5 
108 (Idaho 2002), in which the Idaho Supreme Court suggested that the application of 
6 Idaho Code §49-1301 to a collision between a vehicle and a horse was 'not obvious." 
7 Additionally, ICn 1036 suggests that the statutory phrase 'driven or attended by 
8 any person' does not include the cited driver's own vehicle because that Instruction 
9 
10 
11 
12 
uires the State to prove the involvement of 'another' vehicle in addition to the 
Defendant driver's vehicle. 
The Court may recall that this case arose from the collision between Mr. Wright's 
13 vehicle and a speed limit sign caused by icy roads. 
14 Prior to trial the Defendant objected to the State's failure to respond to his written 
15 request for discovery, but the Court noted that the Defendant, who appeared pro-se, had 
16 
17 
failed to raise the issue by pre-trial motion as required. The Defendant was given the 
opportunity to read the police report and the case proceeded to trial. 
18 
19 Following trial, the Court inquired of the Defendant as to whether he wanted to 
20 roceed to sentencing. The Defendant stated that he wished to speak to an attorney about 
21 an appeal. The Court stated that it would set the case for disposition. The prosecutor 
22 
objected and stated that he felt there was no need to delay the sentencing primarily 
23 
because he saw no reason that the Defendant would not qualify for a withheld judgment. 
24 
25 The Defendant had been a law enforcement officer for approximately thirty-four (34) years 
26 in the State of Florida prior to retiring and moving to Idaho. Following some discussion, 
27 the Defendant agreed to proceed to disposition immediately and the Court '\\ithheld 
28 
MOTION TO MODIFY TERMS OF WITHHELD JUDGMENT- 2 
p.2 
Richard W. Wright 39483 143 of 183
UCK :H,
D v. .
5 .
6 
le
15 
l
19 
25 
T 
Jun 22 2011 4:38PM Richard K. Kuck, PLLC 2086673379 
1 'udgment for a period of one (1) year. The terms of the withheld judgment were as 
2 follows: I) the Defendant was to commit no crime greater than a traffic infraction; 2) the 
3 
4 
Defendant was to maintain liability insurance on any vehicle that the Defendant drove; 3) 
5 
the Defendant was to advise the Court of a change of address within ten (1 0) days of any 
6 such change; 4) the Defendant was to perform sixteen ( 16) hours on the County Sheriffs 
7 Labor Program; and 5) the Defendant was to reimburse the county the sum of $200.00 for 
8 costs of prosecution. 
9 
10 
More than one (1) year has passed since judgment was withheld on March 1, 2010, 
the Defendant has successfully completed each of the terms and cOnditions of the withheld 
11 
12 'udgment and would normally be entitled to have the conviction set aside and the case 
13 dismissed at this time. 
14 The issue that arises however, is the operation of the District Court's June 1, 2010 
15 
16 
17 
Order arresting the operation of the withheld judgment pending resolution of the appeal. 
The probable legal affect of the District Court's order is to toll the running of the one (1) 
18 year tenn of the withheld judgment during the appeal. Equally however, the Defendant has 
19 successfully completed each of the terms and conditions of the Court's withheld judgment 
20 for more than one (1) year at this point. If the Court were to modify the term of its 
21 
withheld judgment, and set aside the conviction and dismiss this matter based upon the 
22 
23 
Defendant's actual successful compliance with the Court's March 1, 201 0 withheld 
· udgment there would be no need for the Defendant to further pursue his appeal. 
24 
25 Idaho Criminal Rule 54.5(5) expressly permits a trial court to 'conduct any hearing, 
26 and make any order, decision or judgment with regard to a withheld judgment entered 
27 upon a plea of guilty or verdict of guilty' during a criminal appea]. 
28 
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1 It is also axiomatic that the trial court retains continuing authority to modify or 
2 
3 
4 
revoke a withheld judgment which it has granted at any time. 
For the reason that the Defendant has actually satisfied the terms of the Court's 
5 
March 1, 2010 withheld judgment and more than one (1) year has elapsed, the 
6 modification of the term of the Court's March 1, 2010 withheld judgment as necessary to 
7 allow for the immediate dismissal of this matter would render the issues currently on 
8 appeal moot and allow for the dismissal of the appeal without the further expenditure of 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
urces by the parties or the judiciary on those issues. 
Oral argument is respectfully requested. 
DATED this c:JJ. day of June 2011. 
RICHARD K. KUCK, Pll..C 
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1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
2 I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~ day of June 2011 I caused to be served a 
3 true and correct copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Barry McHugh 
Attn: Jim Reierson 
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney 
P .0. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
[ 1 U.S. Mail, postage prepaid. 
[X] Fax transmission 208-446-1833 
[ 1 Hand delivered 
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Lng of 1K-COURTROOM7 01 . '10/2011 Page 1 of3 
Description CR 2009-25609 Wright, Richard William 20110630 Rule 35 
Judge Friedlander ~ ~ 
Clerk Denice Larsen 1i 'JJa ,~A/1 
Date 16/30/2011 II Location ]11 K-COURTROOM7 
Time I Speaker I Note 
09:10:47 AM Judge Calls case. Jim Reierson for State. Richard Kuck for Def. Def 
Friedlander present not in custody. 
09:11:52 AM Judge I'm not sure what we are here for. Friedlander 
09:11:58AM Richard Should be motion to modify terms of withheld jdmt. 1,(',,,.~.-
I '\.A\,,#1'\. 
09:12:06 AM Judge There is pending petition for rehearing on memo decision and 
Friedlander order on appeal. Isn't this a district court issue. 
09:12:22 AM Richard No, trial court always retains jurisdiction to modify for withheld. 
Kuck Re: 54.5(5) . 
09:14:48 AM Appears this Court does have authority re withheld jdmt. I note 
in this file withheld jdmt was granted on March 1, 2010 and has 
Judge not been opposed. Believe operation was suspended or stayed 
Friedlander during appeal, decision of this Court was affirmed and it's 
memorandum decision and order. Appears petition for rehearing 
which is currently pending before district court. 
09:16:10 AM Richard It is not set. It is decided without oral argument and he has not nrrfer~=>rf that :::~t thic::! nnint m!:i!Hho ho i<:> '"'ai+inn +n "'eo ,.,ha+ 
Kuck -•- ·-- "'"" ""-• 111- t-''-'11 L' IIIII.AJU"' IIV I~ VY ILIII~ LV .;J V VVII l happens today. 
I 09:16:44 AM I Jim I Objecting to what he is proposing. I Reierson 
09:16:52 AM On March 1, 2010 trial was on 49-1301, which was 7:55am 
Richard collision and he did not remain at scene. He drove on to his 
Kuck business. He has cafe on 4th street. Prior to that he had been 
law enforcement officer in Florida for some time. 
I 09:18:03 AM I Jim Obj to recitation of facts in case. Not at issue. You already found 
Reierson him guilty. 
I 09:18:28AM I Judge 
. Friedlander Overruled. I think it's fine for counsel to set the background . 
09:18:49 AM 
There were a couple contacts with law enforcement that 
morning. They called him on his cell phone and he admitted to 
Richard knocking over sign. Later they drove to business when officer 
Kuck believed he was evasive in his answers. The issue on appeal is 
whether 49-1301 can apply to single vehicle accident. Reason it 
came up, in matter not before court, that the withheld triggered a 
I I 111 years suspension of his driving privileges 49-1301 and 49-325 II 
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Log of 1K-COURTROOM7 o1 - '10/2011 Page 2 of3 
which are conflicting statutes. His conviction would not have 
been final due to withheld. 
09:20:52 AM DOT said they don't care. Conviction until dismissed. They have 
suspended his license and went in to effect on March 2010. 
Effective again May 11, 2010 when Judge Mitchell affirmed. 
Court on March 1 withheld jdmt for 1 year. He completed SCLP, 
Richard he paid fines and restitution. only other terms and conditions is 
Kuck that he commite no law violation greater than infraction and 
keep court apprised of change of address. It has been in fact 
longer than 1 year for lie suspension and he has complied with 
all the terms. He has signed an affidavit of compliance that we 
could file with court. 
09:24:19 AM I I We are seeking that court recognize that 1 year has passed Cl\lOn +hn• ,,h co+"'"ed A co" +n ""e"l"" .. 8 +h ... + II, .. \11/ .. ;,..h+ h ...... 
vVvll \IIVU~II ~\O.J • ~"- \V U viO.I LIIO.l lVII. VVII~IIL IIQ;:) 
complied, has performed each term and condition and ask court 
to dismiss the case today. If Court were to do that then the 
Richard appeal before Judge Mitchell would become mute. In this case 
Kuck we have several conflicting statutes. One requires administrative 
suspension. I'm here to see if we can truncate process. Court 
has authority to grant relief we are seeking. Re: Lund vs. 
Transportation. Using language such as used in 49-1301. Does 
not apply to single vehicle accidents. 
09:28:49 AM Re definintion of accident. It raises issues like what happens 
when you get rock chip in windshield. This is a case about 
Richard knocking over a street sign. That doesn't require returning to 
Kuck scene of accident. Re 1036 jury instructions and 1038 doesn't 
require the person return to scene of accident. Issue not clear in 
I 
I Idaho, hasnjt been decided. 4 Supreme Courts have held this 
would not be a 49-1301 issue. 
09:31:22 AM I I 
09:31:32 AM Judge Not following the argument with what is before Court today. Friedlander 
09:31:49 AM Ask Court to tell us today that Mr. Wright has in fact complied 
with withheld jdmt and modify terms and give us credit for amt of 
time withheld has been suspended June 1, 2010 to May 11, 
Richard 2011 and rule that his actual compliance for a period of time 
Kuck longer than 1 year is sufficient. Ask to modify terms to terminate 
today. He has done everything Court has asked him to do. 
License suspension is crippling thing. Knocking down a street 
sign doesn't apply. 
09:33:56 AM 
This is very simple case. Appeal was his decision. Whole 
Jim argument it has been over a year, it is thgeir actions, disingenuous to have you dismiss case. License suspension, Reierson the appeal stayed the license suspension. This is all about his 
driving privileges. That is the effect of his conviction. One year 
I 1 suspension has not been complied with at this point. He has I 
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09:36:32 AM Judge 
Friedlander 
09:42:23 AM Judge 
Friedlander 
09:42:38 AM 
Judge 
Friedlander 
09:44:14 AM 
Judge 
Friedlander 
~~:46AM 
:46AM End 
motion pending before Judge Mitchell, think that should go 
forward. Strongly asking Court to allow this to take it's natural 
course. 1 year of withheld has not been completed. 
I Quick recess. 
Back on record. 
Court is being asked to ignore the stay of the withheld jdmt. 
upon appeal and grant dismissal as if the withheld had remained 
in effect without stay of appeal at conclusion of withheld jdmt 
period. I'm not persuaded I had that power, but even if it does I 
will deny the motion at this time. When appeal is filed, Court 
action is stayed and it was stayed as matter of law. To ignore 
that stay is improper procedural thing to do. 
Everybody has right to appeal if they wish to pursue. In addition 
it would appear to Court that DOT imposed lie suspension would 
not fully take in effect, that is not something Court will 
manipulate. Deny motion. Mr. Reierson to prepare order. 
Produced by FTR Gold™ 
www.fortherecord.com 
I 
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BARRY McHUGH 
Prosecuting Attorney 
501 Government Way/Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
Telephone: (208) 446-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 446-1833 
fln'"::"· -., .. w L-;. 11.:!.\..,IIIJ~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD WILLIAM WRIGHT, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-2009-25609 
ORDER 
The above matters came on for a hearing before the Honorable BARRY WATSON, 
Judge, on the 30TH day of June, 2011. The State was represented by JIM REIERSON, Deput-y 
Prosecuting Attorney, for Kootenai County, Idaho. The defendant was present, represented by 
RICHARD K. KUCK, Attorney for t~dant. After argument from all parties, the Court 
enters its order as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's Motion to Modify Terms of Withheld 
Judgment is denied. /___ d~ 
ENTERED this ~ day o~ 2011. 
ORDER 
1 of2 Richard W. Wright 39483 150 of 183
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I hereby, certify that on the lL_ day of~' 011, that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was mailed/delivered by regular U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, Interoffice Mail, Hand 
Delivered, or Faxed to: 
Prosecutor Y~~' )fo~3 Defense Attorney {_p (.p 1-3 '6/~efendant __ _ 
Auditor _____ Police Agency ______ _ 
Other 
-----------
~~~~I 
ORDER 
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1 Richard K Kuck, ISB No. 3875 
2 
RICHARD K. KUCK, PLLC 
P .0. Box 1320 
3 408 Shennan A venue, Ste. 205 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1320 
4 Tel: 208-667-3600 
Fax: 208-667-3379 
5 Attorney For Defendant 
6 
7 
8 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDA.J.IO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
9 STATE OF IDAHO, 
10 
v. 
11 
) 
) 
PI aintiff, ) 
) 
12 RICHARD WILLIAM WRIGHT, 
) 
) 
) 
Defendant ) 
Qe 
Case No. 2009-0025609 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
13 
14 
15 COMES NOW THE DEFENDANT, RICHARD W. WRIGHT, and respectfully 
16 moves the Court for an Order reconsidering the Court's July 6, 2011 decision to deny the 
17 Defendant's Motion to Modify the effective tenn of the one (I) year withheld judgment 
18 granted to the Defendant by the Court following a bench trial on March 1, 2010 for the 
19 
20 
reason that the interests of justice would be best served by the entry of an Order modifYing 
21 
the term of the withheld judgment and dismissing this matter. 
22 This Motion is supported by the Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion 
23 to Reconsider filed with this Motion. Oral argument is respectfully requested. 
24 DATED this~ day of July 2011. 
25 
26 
27 
28 
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1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
2 I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the z..d'L day of July 2011 I caused to be served a 
3 true and correct copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Barry McHugh 
Attn: Jim Reierson 
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid. 
~ax transmission 208-446-1833 
[ ] Hand delivered. 
[ ] Other _______ _ 
14 Attorney for the Defendant 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
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1 Richard K. Kuck, ISB No. 3875 
2 RICHARD K. KUCK,. PLLC P.O. Box 1320 
3 408 Sherman Avenue, Ste. 205 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1320 
4 Tel: 208-667-3600 
Fax:208-667-3379 
5 Attorney For Defendant 
6 
7 
8 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
9 STATE OF IDAHO, 
10 
v. 
11 
12 RICHARD WILLIAM WRIGHT, 
) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
Case No. 2009-0025609 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
13 
14 
15 
Defendant Richard W. Wright respectfully submits the following points and 
16 authorities in support of his Motion for Reconsideration. 
17 By Order filed July 6, 2011~ the Court denied the Defendant's previously filed 
18 
19 
20 
Motion to Modify the tenn of the withheld judgment granted to the Defendant by the 
Court on March 1, 2010. For the reasons set forth below, the Defendant respectfully 
21 
requests that the Court reconsider the denial of his motion. 
22 1. Factual and Procedural Background. 
p. 1 
23 On March 1, 2010, following a bench trial, the Defendant, who represented himself 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
at trial, was found guilty of violating Idaho Code § 49·130 1 as a result of a single vehicle 
accident with a speed limit sign. The evidence at trial was that the Defendant was driving 
work on very icy roads when his vehicle slipped off the road and struck and damaged a 
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1 speed limit sign. There was also testimony that the Defendant's vehicle suffered some 
2 damage to its plastic door molding. The Defendant did not remain at the scene of the 
3 
4 
accident and later that morning told a sheriff's deputy during a phone call about the 
incident that his intention had been to report the accident using an accident self-report 
5 
6 fonn. 
7 There was no evidence introduced by any party at trial that any person was injured 
8 in the accident and no evidence introduced as to the value of the damage to either the 
9 
speed limit sign nor to the Defendant's vehicle and for that reason it is not possible to 
10 
determine whether the Defendant was required to immediately report the accident to law 
11 
12 enforcement under Idaho Code§ 49-1305, which requires accidents to be reported to law 
13 enforcement only when there is damage to any one person's property greater than 
14 $1 ,500. 00, or when there is an injury or death. 
15 
16 
17 
There was also no evidence introduced at trial regarding the identity of the owner 
of the speed limit sign. Rather, the only evidence presented was that the Defendant 
18 damaged the sign, did not remain at the scene of the accident and did not report the 
19 accident to law enforcement. Because no person was injured and the State failed to present 
20 any evidence at trial as to the value of the damage either to the Defendant's vehicle or to 
21 the sign there is no evidence from which it can be concluded that the Defendant had a duty 
22 
23 
to report the accident to law enforcement. The only question is whether the Defendant had 
a duty to remain at the scene of the collision. 
24 
25 Idaho Code § 49-1301 provides in the relevant portion as follows: 
26 § 49-1301. ACCIDENTS INVOLVING DAMAGE TO 
VEIDCLE 
27 
28 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
(I) The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident, either on public or 
private property open to the public, resulting only in damage to a vehicle 
which is driven or attended by any person shall immediately stop the 
vehicle at the scene of the accident, or as close as possible, and shall 
immediately return to, and in every event shall remain at, tbe scene of the 
accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of law. 
5 If the Defendant had requested a jury trial rather than a bench trial it would have been 
6 
necessary to instruct the jury on the elements of the offense of a violation of Idabo Code § 
7 
8 
49-130 I. The instruction adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court to apply to alleged 
violations of Idaho Code§ 49-1301 is ICll 1036. That instruction reads as follows: 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
I5 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
ICJI 1036 LEAVING SCENE OF ACCIDENT- A TrENDED VElflCLE 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Leaving the Scene of an Accident 
[Involving an Attended Vehicle], the state must prove each of the 
following: 
1. On or about [date], 
2. in the state of Idaho, 
3. the defendant r name] was driving a motor vehicle 
4. on public or private property open to the public. 
5. the defendant's vehicle was involved in an accident 
6. which resulted in damage to another vehicle which was driven or attended by a 
person, 
7. the defendant had knowledge of the accident, and 
8. either the defendant failed to immediately stop [his] [her] vehicle at the scene of 
the accident, or to stop as close as possible and then immediately return to 
the scene of the accident, or after stopping at or returning to the scene of the 
accident, the defendant failed to remain at the scene until [he] [she] had 
done the following: 
{a) given his or her name and address; 
{b) given the name of his or her insurance agent or company, 
if the defendant had automobile liability insurance; 
(c) given the vehicle registration number of the vehicle the 
defendant was driving; and 
(d) if available, exhibited [his] [her] driver's license to the 
driver of or person attending the other vehicle involved in 
the coJlision. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you 
must fmd the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty. 
Comment 
I.C. §§ 49-1301 & 49-1302. Although the statute does not expressly 
require that the defendant have knowledge of the accident, it is an essential 
element of the offense. State v. Parish, 79 Idaho 75,310 P.2d 1082 (1957). 
6 ·~~!!B!I~~ee~d. rcn 1036 c1early requires the involvement of more than one vehicle 
7 before a Defendant can be properly convicted of a violation of Idaho Code § 49-1301. The 
8 instruction that applies to collisions with fixtures on or adjacent to a highway is ICJI 1038 
9 which applies to violations of Idaho Code§ 49-1304. 
10 
li 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
ICJI 1038 LEAVING SCENE OF ACCIDENT- FIXTURES 
INSTRUCTION NO.----
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Leaving the Scene of an 
Accident [Involving Fixtures], the state must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about [date], 
2. in the state of Idaho, 
3. the defendant [name] was driving a motor vehicle 
4. which was involved in an accident resulting in damage to fixtu."""es 
or other property legally upon or adjacent to a highway, 
5. the defendant had knowledge of the accident, and 
6. the defendant failed to do all of the fo1lowing: 
(a) take reasonable steps to locate the owner or person in charge of 
the property; 
(b) notify such person of the accident, the defendant's name and 
address, the name of the defendant's insurance agent or company if the 
defendant had automobile liability insurance, and the motor vehicle 
registration number of the vehicle the defendant was driving; and 
(c) exhibit [his] [her] driver's Jicense, if it was available and the 
defendant was requested to exhibit it. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, 
you must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty. 
Comment 
I.C. § 49-1304. Although the statute does not expressly require that the 
defendant have knowledge of the accident, it is an essential element of the 
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Jul 20 2011 4:45PM Richard K. Kuck, PLLC 2086673379 p.5 
1 offense. State v. Parish, 79 Idaho 75, 310 P.2d 1082 (1957). 
2 The effect of finding the Defendant guilty of a violation of Idaho Code § 49-1301 rather 
3 
than a violation of Idaho Code§ 49-1304 is that a driver who strikes an attended vehicle 
4 
and does not remain at the scene of the accident suffers a one (1) year Departmental 
5 
6 
license suspension whereas a driver who strikes a fixture and otherwise violates Idaho 
7 Code§ 49-1304 does not sustain a drivers license suspension of any sort. The 
8 combinations and pennutations of when a driver would be required to stoop and remain at 
9 the scene of a otherwise non-reportable single vehicle accident are virtually endless and 
10 there is no conceivable purpose in such a requirement. 
11 
12 
In this case. the Defendant should have been convicted of violating Idaho Code § 
49-1304 and not Idaho Code§ 49-1301. 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Idaho Code § 49-1 02(3) defines the term 'accident:' 
.. Accident" means any event that results in an unintended injury or property 
damage attributable directly or indirectly to the motion of a motor vehicle." 
17 
The statutory tenn 'accident' does not limit the threshold damage to personal property to 
18 damage above a certain monetary value. If Idaho Code § 49-1301 applies to any single 
19 vehicle accident, then the driver of that single vehicle has the duty to stop, return to and 
20 remain at the scene of any 'accident' which results from damage to any windshield, any 
21 paint chip or any dent caused by a rock tossed up by the motion of the driver's vehicle, or 
22 
23 
by the motion of any other motor vehicle, or perhaps to the accumulation of road tar 
caused by driving on a recently oiled road that damages the driver's vehicle's clear coat. or 
24 
25 any damage or dent caused by any baseball, basketball or soccer ball while the driver's 
26 vehicle is in motion on a public roadway or private roadway open to the pub1ic, such as a 
27 highschool parking lot or the parking area of any public playfie1d. 
28 
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1 Aside from ICJI 1036, the Idaho Supreme Court has also telegraphed fairly clearly 
2 that it does not see the app1ication of Idaho Code§ 49-1301 to single vehic1e accidents. In 
3 
the case of Munns v. Swift Tran:wortation Company, 138 Idaho 108 (Idaho 2002) the 
4 
Idaho Supreme Court wrote: 
5 
6 
7 
"In the case before us, where the property damage caused by the accident 
was to the front bumper of Swift's truck and to a runaway horse, the 
applicability of the statute [I.C. § 49-1301] is not obvious." 
8 1~ow.u~~u:u.U:....:!~~~~a.L.:~~an~, 138 Idaho at 111. In that same case, the Idaho 
9 Supreme Court found Idaho Code§ 49-1301 to be 'inherently ambiguous.' 
10 
11 
12 
''The inherent ambiguity in the statute precludes a conclusion that Swift 
Transportation Co. Inc., and its driver were negligent as a matter of Jaw for 
violating the statute by not remaining at the scene of the accident with the 
horse." 
13 Munns y. Swift Transportation Company, 138/daho at 111. The Court's suggestion 
14 
of 'ambiguity' in the statute has deep meaning when it comes to the application of the 
15 
Rule of Lenity in criminal matters, which has been adopted in Idaho and is discussed 
16 
17 
below. While Munns was a civil case regarding the application of the doctrine of 
l8 negligence per se and the Defendant does not desire to argue its direct application to this 
19 case, there is no mistaking the fact that in Munnsthe Idaho Supreme Court took a c1ear 
20 and direct look at Idaho Code§ 49-1301 and did not identify it as a statute having obvious 
21 
application to a single vehicle collision. 
22 
23 
The thoughts of the Idaho Supreme Court in Munns have been adopted as the law 
of the land in other states. Construing nearly identical language to that of ldabo Code § 49-
24 
25 1301, the Colorado Supreme Court examined the statutory language of C.R.S. 42-4-1403 
26 which states: 
27 "The driver of any vehicle directly involved in an accident J'esultlu~ vuly iu 
:2;8 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
damage to a vehicle which is driven or attended by any person shall 
immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such accident or as close 
thereto as possible, but shall forthwith return to and in every event shall 
remain at the scene of such accident until he has fulfilled the requirements 
of section 42-4-1403." 
Lurnbardy v. Colorado, 625 P.2d. 1026, 1027 (Colo. 1981). Construing that language the 
5 
6 Colorado Supreme Court held: 
7 
8 
9 
Section 42-4-1402 plainly applies to an accident involving injury to 
someone other than the driver or damage to two or more vehicles. The 
statute contemplates a situation where there are other persons to whom the 
driver should report information about himself. 
10 The Colorado Supreme Court reasoned that the lower courts had stretched the application 
11 of C.R.S. 42-4-1402 too far to try to give it application to a single vehicle collision: 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
The county court, in determining that section 42-4-1402 applied to 
the facts in this case, interpreted "any person" in the first sentence of the 
statute to refer back to "the driver." So construed, "accident," as used in the 
statute, would include all one car accidents since the driver and "any 
person" would be one and the same individual. 
The district cowt affirmed the county court's interpretation of "any 
person." It also interpreted the emphasized "and'' in section 42-4-1403(2), 
p. 3, supra, as an "or" in order to make section 42-4-1403logically 
applicable to single vehicle accidents. 
The defendant argues that the duties of a driver involved in a one car 
accident are prescribed by section 42-4-1406, C.R.S.l973: 
"(1) The driver of a vehicle involved in a traffic accident resulting in injury 
to or death of any person or any property damage shall, after fulfilling the 
requirements of section 42-4-1402 and 42-4-1403(1), give immediate notice 
of the location of such accident and such other information as is specified in 
section 42-4-1403(2) to the nearest office of the duly authorized police 
authority and, if so directed by the police authority, shall forthwith and 
without delay return to and remain at the scene of the accident until said 
police have anived at the scene and completed their investigation thereat." 
We agree. 
Section 42-4-1406(1) unequivocally applies to-a single car accident. 
Apparently, the county court and the district court over1ooked or ignored 
section 42-4-1406. Instead. they found it necessary to stretch the terms of 
section 42-4-1402 to "reasonably effect the legislative intent evidenced by 
the entire statutory scheme." The duty to report a single car accident under 
section 42-4-1406 is included within the leaving the scene of the accident 
("hit and run") statutory scheme. Gammon v. State Dept. of Revenue, 32 
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Colo.App. 437, 513 P.2d 748 (1973). Therefore, section 42-4-1406, rather 
than section 42-4-1402, as interpreted by the two lower courts, is the 
provision requiring a driver to report property damage in a sing1e car 
accident. The facts of this case do not support the defendant's conviction 
under section 42-4-1402. 
We reverse and remand to the district court with directions to vacate the 
defendant's conviction. 
p.B 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 Likewise, the Court of Appeals of Kansas has construed language in its Leaving the 
7 Scene of an Accident statute to require the involvement of at least two (2) vehicles. In that 
8 case, State y, HoJm, 41 Kan.App.2d 1096,208 P.3d 325 (Kan.App. 2009) the court was 
9 construing K.S,A. 8-1603, which reads in the pertinent part: 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
"The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting only in damage 
to a vehicle or other property which is driven or attended by any person 
shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such accident, or as close 
thereto as possible, but shall forthwith return to and in every event shall 
remain at the scene of such accident until he or she has fulfilled the 
requirements ofK.S.A. 8-1604." 
The Kansas statute is substantially identical to Idaho Code§ 49-1301 with the exception 
that it expressly applies when there is damage only to a "vehicle or to other property." 
16 
17 Idaho Code Section49-1301 omits any reference to 'other property' and expressly applies 
18 only to accidents resulting in damage to a vehicle. Like the Colorado Supreme Court, the 
19 Kansas Court of Appeals held that: 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
"A reading of these statutes appears to require remaining at the scene of a 
noninjury accident only if the property damaged by the damaging driver is 
attended by another person. Therefore a single car accident does not require 
remaining at the scene unless the property the property of some other person 
is damaged. 
v. HoJm, 41 Kan.App.2d 1096, llOO, 208 P.3d. 325, 328 (Kan.App. 2009). It is 
25 critical to note that the Kansas statute expressly applies to collisions involving damage to 
26 personal property. Idaho Code§ 49-1301 expressly omits damage to personal property. 
27 The Supreme Court of Iowa has also interpreted similar statutory language as 
28 
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1 having no application to single vehicle accidents. In State y. Tarbox~ 739 N. W.2d 850 
2 (Iowa 2007) the Supreme Court of Iowa wrestled with a similar issue. In that case Tarbox 
3 
crashed his car into a concrete wall, suffered a personal injury and fled the area. Tarbox 
4 
was charged with a violation of Iowa Code§ 321.261 which provides: 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
"§ 321.261. Death or personal injuries 
1. The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or 
death of any person sha11 immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the 
accident or as close as possible and if able, shall then return to and remain at 
the scene of the accident in accordance with section 321.263. Every such 
stop shall be made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary. 
2. Any person failing to stop or to comply with the requirements in 
subsection 1 of this section, in the event of an accident resulting in an injury 
to any person is guilty upon conviction of a serious misdemeanor." 
The Supreme Court of Iowa ruled that the statutory language 'accident resulting in injury 
13 
14 to, or death of any person' does not apply to the driver of a vehicle involved in a single-
15 vehicle collision: 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
In his petition for further review Christopher Jerome Tarbox asks this court 
to reverse the court of appeals decision finding the district court erred when 
it dismissed the trial information charging him with leaving the scene of an 
accident in violation of Iowa Code section 321.261 (2003). Tarbox claims 
because he was involved in a single-vehicle accident, and he was the only 
person who suffered a personal injury, his conduct did not violate section 
321.261. Accepting the facts a11eged by the State in the trial information and 
minutes as true, we agree with Tarbox that his conduct of leaving the scene 
of the single-vehicle accident did not violate section 321.261. Accordingly, 
we vacate the decision of the court of appeals and affirm the decision of the 
district court. 
Finally, in addressing that question of whether Idaho Code§ 49-1301 applies to 
24 single vehicle collisions with personal property the Rule of Lenity is a critical legal issue 
~" which has application to this case. The rule of lenity has been adopted in Idaho by the 
26 
27 
28 
Idaho Supreme Court in the foJlowing form: 
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I 
2 
The rule of lenity states that criminal statutes must be strictly construed in 
favor of defendants. 
3 State v. Anderson. 145 Idaho 99, 175 P.3d 788~ 792 (Idaho 2008). The 'inherent 
4 ambiguity' in Idaho Code § 49-1301 discussed by the Idaho Supreme Court in Munns 
5 should weigh in favor of the Defendant regarding this Motion. 
6 
7 
8 
In its previous ruling denying the Defendant's Motion to Modify the Court 
expressed concern about its authority to modify the terms of a withheld judgment once 
entered. That issue has been specifically answered by the Idaho Court of Appeals. In the 
9 
10 
case of State v. Branson, 128 Idaho 790, 919 P.2d 319 (1996), citing earlier authority, the 
p. 10 
11 daho Court of Appeals was describing the distinction between a suspended sentence and a 
12 withheld judgment under Idaho law and described the trial court's power over a withheld 
13 
'udgment as follows: 
14 
15 
16 
17 
If the court grants a withheld judgment to a particular defendant and places 
that defendant on probation, jurisdiction is retained by the district court 
during the period of probation and the court has continuing jurisdiction to 
modify the conditions of the defendant's probation. Peltier v. State, 119 
Idaho 454,460, 808 P.2d 373, 379 (1991) (citations omitted). 
18 State v. Branson, supra. 128 Idaho at 792. 
19 Other factors also play into the Defendant's Motion. In the case before the Court 
20 prior to trial the Defendant served a written request for discovery upon the State, which the 
21 State did not respond to. When the issue was raised by the Defendant at trial, the Court 
22 
23 
observed and ruled that the pro-se Defendant had not availed himself of the remedies 
24 
provided by the Idaho Criminal Rules for the State's failure to respond to his requested 
25 discovery, but allowed the Defendant to read the poJice report before the State called its 
26 first witness. It seems likely that the State's failure to respond to discovery worked to the 
27 efendant's disservice at trial 
28 
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1 Additionally, prior to sentencing, the Defendant requested a continuance to consult 
2 
with counsel. The Court granted the request, but the State then objected and suggested that 
3 
the Defendant could receive a withheld judgment, the concept of which was explained to 
4 
the Defendant by the Court. But the Defendant was not advised pursuant to U.S. v. Sham 
5 
6 that a withheld judgment was treated as a conviction until it the matter was dismissed and 
7 consequently was not advised that if he accepted the State's offer to waive counsel and 
8 receive a withheld judgment that his driving privileges would be withdrawn by the Idaho 
p. 11 
9 Department of Transportation for one (1) year. The Defendant is not arguing that the Court 
lO 
misadvised the Defendant, but the question of the vo1untariness of the Defendant's waiver 
11 
12 
of counsel must come into play. The issue of the applicability of Idaho Code § 49-1301 to 
the facts of this case, and therefore the question of whether the Defendant, given the 
13 
14 undisputed facts of the December 18, 2009 accident with the speed limit sign, should suffer 
15 a one (1) year drivers license suspension is certainly paramount to this Motion. 
16 The Court has the jurisdiction to grant the Defendant's requested relief and given 
17 that the Defendant has in all respects complied with every provision of the Court's March 
18 
19 
1, 2010 withheld judgment, including completion of the County Sheriffs Labor Program 
and payment of the penalty and the restitution in full, and has sustained a drivers license 
20 
21 suspension from March 1, 2010 until June 1, 2010 and again from May 11, 2011 to the 
22 present, the Defendant respectfully requests that the Court consider the legal arguments set 
23 forth above and modify the tenn of its withheld judgment to run from March I, 2010 to the 
24 date that this Court enters its order on this Motion and enter its order dismissing this matter. 
25 
26 
27 
28 
The Court's observations that the Defendant has the right to appeal the issues which 
he has raised in this Motion is certainly well understood by the Defendant and a Petition for 
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1 Rehearing has been filed with the District Court in its appellate capacity. Appeals are 
2 lengthy and very expensive to the litigants and this Motion is certainly made in the attempt 
3 
4 
5 
to avoid that uncertainty and cost on a misdemeanor matter. 
The Defendant requests that the Court consider that be has actually and faithfully 
6 
complied with every aspect of the Court's requirements of him for a period of time 
7 :approaching five (5) months longer thnn the originnl tcm1 of tlte Court's withheld 
8 'udgment, and that it reconsider its July 6, 2011 order and grant his Motion to Modify the 
9 tenns of the Courfs March 1, 2010 withheld judgment as prayed for in his Motion. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
DATED this 2cJ--day of July 2011. 
RICHARD K. KUCK, PLLC 
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1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
2 I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~y of July 2011 I caused to be served a 
3 true and correct copy of the foregoing document. by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Barry McHugh 
Attn: Jim Reierson 
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
(b4 Fax transmission 208-446~1833 
[ ] Hand delivered. 
[ ]Other _______ _ 
·chard K. Kuck 
Attorney for the Defendant 
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I 
Description CR 2009-25609 Wright, Richard 20111 004 Wright, Rich ir~~ ~,____, . 
Judge Friedlander 
Clerk Emma Stone ) 'J 
DateJ.l3§011 Location 111 K-COURTROOM7 
Time ~-:~!::J ""I" ... Note 
10:00:53 AM Judge Calls case Friedlander 
10:01:01 AM Jim KCPA Reierson 
10:01:05 AM Richard Atty for the defendant Kuck 
10:01:12 AM Richard Not present Wright 
10:01:36 AM This case was appealed and then a memo came out. There was 
Judge a pending motion to modify the withheld JDMT. Petition for re hearing is set before Judge Mitchell. Motion to reconsider set Friedlander before me. The court denied the motion to modify the withheld 
jdmt. 
10:03:19 AM Richard We are here again. Would like this dismissed pursuant to the 
Kuck withheld jdmt. Mr. Wright is present 
10:04:17 AM Jim I would be objecting Proper is before Judge Mitchell Reierson 
10:04:51 AM 
Magistrate court has the authority to modify the withheld jdmt. 
One of the few things the court has power to do. It allows us to 
meet today even with an appeal. Judge Mitchell's clerk set this 
hoping for a resolution with this hearing. Accomindate a 
stiuation. In this case this is a conviction. After a bench trial the 
court found him guilty. Withheld was granted. He has done 
everything for his withheld jdmt. He has comitted no crimes. 
Since we filed an appeal this case wasnt dismissed. 1 year ALS 
suspension. He was not aware at the time of sentencing. He 
Richard requested counsel at sentencing and PA objected. He went 
Kuck forward with sentencing without an attorney. Post trial motions 
would have been brought. Trying to sort out where to go from 
here. There is an issue about the arguments I want to bring in 
my appeal since my client didnt raise them at the bench trial. 
Consider the arguments and the fact that Mr. Wright has 
complied with the withheld JDMT. It should be deemed as 
complied with. Is Mr. Wright guilty of what he was convicted of. 
My error last time not to raise these issues. I wasnt aware of one 
of the jury instructions. His vehicle left the road and knocked 
over a speed limit sign. Needs to be damage to a vehicle to 49-
I 11301. Right to remain at the incident. It would have been 
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instructed this way if it was a jury trial. The jury instruction is 
clear. Nothing requires the defendant to remain. There must be 
damage to a vehicle It says an accident involving any damage. 
Criminal statue is confusing 
10:14:41 AM Jim I'm going to object. Reierson 
10:14:55 AM Judge I willl listen to counsel Friedlander 
10:15:05 AM Evidence of another vehicle. I started looking State by State to 
see how its interupted.Four different States had 4 similar staute. 
In each of those cases the appellet court found it didnt apply to 
single collision accident. It makes it impossible to conclude. Not 
in favor of conviction. The supreme court didnt see connection. 
What was he suppose to do. The driver of the vehicle who hits 
another vehicle is to stay at the scene of the accident. The 
owner of the street sign was not present. No proof of who the 
Richard owner was. 49-1305 doesnt require it bee reported right away. 
Kuck Injury or death cause. No evidence of the value of the damage. There was no injury or death. The owner of the sign was not 
present. What benefit could be applied. Accident is not 
reportable. Thats how other states interupt their statues. Idaho's 
definition of accident. The only damage was to my client's 
vehicle. Do you have to pull over and wait at that scene if a rock 
chip hits your car and causes damage. Mr. Wright may have 
been convicted of a statue he did not commit. One year has 
gone by. He has followed the requirements of his jdmt. Dismiss 
his withheld jdmt. It doesnt change the facts. 
10:23:08 AM The defendant has a right to have Judge Mitchell reconsider this 
Jim case. I dont think this is proper. 19 page opinion. Good reason 
Reierson why the suspensions are there. I think he is speculating that Judge Mitchell's clerk was hoping this was resolved. Not proper 
for this court. If they want Judge Mitchell to reconsider is proper 
10:24:56 AM The hearing is a petition for a rehearing. This wont be argued 
next tuesday Judge Mitchell should allow additional briefing and 
Richard arguing. The cost of going forward in the supreme court are 
Kuck tremendous. This court didnt enter a DL suspension. DL 
suspension is burdensome. If the court thinks we have a good 
argument we should end this case today 
10:27:14 AM The court has considered the arguments today. There was a 
prior motion to modify. There was a stay of the order withholding 
jdmt when it went on appeal. The court is being asked to act as if 
Judge the stay didnt occur and grant a dismissal based on the fact that 
Friedlander his client has complied. The DL suspension never occured. Rule 
54.5 under B 5 I am being asked to use those powers. i'm 
hearing argument and its well taken. That is something for the 
district court. That motion is pending before Judge Mitchell. The 
court has never looked at an appeal negativly. It clairifys the law. 
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The argument is proper in district court. I understand why you 
brought this back to this court. I am not presuaded that I should 
nulify the stay and grant the withheld jdmt to serve the reason of 
not having a DL suspension imposed. I havent heard anything 
that changes my mind. I will deny the motion today. Mr. Reierson 
to prepare the order 
Produced by FTR Gold TM 
www.fortherecord.com 
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Description 
Date 
Time 
02:43:21 PM 
02:45:01 PM 
02:46:25 PM 
9:22PM 
9:28PM 
:28 PM 
CR 2009-25609 Wright, Richard 20111011 Motion for Rehearing 
Judge Mitchell 
~ Court Reporter Julie Foland ~ Clerk Shari Rohrbach 
10/11/2011 I 
Speaker 
J 
DA 
J 
End 
Location 111 K-COURTROOM8 
Note 
Calls, def not present, Richard Kuck for the def, Jim Reierson 
present for the state. Reads rules re: argument. 
We petitioned for rehearing, I didn't schedule argument for this. 
My contemplation was that the court would rule without 
argument. We're here on whether the court wil re-hear this or 
not. 
I think I have discretion, will exercise that and not have oral 
argument. I've read the briefs. Deny the Petn for rehearing. 
There is nothing in the written submisison that changes my 
mind. I don't find it to be an error, and that other authority, from 
CO, 10, KS to be controlling. 
Mr Reierson prepare an Order. 
Produced by FTR Gold™ 
www.fortherecord.com 
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~Ull/UCT/U//Hl 16:10 KO CO PROSECUTER FAX No. 208-446-1841 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, . ) 
) CASE NO. F09~25609 
Plaintiff, ) 
) ORDER 
vs. ) 
) 
RICHARD WILLIAM WRIGHT, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
_________________________ ) 
P. 001 
The above entitled matters came on ~or a MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION before 
the Honorable Judge Friedlander on October 4, 2011. Personally present was the Defendant and 
the Defendant's atto:t:Q.ey of record, Richard K. Kuck. Also appearing was Jim Reierson, Deputy 
Prosecuting Attomey. Argument was given. Based ·upon such, the Court then ruled as follows: 
HEREBY FINDS AND ORDERS: 
· That the Defendant's Motions for Reconsideration is hereby denied. 
DATED thi.(tj L day of ({)ell--. , 2011. 
~ GE . 
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·CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby ce~ that on the. I ~ay o~\1-.e.JV , 201 ~ copies of the 
document(s) were mailed, postage prepaid, or sent by facsimile or inter office mail to: 
X Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Kootenai County FAX 208-446-1833 
___ Defense Counsel Kootenai County P;9Wic Defender FAX 208- 446~ 1701 )? : Defense Counsel FAX l€\{J] .- ~6l g · 
______ Defundant. ________________________ __ 
______ Kootenai County Sheriffs Department FAX208-446-1407 
------'"-- Idaho Probation & Parole FAX 208-7 69-1481 . 
_____ Idaho Department of Correction FAX 208-327-7445 
-----
CCD Sentencing Team FAX 208-658-2186 
------ Idaho Department of Transportation FAX 208-334-8739 
----~ Community Service Interoffice ~ail or FAX 208-446-1193 
_____ Auditor Interoffice Mail or FAX .208-446-1662 
______ BCI (Bureau of Criminal fuvestigation) FAX208-884-7193 
_____ Kootenai·Co,unty Law Library/TranscriptionF AX 208-446wll87 
ORDER 
Received Time Oct. 7, 2011 .4:05PM No.3376 
P. 002 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATEOFIDAHO, ) 
) CASE NO. F09-25609 
Plaintiff, ) 
) ORDER 
vs. ) 
) 
RICHARD WILLIAM WRIGHT, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
________________________ ) 
The above entitled matters came on for PETITION FOR REHEARING before the 
Honorable Judge Mitchell on October 11, 2011. Personally present was the Defendant's 
attorney of record, Richard K. Kuck. Also appearing was Jim Reierson, Deputy Prosecuting 
Attorney. No oral argument was given. Based upon such, the Court then ruled as follows: 
HEREBY FINDS AND ORDERS: 
That the Defendant's Petition for Rehearing is hereby denied. 
'2011. 
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CERTIFICATEOF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the __j1_ day of QC 1o [::{( , 2011 copies of the foregoing 
document(s) were mailed, postage prepaid, or sent by facsimile or inter office mail to: 
)( Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Kootenai County FAX 208-446-1833 
---:-::--- Defense Counsel Kootenai, County fublic Defender FAX 208- 446-1701 
'b. Defense Cotmsel FAX ~ L\oa.dlL -!6 CIL~ \pfe 1-131~ 
Defendant 
---- ~--------------
---- Kootenai County Sheriffs Department FAX 208-446-1407 
_____ Idaho Probation & Parole FAX 208-769-1481 
____ Idaho Department of Correction FAX 208-327-7445 
___ CCD Sentencing Team FAX 208-658-2186 
____ Idaho Department ofTransportation FAX 208-334-8739 
____ Community Service Interoffice Mail or FAX 208-446-1193 
____ Auditor Interoffice Mail or FAX 208-446-1662 
____ BCI (Bureau of Criminal Investigation) FAX 208-884-7193 
____ Kootenai County Law Library/Transcription FAX 208-446-1187 
CLIFFORD T. HAYES 
CLERK OF THE DISTRJCT COURT 
~ ) By:YJlWAL~ 
puty Clerk 
ORDER 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Piaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD WILLIAM WRIGHT, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CR 2009-25609 
REMITTITUR 
The Court having heard oral argument on this matter and filed its Opinion regarding the 
Petition for Rehearing; now, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the same is hereby remanded to the Magistrate Division 
for such further proceedings as may be necessary. 
DATED this)1fday ofNovember, 2011. 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this :A q day ofNovember, 2011, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, sent via facsimile, or sent via interoffice mail to 
the following: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor 
Faxed: 446-1833 y-" 
Richard Kuck 
Faxed: 667-3379 / 
Hon. Penny Friedlander X) Kf\ ( ':v 
Interoffice ./ ~ 1 uv -\ 
REMITTITUR: 2 
CLIFFORD T. HAYES 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
By (jteC:MLf!t~ 
eputy 
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1 Richard K. Kuck, ISB NO. 3875 
2 
RICHARD K. KUCK, PLLC 
P.O. Box 1320 
3 Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1320 
Tel: 208-667-3600 
4 Fax: 208-667-3379 
Attorney for Appellant 
5 
StATE Of: IDAHO }. 
COUNTY OF Kn(IF;\!AI FILED - ,_ .. " 
6 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
7 STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
8
. STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 9 
10 
v. 
11 
Plaintiff/Respondent, ) 
) 
) 
Case No. CR-2009-0025609 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
12 RICHARD W. WRIGHT, 
) 
) 
) 
13 
14 
15 
Defendant/ Appellant. ) 
COMES NOW the above-named Appellant, by and through his attorney, Richard 
16 K. Kuck, RICHARD K. KUCK, PLLC, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, and pursuant to I.A.R 17 
17 states as follows: 
18 
19 
20 
1. Pursuant to I.A.R. 11(c)(1) and 11(c)(10) the above-named Appellant appeals 
against the above-named Respondent the Judgment of Conviction for a violation ofldaho 
21 
Code §49-1301 entered against him following a trial without a jury to the Hon. Penny 
22 Friedlander, Magistrate Judge on March 1, 2010, affirmed on intermediate appeal by the 
23 Hon. John Mitchell, District Judge by Memorandum Decision and Order on Appeal filed 
24 on May 11, 2011, with rehearing denied by Order Denying Petition for Rehearing filed on 
25 
26 
27 
28 
October 17, 2011. 
The Appellant states as follows: 
1. Designation of Parties: 
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1 (a) The Appellant is the Defendant, Richard W. Wright. The Appellant's counsel 
2 is Richard K. Kuck. The Appellant's counsel's contact information is: 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Richard K. Kuck 
RICHARD K. KUCK, PLLC 
408 Sherman A venue, Suite 205 
P.O. Box 1320 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1320 
(P) (208) 667-3600 
(F) (208) 667-3379 
E-mail: richk@rklaw.com. 
(b) The Respondent is the State of Idaho and the Respondent's counsel is Barry 
10 McHugh, Prosecuting attorney for Kootenai County, Idaho. The assigned deputy 
11 prosecuting attorney is Jim Reierson. The Respondent's counsel's contact information is: 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Jim Reierson 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Kootenai County 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-9000 
(P) (208) 446-1800 
(F) (208) 446-1833 
E-mail: jreierson@kcgov.us 
2. Designation of Appeal: Pursuant to I.A.R. 11 the Appellant has the right to 
19 appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court from the withheld judgment operating as a final 
20 conviction of a violation of Idaho Code § 49-1301 entered by the Court on March 1, 2010 
21 following a court trial. 
22 
23 
24 
25 
3. Designation of Issues: 
(a) Preliminary Statement oflssues on Appeal. 
(1) Whether a driver can properly convicted of a violation of Idaho Code § 49-
26 1301 following a single vehicle collision between that driver's vehicle and a speed limit 
27 sign located adjacent to a roadway where the convicted driver was the sole occupant of his 
28 
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27 
1 vehicle, was not injured in the collision and when there was no evidence presented at trial 
2 
of the value of the damage to either the driver's vehicle nor to the speed limit sign. 
3 
4 
(2) Whether the conviction of the Defendant following a court trial of a violation 
of Idaho Code § 49-1301, following a single vehicle collision between that driver's vehicle 
5 
6 and a speed limit sign located adjacent to a roadway, where the driver was the sole 
7 occupant of his vehicle, was not injured in the collision, and when there was no evidence 
8 presented at trial of the value of the damage to the driver's vehicle nor to the speed limit 
9 
10 
11 
sign, constitutes fundamental error. 
(3) Whether the evidence presented at the court trial of a driver whose vehicle was 
12 involved in a single vehicle collision between that driver's vehicle and a speed limit sign 
13 located adjacent to a roadway, where the driver was the sole occupant of his vehicle, was 
14 not injured in the collision and when there was no evidence presented at trial of the value 
15 
of the damage to the driver's vehicle nor to the speed limit sign, was sufficient to convict 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
the driver of a vioiation ofldaho Code § 49-1301. 
4. Sealing of Record: There has been no order entered sealing the record ofthis 
matter. 
5. Designation of Transcript: 
(a) Is a reporter's transcript requested? A standard transcript of the court trial of 
this case has already been prepared, paid for, and filed in conjunction with the 
intermediate appeal. The Appellant does not request a further transcript at this 
time. 
(b) The Appellant requests that the transcript be delivered in electronic format: 
Yes. 
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1 6. Designation of Record: The Appellant requests the following documents to be 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
included in the clerk's (agency's) record in addition to those automatically included under 
Rule 28, I.A.R.: None. 
7. I certify that: 
(a) A hard copy ofthis Notice of Appeal has been served on each reporter of whom 
a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
(1) Julie Foland, 
Court Reporter- Hon. John T. Mitchell 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
(b) That the Clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated transcript fee 
according to the practice established for payment by the Clerk of the Court for 
Kootenai County, Idaho. 
(c) That the estimated fee of$100.00 for preparation of the clerk's or agency's 
record has been paid. 
(d) That no appellate filing fee is required. 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20. 
DATED this J3 day of November 2011. 
RICHARD K. KUCK, PLLC 
Attorney or Appellant 
Richard W. Wright 
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1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
2 I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~ day of November 2011, I caused to be 
3 served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Barry McHugh 
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney 
Attn: Jim Reierson 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid. 
[X] Fax transmission 208-446-1833 
[ ] Hand delivered. 
[ ] Overnight mail. 
Lawrence G. Wasden 
IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83 720-00 1 0 
[:;<:!U.S. Mail, postage prepaid. 
[ ] Fax transmission 208-854-8071 
[ ] Hand delivered. 
[ ] Overnight mail. 
Attorney for the Appellant ....-----
----------
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RICHARD K. KUCK, PLLC C--
------
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTEAI 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs. 
RICHARD W. WRIGHT 
Defendant/appellant 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
SUPREME COURT 
39483 
CASE NUMBER 
CR2009-25609 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I, Amanda McCandless Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the foregoing 
Record in this cause was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, correct 
and complete Record of the pleadings and documents requested by Appellate Rule 28. 
I further certify that the following will be submitted as exhibits to this Record on Appeal: 
TRANSCRIPT 5-24-10 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this day of January 27, 2012. 
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VS.
,2
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO { SUPREME COURT# 39483 
Plaintiff/Respondent { CASE # CR2009-25609 
{ CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
{ 
Vs. { 
{ 
RIGHARD W. WRIGHT { 
Defendant/ Armellant { 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 271h day of January 2012, I mailed a true and correct 
copy ofthe foregoing: CLERK'S RECORD & REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
Through: 
(X)Regular Prepaid Postage Mail ( ) Certified Mail ( ) Inter-Office 
TO: Mr. Lawrence G. Wasden 
Attorney General 
State Of Idaho 
Boise, ID 83 720 
Mr. Richard K. Kuck 
Attorney 
PO Box 1320 
Coeur D'Alene, ID 83816-1320 
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